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THE DIGITAL SHIFT
Contracts lie at the heart of the regulatory system 
governing the creation and dissemination of 
cultural products in two main respects:
(i) The exclusive rights provided by 
copyright law may turn into financial 
reward, and thus incentives to 
creators, through a contract with a third 
party to exploit protected material.
(ii) From a user perspective purchases 
of protected material may take the 
form of a licensing contract, governing 
behaviour after the initial transaction. 
The renewed interest in the relationship of 
copyright and contract law can be traced quite 
precisely to the mid-1990s. There was a major 
technological shift, with the rapid adoption of 
the WorldWideWeb as a consumer medium 
(Netscape’s Navigator browser was released in 
1994). In parallel, the media and entertainment 
sector experienced a wave of consolidation, with 
multinational enterprises keen to hedge their bets 
in the rapid growth of Internet services (in 2000, 
AOL merged with Time Warner to create the 
world’s largest media company).
In the new ‘private ordering of cyberspace’, 
contracts played a major part.1 Not only was 
there a sudden question mark over who owned 
the rights to new digital uses of existing works, 
but changing contractual practices made clear 
that new forms of exploitation, and (if permitted 
by the governing law) unforeseen uses would 
soon be covered in all publishing and production 
agreements. Creators deride these new practices 
as ‘rights grabbing’; publishers and producers 
characterise them as ‘due diligence’. 
The digital environment also changed the 
contractual relationship between buyers 
and sellers. Traditionally, the producers and 
distributors of copyright materials were not much 
concerned about the consumers’ after-sale 
behaviour.  General principles relating to trading 
standards and the sale of goods applied. Once 
a physical carrier was bought in good order, the 
relationship to the right owner was severed – at 
least in the private sphere. A consumer could 
read, play, modify, or even copy a work. The 
purchased book or record could also be sold 
on under the doctrines of ‘first sale’ (US), or 
‘exhaustion of rights’ (EU). 
In the digital world, the relationship between 
buyer and seller may persist after the initial 
transaction, prescribing conditions of use that 
have no source in copyright law. The chain of 
transactions governed by copyright contracts can 
be represented graphically as follows:
1  The idea of cyberspace as a seperate legal sphere, with self governing communities as law-makers and law-enforcers was 
first proposed by Johnson and Post (1996) in Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace.
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A review of the relationship between copyright 
and contract law has to address both supply- and 
demand-side issues.
On the supply side, policy concerns include 
whether copyright law delivers the often stated 
aim of securing the financial independence of 
creators.2 Particularly acute are the complaints 
by both creators and producers that they fail 
to benefit from the exponential increase in the 
availability of copyright materials on the Internet.3 
On the demand side, the issue of copyright 
exceptions and their policy justification has 
become central to a number of reviews and 
consultations dealing with digital content. Are 
exceptions based on user needs or market 
failure? Do exceptions require financial 
compensation? Can exceptions be contracted out 
by licence agreements?4
STRUCTURE AND METHODOLOGY 
OF THE REPORT
The review of the relationship between copyright 
and contract law was conducted by a consortium 
of four academics. Estelle Derclaye and Marcella 
Favale (University of Nottingham) are doctrinal 
lawyers with a particular expertise in comparative 
law. Martin Kretschmer directs the Centre for 
Intellectual Property Policy & Management 
(www.cippm.org.uk) at Bournemouth University, 
the only UK research centre specializing in 
empirical research on intellectual property. 
Richard Watt (Canterbury University, NZ) is the 
Secretary of the Society for Economic Research 
on Copyright Issues (SERCI), and one of the 
leading copyright economists. The consortium 
covers legal and economic perspectives on 
copyright and contracts, as well as native 
language capability in UK, Australian, Belgian, 
German, French and US law.
Supply and demand side issues related to 
copyright contracts were initially allocated in the 
following way. Richard Watt covered economic 
theory of contracts, value chains and transaction 
costs. Martin Kretschmer reviewed the literature 
on creator and intermediaries contracts, and 
labour markets. Estelle Derclaye and Marcella 
Favale reviewed user contracts, with particular 
regard to the implications of digital rights 
management systems, and jurisdictions that had 
legislated on the contractual status of copyright 
exceptions. The researchers took a comparative 
international approach, reviewing the evidence 
for the UK and several other countries. Rather 
than selecting a set number of jurisdictions, the 
consortium drew on different countries for different 
parts of the review. The aim was (i) to identify a 
comprehensive range of regulatory options, (ii) 
to survey the empirical evidence on their effects, 
and (iii) where none was available, to extrapolate 
predicted effects from theory.
2 For one example of many such statements, see Recital 11 of the Directive on the harmonisation of certain aspects of 
copyright and related rights in the information society: Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC): ‘A rigorous, effective 
system for the protection of copyright and related rights is one of the main ways of ensuring that European cultural creativity 
and production receive the necessary resources and of safeguarding the independence and dignity of artistic creators and 
performers.’
3 In a survey of 25,000 British and German literary and audio-visual writers conducted in 2006, only 14.7% of UK authors and 
9.2% of German authors claim to have received specific payments for Internet uses of their works. For audio-visual authors 
the figures are even lower (UK: 11.1%, Germany: 6.9%). See Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007, p. 32.
4 In the UK, the debate is taking place in the context of the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (London: HM Treasury 
2006). Gowers encouraged a greater flexibility of the copyright system with recommendations on copyright exceptions 
relating to private copying, archiving, educational and research use, parody and pastiche, and orphan works. For the state 
of play, see Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Second stage consultation on copyright exceptions 
(UK Intellectual Property Office, December 2009). In Europe, the European Commission consulted recently on a Green 
Paper Copyright in the Knowledge Economy (Brussels, COM(2008) 466/3) and on a Reflection Document Creative Content 
in a European Digital Single Market: Challenges for the Future (Brussels, DG INFSO and DG MARKT, 22 October 2009).
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Having mapped out the areas to be covered, the 
authors drafted each paper independently, using 
their own disciplinary approach. Findings were 
then analysed and consolidated. The report was 
coordinated, and the synopsis drafted by Martin 
Kretschmer who is both a legal scholar and a 
social scientist. The Bournemouth Symposium 
on ‘Copyright, Contracts and Creativity’ on 25 
September 2009 (co-organised by Professor Ruth 
Towse), as well as an internal SABIP workshop on 
19 October 2009 provided a forum for assessing 
the evidence on creator and user contracts, and 
for discussion of possible research avenues. The 
authors would like to acknowledge the insightful 
critical commentary received on these occasions. 
All authors contributed to the assessment of 
appropriate methodologies for the research 
questions identified throughout the report.
FINDINGS
Under the standard economic conception of 
property rights, it is copyright law that allows 
contracts to be written: copyright law defines the 
characteristics of the work and the property rights 
in the work – the contract space.
A core methodological problem is how to 
conceptually distinguish the role of statutory 
copyright in contractual arrangements. Consider 
two simple examples:
•	 The literary author:   
A typical contract may assign the copyright 
in a work to a publisher, against an advance 
and a royalty on copies sold. 
•	 The professional footballer:   
A typical contract may bind a footballer 
exclusively to a club against a signing-on 
fee and salary payments that depend on 
appearances and success.
The former is a copyright contract, the latter 
a contract not based on a right defined by 
statute. Yet their commercial features resemble 
each other. Thus if a journalist supplies a 
commissioned text to an online magazine, to 
what extent is that service dependent on the 
right subsisting in the text? Similarly, if a user 
decides to subscribe to the online magazine, 
to what extent is the contract permitting access 
dependent on statutory concepts?
Under various economic models, we would expect 
copyright law to affect contracts, depending 
on time preferences (patience); risk, and risk 
aversion; outside and inside options; and the 
extent of asymmetric information between the 
parties - but there is no evidence that this is 
empirically the case.
A major research gap is therefore how a change 
in copyright law will affect the bargaining outcome 
between parties contracting over material 
protected by copyright law.
EVIDENCE ON CURRENT OUTCOME OF 
CONTRACT BARGAINING
Creator contracts
Cultural markets are winner-take-all markets. 
They are very risky for both creators and 
investors. The earnings data available from 
labour market statistics, tax and insurance 
audits, and surveys indicate that the top 10% of 
creators receive a disproportionally large share 
of total income in the creative professions (for 
literary authors about 60-70% of total income; 
for composers/songwriters about 80% of total 
income).5  For most other creators, ‘portfolio 
lives’ are typical: about two thirds of professional 
creators have earnings from a second job. 
Overall, the income of creators is well below the 
national median income.
5 This compares to earnings data for the total population of employees, where the top 10% of earners earn about 20% of total 
income (Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), UK Office for National Statistics).
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There are some variations by sector, but broadly 
the picture is consistent across the developed 
world.
Unsurprisingly, the bargaining outcome over rights 
is tilted towards bestsellers. Creators with a track 
record of success are able to negotiate contracts 
that preserve their interests. For most others, 
in particular new entrants to the entertainment 
industries, assignment of rights is common. 
Mechanisms of collective bargaining (for example 
through unions, professional associations and 
collecting societies) appear to have a greater 
effect than statutory (ownership) rights because 
the latter, typically, will be varied and/or transacted 
by contract.
User contracts
In the digital environment licensing contracts, 
rather than outright sales, are predominant. 
The market for electronic services is growing 
rapidly, and users’ access to copyright content is 
increasingly governed by contract. There is robust 
evidence that licence agreements for software, 
digital consumer services and educational 
content routinely conflict with statutory copyright 
exceptions (for example regarding back-up copies 
and archiving). Similarly, consumer protection 
legislation is often ignored or hard to enforce (for 
example, many online licence agreements are 
not easily understood, and contain excessive 
exclusions of liability).
This bargaining outcome is tilted towards right 
owners, because fragmented end-users (such 
as consumers) typically are not in a position 
to contest the terms of licences offered. Even 
where users should be in position to negotiate, 
for example in the education, archive and library 
sectors, there is evidence that statutory limitations 
and exceptions under copyright law are becoming 
irrelevant. The reasons are not well understood 
but competition issues may play a part (with large 
bundles of rights controlled by few companies).
Digital Rights Management systems (DRM) do 
not necessarily conflict with copyright exceptions 
(see Paper 3.6). We know that no complaints 
have been made to the Secretary of State under 
section 296ZE of the UK Copyright, Design 
and Patent Act 1988 (‘Remedy where effective 
technological measures prevent permitted acts’).6 
6 Section 296ZE was inserted by Copyright Regulations 2003/2498. The section is supposed to solve instances where 
legitimate user needs are not met due to DRM technology. It should be noted that the section is very narrowly drafted (it 
does not apply to computer programs nor to online services offered on agreed contractual terms). Thus, users may choose 
to circumvent copy protection technology rather than formally complain. This would indicate regulatory failure. Non-use of 
Section 296ZE was confirmed by the Copyright and IP Enforcement Directorate of the UK Intellectual Property Office for this 
Report (e-mail Janette McNeill, Head of Copyright Framework, 30 September 2009).
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EVIDENCE ON CURRENT RANGE OF 
REGULATORY TOOLS
Creator contracts
The comparative international review of the 
regulation of copyright contracts uncovered a 
range of regulatory tools that attempt to balance 
the bargaining powers of the parties. These 
provisions relate to Ownership; Requirements 
of Form; Scope of Rights Transferred; Rights to 
Remuneration; Effects on Third Parties; Revision 
and Termination; and Unfair Contracts. Very 
little empirical evidence is available about the 
effectiveness of these provisions, but this report 
contains a number of methodological suggestions 
how regulatory tools could be assessed (if policy 
was to desire to adjust the bargaining outcome 
between creators and investors). Options 
identified by the literature include intervening 
in situations of non-exploitation; strengthening 
rights that cannot be transferred (such as the 
right to be credited as the author); and privileging 
instruments of collective bargaining. It should be 
noted that regulating contracts creates potential 
inefficiencies.
User contracts
An analysis of legislation, case law, and the 
literature of the targeted countries reveals a 
substantial body of literature and case law on the 
interplay between copyright and user contracts. 
The freedom to vary copyright limitations and 
execeptions by contract is typically decided 
on a case-by-case basis by courts, with no 
principled classification of copyright limitations 
and exceptions by rationale (such as fundamental 
rights, public policy or market failure). Among EU 
member states, the United Kingdom and Belgium 
provided the richest doctrinal contribution to the 
present study. 
There are no empirical studies about the effects 
of introducing imperative exceptions (non-
overridable by contract), or about the differences 
between countries having imperative exceptions 
and countries where freedom of contract prevails.
RESEARCH GAP I: EFFECTS OF KEY 
REGULATORY TOOLS
There is a considerable need for systematic 
studies into the empirical effects of key regulatory 
tools under discussion. However, these cannot 
be researched directly without comparing to 
some other ‘counter-factual’ situation – hence the 
interest on the part of researchers in ‘with’ and 
‘without’, and ‘before and after’ situations.7 Such 
studies have methodological challenges, as laws 
are never the only parameter of change, and 
possible differences may be explained by other 
causes (such as the economic cycle, changes in 
taste, etc.). 
Feasible studies focussing on differences 
between countries, or studies capturing changes 
in the market before and after the introduction of 
new legislation include the following.
1.  Creator contracts: Effects of rules 
on first ownership 
In the UK, film directors have been treated as 
authors only since 1 July 1994. This implemented 
the 1993 EU Duration Directive, harmonising the 
copyright term.8 Previously, films were treated as 
entrepreneurial works (1956 Copyright Act, and 
CDPA 1988 before it was amended). First owner 
was the person who undertook the arrangements 
necessary for making the film (i.e. typically the 
producer).
7 See summary of discussions at the Bournemouth Symposium on Copyright, Contracts and Creativity    
 (25/9/09 – available at www.cippm.org.uk).
8 CDPA 1988, s. 9(2)(ab) (as amended by Copyright and Related Rights Regulation 1996): statutory authors in the case of a 
film are the producer and the principal director. The Term Harmonisation Directive was codified as 2006/116/EC.
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The question of why this change should have 
made any difference at all merits consideration, 
as the new right remains assignable. Yet it seems 
that a participation in revenues from certain 
secondary uses (that is, uses that have not been 
included in the primary exploitation contract with 
a producer or broadcaster) was negotiated as a 
result of that change. Economic theory predicts 
that primary producers would pay directors a 
lower fee to allow for further earnings arising 
from secondary usage. There are also costs 
to the system needed to administer these new 
rights, possibly reducing the ‘pie’ available for 
distribution.9 These are generic questions about 
the effects of new rights that would greatly benefit 
from empirical research.
2.  Creator contracts: Effects of rules 
on moral rights 
The Rome revisions (1928, Art. 6bis) to the 
1886 Berne Convention provided for the right 
to claim first authorship of a work (so-called 
‘paternity right’) and the right to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification which 
would be prejudicial to the honour or reputation 
of the author (so-called ‘integrity right’). These 
provisions are also known as droit moral from 
their roots in 19th century French case law 
(Ginsburg 1990). Moral rights are distinct from 
copyright as an economic (property) right in that 
they cannot be transferred or waived (at least in 
most civil law countries).
The UK gave formal recognition to moral rights 
only with CDPA 1988 ss. 77-85: right to be 
identified as author or director (paternity right) 
(ss. 77-79); right to object to derogatory treatment 
(integrity right) (ss. 80-83). In the UK, the right 
to be identified as author or director has to be 
asserted (s. 78), and both rights can be waived by 
way of agreement in writing (s. 87). (Contractual 
waivers of moral rights are inserted as a matter 
of routine in contracts for audio-visual works.) Did 
the introduction of these rights have any effects?
In retaining a persisting link to their works, moral 
rights may improve the author’s bargaining power. 
Alternatively, they could be seen as introducing 
inefficiencies similar to other limits on contractual 
freedom. An empirical study of attribution 
practices in certain media sectors is certainly 
feasible, using samples of publications over 
time.10 Kretschmer and Hardwick (2007, p.31) 
show that disputes over moral rights are more 
frequent in Germany (where these rights cannot 
be waived), but the data is not conclusive on any 
effects on authors’ earnings compared to the 
UK. It should be possible to apply models about 
the economic effects of attribution developed in 
the economics of trade marks to the copyright 
environment.11
3.  Creator contracts: Effects of 
rights to remuneration
As discussed in Paper 2, claims to remuneration 
can be introduced via collective licensing 
schemes. In European countries, this regulatory 
strategy has taken hold since the 1965 German 
Urheberrecht law that introduced a statutory claim 
to remuneration for unauthorised private copying, 
compensated via a levy on copying media and 
equipment.
Collecting societies may be mandated by statute 
as the only mechanism for exercising certain 
rights (as is the case for rental and cable re-
transmission rights under European Directives 
92/100/EEC (codified as Directive 2001/84/EC) 
and 93/83EEC and the resale right or droit de 
suite (Directive 2001/84/EC).
9 Towse and Taylor (1998) analyse this for performers’ rights.
10 This proposal stems from discussions with Professor Lionel Bently.
11 Since incomplete information (or informational asymmetry between buyers and sellers) about product quality is a form of 
market failure, any improvement in the provision of information could potentially enhance efficiency (Landes and Posner 
2003).
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The German copyright contract law 
(Urhebervertragsrecht) of 2002 introduced a new 
general entitlement to equitable remuneration 
(§32 – angemessene Vergütung) from any 
copyright contract (with the express purpose of 
rebalancing the bargain between creators and 
intermediaries). §36 provided that collectively 
negotiated tariffs are deemed to be equitable. The 
German legislation is the most far-reaching recent 
attempt at regulating author contracts directly, and 
would benefit from research from a comparative 
perspective. Questions may include: Did the 
introduction of these changes have any effects 
on the remuneration of authors? As discussed 
in Paper 2, only one tariff has been collectively 
agreed in Germany between 2003 and 2009. Why 
is this? There are important issues surrounding 
the role of the institutional framework of collective 
bargaining that might be applicable to the UK.
It would be possible to study, both theoretically 
and empirically, the kinds of situation in which 
outright sale appears to hold more promise as 
an efficient mechanism for contracting access to 
copyright material than rental type contracts. As 
argued in Paper 1, if the empirical analysis does 
point to the prominence of rental arrangements, 
whereas the theoretical analysis suggests outright 
sale (at least in some cases, as appears to be the 
case studied by Liebowitz 1987), then it would be 
very interesting to attempt to address the reasons 
for such a divergence.
12 These issues are similar to those discussed in the debate about orphan works.
13 Amending Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the term of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights (proposal presented by the Commission, COM(2008) 464/3), Article 10a (Transitional measures relating 
to the transposition of directive), subsection (6): If, after the moment at which, by virtue of Article 3 (1) and (2) in their version 
before amendment by Directive [// insert: Nr. of this amending directive]/EC, the performer and the phonogram producer 
would be no longer protected in regard of, respectively, the fixation of the performance and the phonogram, the phonogram 
producer ceases to offer copies of the phonogram for sale in sufficient quantity or to make it available  to the public, by wire 
or wireless means, in such a way that members of the public  may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen 
by them, the performer may terminate the contract on transfer or assignment. Where a phonogram contains the fixation of 
the performances of a plurality of performers, they may terminate their contracts on transfer or assignment only jointly. If the 
contract on transfer or assignment is terminated pursuant to sentences 1 or 2, the rights of the phonogram producer in the 
phonogram shall expire. 
 The renewed interest in bringing non-exploited works to market is also reflected in a failed amendment to the Digital 
Economy bill tabled by Conservative Peer Lord Lucas that proposed an ‘artists’ right to re-market’ if a work is not available 
in all common current electronic formats in all geographical regions within two years after first publication, or five years after 
its creation, it had not been published. Digital Economy Bill, Amendments debated in the House of Lords (6 January 2010): 
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldbills/001/amend/ml001-ire.htm.
8Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
SUMMARY CHAPTER
4.  Creator and user contracts: 
Effects of reversionary term
Theoretically, reversing assigned rights to the 
author after a fixed period would be an effective 
way of improving the earnings of authors from 
works which are still in demand after reversion. 
Term reversion should also have access 
benefits to users in opening up archives of 
back-catalogues.12 Something similar to term 
reversion has re-surfaced as a regulatory tool in 
the proposed European Directive, extending the 
copyright term for sound recordings.13
Unfortunately, there appears to be no live 
example of a functioning reversionary term 
regime. Under the first statutory law, the Statute 
of Anne of 1710, copyright fell back to the author 
after a term of 14 years, and the author could then 
assign it again for one further term. Until the 1976 
Copyright Act, the United States still followed this 
structure, with an initial copyright term of 28 years 
that could be renewed once.14 In the Italian model 
(providing for the possibility of termination of 
exploitation contracts after two years – see Paper 
2) publishers appear to find contractual means 
around possible reversion. 
It would be desirable to conduct both doctrinal 
studies on the implications of term reversion in the 
current framework of international and European 
law, and historical studies on the empirical effects 
of past regimes.
5.  User contracts: Effects of 
mandatory exceptions
As discussed in Paper 3, apart from a few notable 
exceptions,15 hardly any literature or case law 
discusses the impact that imperative copyright 
exceptions had on contracting licences in those 
countries that stipulate mandatory exceptions. 
Moreover, the difference between countries 
implementing imperative exceptions and countries 
where freedom of contract prevails has not been 
the object of a comparative empirical study.
Following the model of the British Library 
study (discussed in Paper 3, section 3.6), a 
representative sample of licences offered to 
educational institutions and libraries could be 
compared for jurisdictions with and without 
mandatory exceptions. For digital services aimed 
at consumers, sweeping techniques would 
be appropriate to locate licences and analyse 
their potential conflict with statutory copyright 
permissions and consumer protection legislation. 
In addition, the needs of Libraries and educational 
institutions in terms of copyright permissions as 
well as their ability to negotiate clauses should 
be explored. A qualitative, interview based 
methodology would be appropriate here.
14 The US model of term renewal was replaced from 1978 with extremely complex transitionary provisions on term reversion.
15 For Belgium, Dubuisson (2001) and Dusollier (2007).
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RESEARCH GAP II: NORMATIVE AIMS OF 
CONTRACTUAL REGULATION
Research should be undertaken to analyse the 
aims of regulatory tools. Surprisingly, the brief 
for this review has been silent on this issue. Yet, 
there are obvious conflicts between the aims 
of competition law, the aims of copyright law to 
provide an incentive by excluding competition, 
the aims of droit d’auteur inspired legislation to 
secure a livelihood for creators and protect their 
personality, and general principles of efficient 
contracting that may or may not conflict with other 
notions of fairness.  The regulation of contracts 
may also have to take note of fundamental rights 
and freedoms (such as constitutional principles 
and human rights).
1. Fairness
Economists regard copyright law in terms of its 
‘efficiency’ effects in providing an incentive to 
increase creative output rather than in terms of 
equity (see Paper 1, section 1.3). There may 
not be an inherent clash between these views 
but economics has a much less developed view 
of fairness than of efficiency. On the specific 
notion of fairness that is often invoked in policy 
discussion about creator and user contracts, 
there are a number of questions that need to be 
explored, relating to economic, legal and moral 
notions of fairness.16
•	 How should ‘fairness’ be defined for the 
context of copyright contracts?
•	 Are existing contracts really ‘unfair’?
•	 Do alternative contracts, within the 
current copyright law, exist that would be 
perceived as being ‘fairer’? If they do exist, 
do those contracts sacrifice efficiency?
•	 To what extent does any perceived 
‘unfairness’ depend upon copyright law?
•	 Can copyright law be altered in order that 
the balance of bargaining positions be 
changed and the resulting contracts are 
‘fair’?
2. Artistic motivation
Another set of questions relate to widespread 
assumptions about creators’ interests and 
motivations that are frequently used in the policy 
discourse. Empirical work seems to suggest that 
an incentive structure built on exclusive rights 
fails to motivate creators, particularly early in their 
careers (see Paper 2, section 2.4.1).
It would appear to be important to have more 
robust evidence on creators’ interests that 
can only be gathered by primary research. 
Professional organisations that speak on 
behalf of creators have an important role here, 
but typically they are also subject to complex 
interdependencies with exploiters of copyright 
works. Research would have to be truly 
independent.
16 At the Bournemouth Symposium on Copyright, Contract and Creativity (25/9/09), panels of experts from professional 
organisations of journalists, illustrators, photographers, film directors, composers, songwriters and performers/featured 
artists considered the following contractual trends to be unfair (see report of the Symposium, available at http://www.cippm.
org.uk/symposia/symposium-2009.html ): In the UK, creators are routinely required to waive their moral rights in contracts. 
Creators are routinely required to sign contracts that assign all their rights to the publisher or producer (meaning the enterprise 
or organisation that publishes and distributes their work), and cover every potential use in a blanket manner. Contracts for 
digital use are just bolted on to standard ‘analogue’ contracts and do not make provision for additional payment. If creators 
do not comply, others are found who will comply, especially young creators who need to break in.
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use to be made of the work freely and without 
permission.’ (p. 40) ‘[O]ne of the purposes of 
exceptions to copyright is to reduce burdensome 
transaction costs associated with having to 
negotiate licences.’ (p. 47)17
The exclusion of digital copyright works from a 
number of user privileges, as in Article 6(4) of the 
InfoSoc Directive (2001/29/EC), is underpinned 
by their status as services rather than goods. Both 
their status and their exclusion from copyright 
exceptions could be usefully addressed by 
theoretical research.
RESEARCH GAP III: SOLUTIONS FROM 
OUTSIDE COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACT 
LAW
The only UK body charged with reviewing 
copyright contracts is the Copyright Tribunal. It 
has a very narrow mandate, covering dispute 
resolution of certain collective licensing 
schemes.18 
It has been estimated that the costs of a referral 
and full adjudication proceedings amounts to at 
least £250,000.19 
3. Information freedoms
As discussed in Paper 3, regulating the 
relationship between copyright and contract law 
with respect to limitations and exceptions may 
depend on different groups of justifications. For 
market failure remedies (such as, under one 
reading, exceptions for private copying), contracts 
may legitimately trump statutory permissions. 
For fundamental rights (such as those implied by 
exceptions for criticism or parody), these must 
trump. In addition, some exceptions may have 
several underlying objectives or justifications 
which are sometimes contradictory (e.g. is the 
private copying exception based on a market 
failure or on the right to privacy or both?). The 
most contentious exceptions are those based 
on ‘policy’, but it is not clear what policy. There 
is more comparative and analytical work needed 
on the justificatory basis of exceptions, as well as 
on their economic impact. The Gowers Review 
of Intellectual Property (2006) recommended 
the introduction of more flexibility into the 
copyright system but did not analyse the rationale 
for exceptions beyond vague references to 
reasonableness and transaction costs: ‘UK 
copyright law provides a number of ‘exceptions’ 
to the broad rights granted to the owner of a 
copyright work to enable ‘reasonable’ 
17 Gowers’ flexibility recommendations were: Recommendation 8: Introduce a limited private copying exception by 2008 for 
format shifting for works published after the date that the law comes into effect. There should be no accompanying levies for 
consumers. Recommendation 9: Allow private copying for research to cover all forms of content. This relates to the copying, 
not the distribution, of media. Recommendation 10a: Amend s.42 of the CDPA by 2008 to permit libraries to copy the master 
copy of all classes of work in permanent collection for archival purposes and to allow further copies to be made from the 
archived copy to mitigate against subsequent wear and tear. Recommendation 10b: Enable libraries to format shift archival 
copies by 2008 to ensure records do not become obsolete. Recommendation 11: Propose that Directive 2001/29/EC be 
amended to allow for an exception for creative, transformative or derivative works, within the parameters of the Berne Three 
Step Test. Recommendation 12: Create an exception to copyright for the purpose of caricature, parody or pastiche by 2008. 
Recommendation 13: Propose a provision for orphan works to the European Commission, amending Directive 2001/29/EC. 
Recommendation 14a: The Patent Office should issue clear guidance on the parameters of a ‘reasonable search’ for orphan 
works, in consultation with rights holders, collecting societies, rights owners and archives, when an orphan works exception 
comes into being. Recommendation 14b: The Patent Office should establish a voluntary register of copyright; either on its 
own, or through partnerships with database holders, by 2008. For the current status of these recommendations, see Taking 
Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Second Stage Consultation on Copyright Exceptions (UK Intellectual 
Property Office, December 2009, http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-2009-gowers2.htm).
18 The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is defined in Sections 149, 205B and Schedule 6 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(as amended). Some matters may be referred to the Tribunal by the Secretary of State even though collecting societies are 
not involved. For example, it can settle disputes between publishers of television programme listings and broadcasters over 
royalties payable.
19 Responses to UKIPO consultation on Reform of Copyright Tribunal Rules, 9 April 2009; UKIPO workshop (notes on file with 
M. Kretschmer).
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There are models for reviewing tariffs, contractual 
terms and industry practices in other areas 
of public policy. These should be assessed 
systematically for their suitability to the copyright 
environment.
1. Self-regulation
Against overreaching licence agreements the 
examined literature proposed self-regulatory 
solutions, to be enacted through model licences 
and codes of conduct.20 A study on the feasibility 
of such solutions would be interesting for policy 
makers. The relationship of self-regulation, 
collective bargaining and competition law may 
warrant further research. Concerns have been 
voiced that standard agreements may be in 
violation of competition law, specifically the 
prohibition against anti-competitive agreements 
and concerted practices (Art. 81, EC = Art. 101, 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU).21
2. The regulation of utilities
A further line of possible research concerns 
the applicability of models from the regulation 
of utilities. The Utilities Contracts Regulations 
200622 define services as utilities under the 
following categories: water, electricity, gas, heat, 
exploration and exploitation of oil and gas, coal 
and other solid fuels and transport. Airport and 
postal services are subject to related regulatory 
constraints, as is the communications sector, 
regulated in the UK by OFCOM under the 
Communications Act 2003 (covering TV and radio, 
fixed line telecoms, mobiles, and airwaves).
Regulation in all these areas involves issues of 
market access, price control, and contractual 
supervision. Research may analyse the available 
instruments as applicable to the regulation of 
information markets and copyright contracts.23
20 See discussion in Chapter 4 of the EC Green Paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy 2008, the Australian CLRC 
Study 2002, Garnett 2006, Hugenholtz 2008.
21 In Albany International and Brentjens the ECJ ruled that agreements on compulsory pension schemes fall outside the scope 
of Article 81: Case C-67/96, Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751, 
[2000] 4 CMLR 446; Cases C-115 to 117/97, Brentjens v. SBVHB, [1999] ECRI-6025, [2000] 4 CMLR 566. AG Jacobs 
opinion in Albany laid down four conditions for disapplying Art. 81. The collective bargaining agreement (i) was made as part 
of normal collective bargaining, (ii) was made in good faith, rather than to conceal anti-competitive restrictions, (iii) dealt with 
core aspects of collective bargaining, such as wages or other conditions of work, and (iv) did not affect third parties.
22 Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006, Statutory Instrument 2006/6.
23 The Digital Britain report (June 2009) explicitly likens the digital information infrastructure to a utility, and proposes regulatory 
measures to curb copyright infringements in broadband networks. However, the debate has so far omitted to analyse the 
economic rationales for non-judicial intervention.
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RESEARCH GAP IV: CONTRACTING FOR 
DIGITAL SERVICES
While many of the above research gaps could be 
addressed separately, and may offer long term 
evidential benefits, it appears that many of the 
most pressing issues surrounding the regulation 
of copyright contracts stem from the creation 
of new digital services. They typically require 
complex contracting on the creator, producer 
and user sides, and often involve some form of 
collective licensing. There has been a proliferation 
of new arrangements, often without precedent. 
Private ordering appears well ahead of policy 
here. Examples include offering equity stakes 
in new services that are potentially infringing 
to major right holders (YouTube, Spotify). This 
avoids potential liability, but reports suggest that 
very little money from such services flows back 
to the smaller producers and creators.24 Other 
sensitive licensing issues surround digitisation 
initiatives (such as the Google books project), 
information aggregators, the treatment of user 
generated content on social networking sites, and 
the obligations of Internet Service Providers. 
Following a flurry of initiatives by the European 
Commission,25 there is also a process of 
reorganisation of collecting societies under 
way, through the private ordering device of joint 
ventures. Examples include Armonia (2007), a 
one-stop-shop licensing platform for online and 
mobile use of the repertoires of the collecting 
societies of Spain (SGAE), France (SACEM) and 
Italy (SIAE), and CELAS (2007) a joint venture 
between the German collecting society GEMA 
and the UK’s MCPS-PRS for the European-wide 
administration of the repertoire of EMI Music 
Publishing for online and mobile use.
Again the implications for creators, smaller 
intermediaries and users have not been 
systematically explored. 
There are several methodological approaches 
that could be pursued here. Theoretical economic 
research could consider the degree to which 
contracts can substitute for copyright protection 
at all points along the value chain.26 Developing 
digital services could be researched using 
social science perspectives on private ordering, 
from a strategic management perspective on 
business models, or from a consumer perspective 
(acceptability of levels of payment and various 
levels of copy restrictions). Some of this work is 
underway.
In the context of this report we see an immediate 
need to create an inventory of these new 
contractual arrangements. There have been some 
limited reviews of collecting societies (mostly in 
the EU) from a legal perspective. These studies 
compile the rights managed collectively in each 
country, whether they are administered voluntarily 
or on a statutory basis, and what regulatory 
supervision (if any) is in place.
There have been no studies that take primarily 
an approach by economic activity. The key 
questions here would be: (i) What kind of 
activity can copyright users (e.g. broadcasters, 
online aggregators, consumers) in each country 
undertake under collective licences?  (ii) How are 
these activities priced? (iii) How are the licence 
fees distributed between the various right holders 
(intermediaries and creators)?
24 Examples are given in the response by Consumer Focus (the UK statutory body campaigning for Consumers) to the 
European Commission consultation on Creative Content Online (http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/assets/1/files/2009/06/
Consumer-Focus-response-to-Creative-Content-reflection-consultation-final2.pdf - January 2010).
25 Communication COM(2004) 261 The Management of Copyright and Related Rights in the Internal Market; Staff Working 
Document Study on a Community Initiative on the Cross-Border Collective Management of Copyright, 7 July 2005; 
Commission Recommendation On the Collective Cross-border Management of Copyright and Related Rights for Legitimate 
Online Music Services, adopted 12 October 2005.
26 Methodologically, this may be done by looking at areas in which copyright law does not define what is being sold, such as 
TV formats, jokes, recipes or fashion.
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To give a few examples: blanket licences (musical 
works) for commercial radio stations are typically 
set at a percentage (often 2-3%) of revenue. 
Blanket licences (musical works) for CDs are 
set as a percentage of the wholesale price (6-
9% of the published price to the dealer). Blanket 
licences/levies for private copying may be set as 
a percentage of the retail price (5%) of copying 
equipment/media. Blanket licences for course 
readers at universities may be priced as a fixed 
fee per student.27
A methodological obstacle to a comprehensive 
inventory is the commercial sensitivity of some of 
the contractual arrangements beyond the tariffs 
advertised by collecting societies. However, a 
SABIP endorsed review, backed up by content 
analysis of secondary reporting in industry 
publications, should be able to provide a sound 
evidential basis.
PRIORITIES FOR RESEARCH 
1. USER CONTRACTS  
(RATIONALE OF EXCEPTIONS)
Some countries have enacted imperative 
exceptions; however, the legislature 
has not given reasons for making the 
exceptions imperative. The fact that three 
countries reviewed (Portugal, Ireland 
and Belgium) made all their exceptions 
imperative without distinction indicates a 
lack of thought as to the normative aims of 
contractual regulation, i.e. what interests 
copyright should take into account 
(most commentators would say that, for 
instance, fundamental rights and freedoms 
should be taken into account). Also no 
country has made other limits imperative 
(such as the idea/expression dichotomy, 
the originality requirement, the term, the 
economic rights, the exhaustion principle), 
despite these being as crucial if not more 
so than the exceptions to the economic 
rights. In this respect, more comparative 
and analytical work is needed on the 
justificatory basis of copyright limits, as 
well as on their economic impact. A similar 
question is raised by Article 6(4) of the 
InfoSoc Directive which excludes some 
important exceptions from the mechanism 
without apparent reason (this exclusion of 
digital copyright works from a number of 
users’ privileges seems underpinned by 
their status as services rather than goods 
despite the fact that they are copyright 
works in every respect).
27  The percentages/fixed fees vary greatly between activities and between countries. In countries with a Copyright Tribunal/
Board, there is an extensive jurisprudence on the setting of tariffs (when they have been challenged). To our knowledge there 
is no tradition of jurisprudence on the distribution of these fees (e.g. between various categories of rights, between authors 
and publishers, between major and minor earners, thresholds) although some countries set certain elements by law (for 
example in relation to the private copy levy).
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2. USER CONTRACTS 
(LICENSING PRACTICES)
The theoretically undesirable effects of 
overriding some or all copyright limits by 
contract or by technological protection 
measures (TPMs) need to be assessed by 
empirical studies. The effects of imperative 
limits could be investigated by focussing 
on differences between countries having 
imperative exceptions and countries where 
freedom of contract prevails. Preferably 
studies should be undertaken by specific 
sectors, such as software, database, 
music, and film, and should distinguish 
between commercial users, consumers, 
libraries and educational establishments. 
Studies might attempt to obtain and 
analyse the contents of a representative 
sample of contracts for each sector. If the 
contracts are similar despite the law being 
different, consumer behaviours should be 
analysed to see if they behave similarly or 
differently (i.e. whether they are aware of 
their rights or not). 
	 Again this may differ per sector and per 
type of user. For instance, a representative 
sample of licences offered to educational 
institutions and libraries could be 
compared for jurisdictions with and without 
mandatory exceptions. The needs of 
libraries and educational institutions and 
their ability to negotiate clauses could be 
explored through a qualitative, interview-
based methodology. For consumer 
contracts, sweeping techniques (locating 
online licences) as well as survey research 
methods (for example, sampling shrink-
wrap licences) would be suitable.
3. CREATOR CONTRACTS 
(TERM REVERSAL) 
Reversing assigned rights to the author 
(after a fixed period, or because of non-
exploitation) is likely to be an effective 
way of improving the earnings of the 
author. Term reversion should also have 
access benefits to users from opening up 
archives of back-catalogues. It would be 
feasible to conduct both doctrinal studies 
on the implications of term reversion in 
the current framework of international 
and European law, and studies on the 
empirical effects of historical regimes of 
rights reversal.
4. CREATOR CONTRACTS 
(MORAL RIGHTS)
Under the UK Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988, the so-called ‘moral 
rights’ include the right to be identified as 
author (paternity right), and the right to 
object to derogatory treatment (integrity 
right). Contractual waivers of moral rights 
are inserted frequently into copyright 
contracts. If these rights were made 
unwaivable by statute, such a persisting 
link between author and work might 
improve the author’s bargaining power. 
Alternatively, such an intervention could be 
seen as introducing inefficiencies similar 
to other limits on contractual freedom. 
Feasible research projects include 
empirical studies of attribution practices 
in certain sectors, and of differences 
in the treatment of moral rights across 
jurisdictions, and their impact on authors’ 
earnings. 
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5. COMPETITION LAW 
Linked to the above priorities is the 
question of whether contractual practices 
in certain sectors (to be discovered 
through the first batch of studies 
recommended as a first priority) are in 
fact breaching competition law (Arts. 81 
and 82, EC = Arts. 101 and 102, TFEU). 
Rather than commissioning a study, 
SABIP could refer the matter to the 
European Commission and, in the UK, to 
the OFT. 
6. SELF-REGULATION
 Doctrinal as well as empirical research 
should be done to study the feasibility of 
model licences and codes of conduct to 
solve the problem of the overridability of 
copyright limits. In the context of creator 
contracts the status under competition 
law of standard form contracts and the 
effectiveness of collective negotiations 
through professional bodies should be 
examined.
7. COPYRIGHT BUSINESS MODELS 
 It would be desirable to pursue several of 
the research priorities identified above in 
an integrated manner, since digitisation 
appears to have a systemic effect on 
contracting. For example, contracts over 
copyright materials may now be formed 
simultaneously on the supply side and the 
demand side (user-generated content) 
or be negotiated as bundles (ISP/mobile 
services).  
 
 How is the role of intermediaries 
changing? Can predictions of 
disintermediation be substantiated? To 
what degree can contracts substitute for 
copyright protection at all points along the 
value chain? Are developments sector 
specific?  
 
Are collecting licenses meeting the 
challenges of the digital era? What 
kind of activity can copyright users 
(e.g. broadcasters, online aggregators, 
consumers) in each country undertake 
under collective licences? How are these 
activities priced? How are the licence 
fees distributed between the various right 
holders (intermediaries and creators)? 
 
Such a larger project is likely to be 
interdisciplinary, using multiple methods, 
and may subsume several of the research 
priorities identified above. 
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ABSTRACT
The economic theory of copyright is now well 
advanced, and has covered many issues related 
to the grant of copyright and the supply and 
consumption of copyright goods. However, a very 
important aspect of the value chain has been 
largely ignored – the fact that between creation 
and consumption many contracts are likely to 
be involved, and copyright will, logically, have 
effects upon the way those contracts are written 
and interpreted. It is interesting that economists 
themselves have not put the issue of contracts into 
the forefront of the economics of copyright, since 
the study of contracts and the incentives that they 
create is certainly of prime interest to economists 
generally.
This paper reviews the scant economics literature 
that does deal with the relationships between the 
legal institution of copyright and the contracts that 
are then written along the value chain. It is to be 
emphasised that this paper only deals with the 
economic theory literature, and does not consider 
the legal literature. The principal objective is to 
identify clearly the research gaps that exist, and 
to put somewhat into perspective the question of 
how these gaps might be prioritised in terms of 
importance or urgency. 
1.1 CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
The economics of copyright often approaches the 
topic using an incentives argument – copyright 
is granted to authors in order that they can be 
appropriately remunerated for their work, and so 
they thereby have the appropriate incentive to 
provide that work. Under this approach, the central 
problem for determining the correct legal copyright 
parameters is the balancing at the margin of the 
incentive provided to authors and the access to 
works that is available for users.
However, and regardless of the parameters 
involved, the granting of copyright alone provides 
no guarantee of remuneration of any type or 
amount, and so copyright alone cannot provide any 
sort of incentive for authors. There are two other 
crucial elements that are also required in order 
that copyright does not become a ‘straw-man’. 
These elements are enforcement of copyright, 
and contracts between rights holders and eventual 
users. Only contracts can provide remuneration 
and thus incentives, while copyright itself together 
with its effective enforcement are what pave the 
way for contracts to be written. That is, without 
copyright and enforcement, contracts would be 
impossible. Thus, in short, copyright itself is not 
an incentive mechanism, but (assuming that it is 
enforced) it does allow an incentive mechanism to 
operate, namely contracts.
It is also true that, under an enforced copyright 
system in the digital environment, it is only via 
contracts that users actually gain access to 
copyright material. Naturally, some of these access 
contracts might be very simple – you pay me $20, 
and I allow you to take a CD-ROM with my content 
saved to it in such a way that you can access it, but 
payment of the price and acceptance of the disk 
imply that you are contracted not to repackage 
and resell the content in any way. Of course there 
are other, minor, ways in which one can gain 
some access to copyrighted content outside of a 
contract. For example, any fair-use that is provided 
for within the copyright law structure does precisely 
this. However, the principal means of access is via 
contracts, either explicit or implicit.28
  
28 In the analogue world, the first sale doctrine (also known as ‘exhaustion of rights’) ensured that once a carrier of content was 
sold, the contract’s reach ended. The legal status of shrink-wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap licences is not settled in many 
jurisdictions. Similarly, whether fair-use type exceptions survive contractual restrictions remains a point of contention. These 
issues are discussed in detail from a comparative legal perspective in Paper 3.
PAPER 1 - ECONOMIC THEORY OF COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS, Richard Watt
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If we then accept that the incentives provided to 
authors, and access provided to users, stem not so 
much from the grant of copyright itself, but rather 
from the ability that an enforced copyright law gives 
for bringing the parties together via contracting 
then we are justified in looking closely at the way 
in which contracts for access to copyright works 
are structured. And, I might add, the analysis of 
contracts is a very common theme within applied 
microeconomic theory. For that reason, in the 
present document, I propose to look at both the 
general economic theory of contracts, and the 
specific literature on contracts for copyright works, 
in order to see what sort of overlap actually exists, 
and thus to attempt to identify logical gaps in the 
specific literature that might be considered to be 
subject of future research.
1.1.1  Copyright and the contractable 
space
In general, copyright law can be seen to simply 
provide for a restricted space in which contracts 
can be written. If there were no copyright law, or 
alternatively, if there were no enforcement of the law, 
then the effective space for contracting becomes 
empty. Without copyright law an author would not 
be able to contract to provide access to his content 
to a publisher in exchange for royalties, since 
the publisher could envisage no revenue stream 
from which royalties could be paid. Of course this 
depends crucially upon the only incentive to the 
author being financial. If the author does have other 
incentives, for example, if they areonly motivated 
by gaining access to readership, then a contract 
might still be possible under which the author 
pays the publisher for producing and distributing 
the work. Precisely this type of contract is at the 
forefront of the so-called ‘open access’ movement 
in academic publishing, and it has recently been 
strongly proposed as a socially desirable situation 
by Steven Shavell that copyright in academic work 
might be best abolished (see Shavell 2009). In any 
case, in a scenario of pure financial motivation and 
yet no effective copyright law, contracting between
authors and users becomes virtually impossible, 
and the incentive effects for authorship are diluted 
down to nothing. Any authorship that continues 
in such an environment cannot be due, in any 
important manner, to an expectation of financial 
reward.29
On the other hand, a maximal copyright law 
(enforced), with perhaps absolutely no fair-
use provision and no expiry date, provides an 
unrestricted space for contracting, and thus a 
maximal expectation of reward since no access at 
all will be granted unless the right holder permits 
it (which he or she might only be persuaded to do 
in exchange for a financial payment). Intermediary 
options, in which copyright does restrict ownership 
in some way (certainly over time and most likely 
also over specific uses), lead to a restricted, but 
not empty, contract set.
Contracts that are written within a restricted set 
might differ from those in an unrestricted set, 
although this is certainly not a general result. 
Changes in copyright law and its enforcement 
will only have effects upon the contracts that are 
written when those contracts lie on the boundaries 
of the contractable set that copyright offers. 
Clearly this will be the case for when the initial set 
is very small, but it might not be the case when 
the initial set is very large. Thus a central topic in 
the economics of copyright contracts might be to 
look within the contracts to see where, and how, 
the current copyright law parameters are reflected. 
If they are not reflected in the contract, then we 
might understand that the contract in question 
does not lie on the boundary of the contractable 
space, and thus extensions in copyright law (which 
would simply expand the contractable space) 
would have no effect on the contract, and thus on 
the incentive and access effects. Similarly, if the 
current copyright provisions are present, explicitly 
or implicitly, in the contracts that are written, then 
changes in the copyright law will affect the contracts 
that are written, and thus will have both incentive 
and access effects.
29 While this proposition is theoretically plausible, empirical support is poor. Royalty contracts between authors and publishers 
concluded in a non-copyright environment (such as Friedrich Schiller’s Horen contract of 1794 discussed in Paper 2) 
provide a telling counter example. This gap between orthodox economic theory and empirical evidence has profound policy 
implications.
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In order to illustrate, let’s take a simple example. 
Suppose Mr. A, an author, has written a wonderful 
book that he would like to get published and 
marketed. So he negotiates with publisher P for that 
purpose. A and P agree on a publishing contract, 
which stipulates that A will supply the work to P for 
the purpose of printing and sale, and that P will 
pay a specific royalty to A for each book that is 
sold. Upon signing of the contract, A duly supplies 
the work to P. However, at the end of the day, two 
things emerge; (1) even though there have been 
sales of the book, P has not paid any royalties 
to A, and (2) it has been detected that a second 
publisher, Q, has also produced and sold copies of 
the same book. Q has no contractual relationship 
with either A or P. What can A do?
I would argue that A can sue P for breach of 
contract, and A can sue Q for breach of copyright 
law. In principle, A cannot sue P for breach of 
copyright law, since the contract between them 
gives P the right to produce and market the book. 
The important aspect of this example might be 
the remedies that A can expect from both P and 
Q. Clearly, if P is sued for breach of contract, then 
we must look to the contract itself for the remedy, 
which is likely to be that P must pay A the contracted 
royalty. On the other hand, the remedy that will be 
available from Q will depend on copyright law. As 
long as Q is indeed found liable for infringement, at 
the very least Q will be ordered to stop producing 
and selling the book, and perhaps some sort of 
damages will also be awarded from Q to A. The 
point is that the extent of the damages available 
under copyright law might well have contributed 
to the choice of the contracted royalty between A 
and P. If the damages under copyright infringement 
were much lower than what would be contracted to 
as royalty payments, then publishers would have 
an incentive to infringe rather than to contract. 
Thus, the copyright law ‘standards’ and parameters 
might be seen to affect the contractual conditions 
that are agreed to. Weak copyright standards 
might lead to unfavourable contracts for authors, 
while strong copyright standards might lead to 
favourable contracts for authors.30
In that sense, if the contracted royalty is heavily 
dependent upon the copyright standard, then 
we might expect that the royalty would change 
if the copyright standard changes. This is what 
is meant by a contract being on the boundary of 
the contractable set defined by the copyright law. 
In these cases, alterations in the law will have 
incentive effects via the contracts between authors 
and publishers. On the other hand, it might well be 
that the damages from copyright infringement are 
extremely high, and are impossible to approach in 
a voluntary access contract. Then the royalty in the 
contract will not be affected by any further increase 
in infringement damages. In this case, the contract 
is not on the boundary of the contractable set, 
and alterations in the law will have no effect upon 
the contracts that are written, and thus upon the 
incentives that are given.
30 Actually of course, in the example considered, it is also entirely possible that when setting damages in the copyright 
infringement case, the court may look to the contract between A and P for guidance as to what might constitute a reasonable 
royalty. Thus, not only might copyright law affect the contract, but also vice-versa.
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1.1.2  Copyright law and the parties to 
contracts for copyright goods
The relationship between copyright law and 
contracts can only really be fully understood in 
terms of parties that are not actually signatories 
to the contract. This has been clearly argued by 
Kretschmer (2006). There is no real need for any 
kind of copyright law for an author to contract with 
a publisher for the disclosure from the former to 
the latter of the relevant intellectual property. 
This can be done entirely within the domain of 
a private contract. However, what the publisher 
is willing to pay under that contract is, at least in 
part, determined by what potential competitors 
will or will not be able to do in the subsequent 
market in which the work will be made available to 
consumers. Since the competitors are not part of 
the contract, but they do influence the value of the 
contract, it is here that copyright law has its primary 
influence on contracts.31
Conventional wisdom holds that a strong copyright 
protection increases the value of the contract for 
the publisher, and thus (assuming that bargaining 
powers are not extreme) some of that additional 
value can be captured by the author through the 
contract with the publisher. In this way the level of 
protection offered by copyright law would influence 
the terms and conditions agreed to in the contract. 
This conventional wisdom has been challenged 
on many fronts, and may not hold at all. However, 
the important point to note is that not only might it 
be the case that copyright law directly influences 
what is and what is not contractable, but it also 
influences the terms contracted to via its indirect 
effects in governing the activities of agents who 
contribute to the value of the contract but who are 
not directly parties to it.  
No existing literature has been found on this 
topic, and thus we propose it as an interesting 
gap in the literature, waiting to be filled. Research 
would consider the degree to which contracts can 
substitute for copyright protection at all points along 
the value chain. In principle, it would appear that 
where there are very high transaction costs from 
monitoring activities, an important impediment for 
contracting, a far greater reliance will be placed 
upon copyright protection rather than individual 
contracting. Similarly, when third parties (i.e. parties 
that are not signatories to a contract) are able to 
alter the value of that contract, then copyright law 
would become more important. 
1.1.3  Standard contract theory and 
special characteristics of 
copyright contracts
In standard economic theory, the theory of 
contracts is intimately related to the concept of 
incentives. That is, a contract is a means under 
which a given party can be persuaded to carry 
out some task in such a way that is beneficial to a 
second party. In order for the persuasion to work, 
the contracted party must be given the correct 
incentives to do what the contractor would like, 
and this is typically done by linking outcomes with 
monetary payments. Contract theory in economics 
is typically spelled out within the context of the so-
called ‘principal-agent’ model, in which the principal 
attempts to contract an agent to carry out some 
task. Of course, the task will generate revenue, 
and the contract is the mechanism that dictates 
how that revenue is shared between the two 
parties. The standard theory of contracts only really 
becomes interesting in situations of uncertainty 
and asymmetrical information, that is, scenarios in 
which the contractor (i.e. the principal) cannot fully 
observe all that he or she would like to regarding 
the behaviour or identity of the contracted party 
31 On this point generally, much of the economic theory on copyright makes no distinction between the ‘author’ or ‘creator’ and 
the ‘publisher’, considering them as one – perhaps the ‘supply side’ of the market for copyright goods. This is done as a 
simplification, and is justified by there being few differences in objectives between these two parties – that is, the incentives 
of authors and publishers are said to be largely aligned. This so-called ‘harmony of interests’ assumption is both conceptually 
and empirically problematic (for discussion, see Paper 2). In this case, of course, copyright has a direct influence on the 
contracts signed between this side of the market and the other (the demand side). Contracts written exclusively between 
parties on the supply side are dealt with in this survey below (royalty contract theory). 
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(the agent). In such cases the issue of incentives 
comes to the fore, although economic theory has 
proposed very simple and intuitive solutions to the 
different types of problem that may occur, always 
based on contracts that link the agent’s payments 
to the observed outcomes of the task to be carried 
out.32
Good discussions of the types of contracts that are 
commonly used along the value chain for copyright 
products can be found in Baumol and Heim 
(1967) for the case of writers, and in Connolly and 
Krueger (2006) for the case of music. Also the 
widely referenced text of Caves (2000) will be of 
use here, although it is concerned with a much 
wider set of contracts – those corresponding to 
the creative industries generally. However, none 
of those studies looks formally into the theoretical 
relationship between the level and nature of legal 
copyright protection and the contracts that are 
used along the value chain.  
The particular case of contracts for the production 
and dissemination of copyright products is, in 
principle, no different from any of the more general 
situations that are commonly discussed in economic 
theory. Indeed, all that is required is to check that 
the assumptions made in the standard theory 
are relevant to the particular case of copyright, 
and if not, then to establish the correct set of 
assumptions under which the contract problem 
should be analysed. In this subsection we shall 
consider the most widely cited text on the topic of 
the kinds of contracts and the types of problems 
that are prevalent, in the particular case of the 
creation-production-consumption chain for the 
creative industry (a subset of which corresponds to 
copyright goods), namely Caves (2000).  
In this book, Caves concentrates on the special 
features of cultural markets, and considers whether 
and to what extent the contracts typically seen 
in these markets conform or not to the accepted 
economic theory of incentive contracting. Most of 
the book is dedicated to looking at specific details 
of aspects of the arts, for which copyright may 
or may not be such an important feature, and so 
in that sense, copyright is more of a background 
theme to the book.
Caves’ book is so comprehensive of the contractual 
means under which the value created in cultural 
industries is distributed among the participants of 
the creation-distribution-consumption chain that it 
becomes difficult to list each relevant aspect of the 
book under a series of corresponding topical areas. 
Thus, it is perhaps best to mention this important 
book separately, and trust that the interested 
reader will consult it for further details.
The claimed principal focus of Caves is to apply 
the standard principal-agent theory of applied 
microeconomics to the case of contracts along the 
value chain for creative goods. Nevertheless, the 
book does not provide any modelling on contract 
theory at all (almost certainly in the interests of a 
more general readership), but rather Caves limits 
his analysis to looking at specific features of the 
contracts that are typical in the real-world at specific 
points along the value chain for a wide range of 
creative processes, and noting their relevance to 
the economic theory of contracts. 
Indeed the most interesting part of the Caves book 
(especially where relevance to the current survey 
is concerned) is the introductory chapter, which is 
the most general of all of the chapters in the book, 
and that which is most clearly focused on the 
relationship between traditional contract theory and 
creative industries generally. In that introductory 
chapter, Caves sets out the general aspects of 
cultural industries that should be present in any 
analysis of contracting for goods and services 
within those industries. He also looks at the general 
economic theory of contracts, and poses (perhaps 
somewhat implicitly) that the latter might require 
amendment in order to cater appropriately for the 
cultural sector. 
32 The interested reader can consult any standard intermediate microeconomics text for a chapter on the principal-agent model 
with asymmetric information. For example, the well known text by Hal Varian (Intermediate Microeconomics, 7th ed. 2007) 
would be a good place to start.
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To the extent that transactions within cultural 
industries are reliant upon copyright this discussion 
by Caves, which sets out the salient aspects of 
contract, can be applied to contracts for the use of 
copyright (though Caves himself does not so).
To summarise, the principal features of cultural 
markets identified by Caves as being of importance 
for the theory of contracts are the following:
1.  Demand uncertainty
2.  The fact that creative workers care about 
their output
3.  Some creative products require diverse 
skills
4.  The existence of differentiated products
5.  Vertically differentiated skill requirements
6.  The importance of timing
7.  The fact that cultural products are durable, 
leading to durable rent flows
8.  The existence of essential inputs in the 
value chain.
It remains an open question for theory to look 
more closely at each of these aspects in turn, 
within the standard principal-agent contract theory 
set-up, to see how, or indeed if, they lead to a 
markedly different set of outcomes from those of 
the traditional theory. In fact the first of the aspects 
noted by Caves, namely demand uncertainty, 
is of course already a very common aspect of 
the standard theory of contracts, and so we can 
certainly consider that this has already been 
covered by the general theory. It is however less 
clear that points 3, 4, and 5 will require any major 
adjustments to the general theory, and they may 
instead simply imply a widened understanding of 
the inputs and outputs of agents. In short, instead 
of using a scalar interpretation of inputs and 
outputs, we might want to use a vectorial notation. 
While certainly adding a level of complexity, doing 
this should not be impossible, and indeed one may 
well doubt whether it would add significant new 
insights as to the incentive effects of contracts. 
Likewise, Caves’ points 7 and 8 are also unlikely 
to be of any great importance to standard contract 
theory. Durability of rent flows is often incorporated 
by simply taking variables in terms of present 
discounted values and, as far as essential inputs 
are concerned, the standard theory already has 
this aspect present in the sense that no principal 
gains any profit without an agent, and no agent 
gains any utility without the presence of a principal. 
Thus the essentiality of inputs in creative industries 
is unlikely to pose any challenge to contract theory, 
and it is also unlikely to lead to any significant 
alteration in the results of that theory.
However, the other points, namely point 2 
(workers care about their output) and point 6 (the 
importance of timing) may well be more interesting. 
It is certainly true that in the standard theory of 
contracts workers are only concerned with the 
financial gains from their efforts, and not from 
any other aspect related to the output obtained. 
If trade-offs between monetary payments and 
other aspects of output (perhaps the level of sales 
itself) are able to be brought into the contract, it is 
to be expected that different outcomes will result. 
Finally, with respect to timing, when there are 
many acts within the sequence of actions required 
for an output to be gained, and when the ordering 
of these acts is important, then there is a clear 
incentive for strategic and collusive behaviour 
by the participants along the value chain. Again, 
these types of considerations are likely to impact 
upon the outcomes of traditional contract theory, 
in which generally there is a single act (that of the 
agent), and thus no scope at all for collusion and 
hold-up effects.
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Thus, clearly we have another gap in the literature, 
namely the extension of the traditional principal-
agent framework to one that includes agents who 
care about more than just their monetary payments, 
and (independently of the previous suggestion) 
a greater complexity when considering possible 
strategic interactions among the players along the 
value chain. Both extensions to the basic model 
appear to be reasonably straightforward, and 
should not present any major modelling difficulties.
Notwithstanding Caves’ invitation, implicit or 
otherwise, to economic theory for a consideration of 
some of the specific aspects of creative industries 
within contract theory, he himself refrains from 
providing any such analysis, retaining instead the 
standard (i.e. ‘simple’) theory of contracts. Indeed, 
in his own words (Caves, 2000, p. 11): ‘Much of 
this book is about why contracts and deals are 
structured the way they are, and so simply contract 
theory plays a considerable role.’  Thus, Caves 
limits his work to the use of the standard theory 
as an explicative device for specific aspects of 
contracts that are observed in the real world of the 
creative process value chain. 
It is also true that Caves’ book has relatively little to 
do with copyright, and specifically the relationship 
between copyright and contracts. Copyright is 
not mentioned until relatively late in the book 
(page 281 to be precise), and the first mention of 
copyright law is related to droit de suite for works of 
visual art, rather than copyrights for other forms of 
access, which are of greater interest to the current 
survey. However, the second to last chapter of the 
book, entitled ‘Organising to Collect Rents: Music 
Copyrights’ is certainly of relevance to the current 
survey. 
This chapter offers a rather US-centric history of 
collective administration of the various royalty 
sources from music, but again does not discuss 
the way in which copyright law might affect 
the contractual relationships, or vice versa. 
However, interestingly, a testament to the highly 
controversial nature of the structure of royalty 
payments for music is apparent in the constant 
participation of the regulator in setting royalty fees. 
For example, as Caves documents (for the case of 
USA at least), mechanical royalty fees have always 
been set by legal decree rather than contractual 
negotiation. It is also interesting to note that some 
contractual terms appear to be pure ly the result 
of historical antecedents rather than contractual 
negotiation. For example, the fact that (again, in 
the USA, as documented by Caves) the royalties 
for performance of music are split equally between 
authors and publishers appears to be purely the 
continuation of what was first decided, without 
recourse to further negotiation (that could be 
explained by contract theory). 
23
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 1 - ECONOMIC THEORY OF COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS
1.2 INDIVIDUAL CONTRACTING
As argued in the previous section, the divergence 
between the traditional economic theory focus of 
contracts and what is required for the particular case 
of copyright related transactions is not too great. 
In effect, most (if not all) of the assumptions that 
would be relevant to copyright are in fact present in 
the more general theory, and any assumptions that 
are not could feasibly be introduced (and indeed, 
they might be relevant for many particular cases, 
not only copyright), but at the not insignificant cost 
of complexity of analysis. In our opinion, the costs 
of re-working contract theory to accommodate such 
aspects as workers who care about their output, 
and timing issues, would outstrip the additional 
insights that would be gained by their inclusion.
In short, I find that the economic theory literature 
has paid very scant attention to the question of 
the relationship between copyright protection 
and contracts along the value chain for copyright 
goods. The question has only really been studied 
in passing, indirectly, or at best in an incomplete 
fashion. That said it is worthwhile pointing out 
that most of the earnings literature concludes 
that median authors actually earn rather little 
from copyright royalty contracts.33 For example, 
Connolly and Krueger (2006) find that on average, 
over the 35 top musical acts that toured during 
2002, less than 10% of income was generated by 
recordings (i.e. copyright royalty income), while 
some 73% was due to concert earnings. While 
copyright royalty income should clearly depend 
upon the legal copyright protection standard, it 
would be interesting to study exactly how other 
income streams do. For example, to what extent do 
concert earnings actually depend upon copyright? 
In Domon and Nakamura (2007) for example, 
empirical evidence from Vietnam is collected that 
shows that when the perceived level of copyright 
protection is low, artists rely heavily on concerts 
for income. Indeed, Domon and Nakamura show 
that, at least for the case of Vietnam, the lower 
the level of protection, the more recordings are 
heard (although most in illegal formats), and 
correspondingly the greater concert attendance is, 
and thus revenue. Thus there may exist a negative 
relationship between copyright strength and 
concert earnings, and if concert earnings are by 
far greater than earnings from sales of music (as is 
the case in Vietnam), then there will be a negative 
relationship between the strength of copyright 
protection and total earnings of artists. 
Similarly we have a reasonable number of 
theoretical papers (see below for a discussion) 
that analyse the welfare effects of alterations in 
copyright, and these papers do (in some cases) 
include a consideration of the effects of copyright 
upon the price that is charged to consumers for 
access to the copyright good, which can clearly 
be seen as a rudimentary contract. However 
the contractual implications in these models are 
nothing more than a side-effect, and  are not seen 
as being of principle importance. Indeed, the best 
of the models cannot actually sign the effect of 
an increase in the copyright standard upon the 
market price of an original, due to the incorporation 
of many other variables, related mainly to piracy. 
Finally, we have a literature that explains how 
copyright licensing contracts should be structured, 
but these models (at least the published ones) 
are not designed to consider the effect of an 
alteration in the copyright standard upon the 
contractual structure for a licensing agreement. 
Notwithstanding these comments, we shall now 
go on to review the literature that exists, above all 
since it does serve to highlight the large research 
gap concerning the relationship between contract 
structures and copyright protection. 
33  For a detailed review of earnings data, see Paper 2.
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1.2.1  The structure of royalty contracts 
– royalty vs. buy-out
There is certainly one particular aspect of individual 
contracting for copyright goods that has been the 
subject of economic analysis – namely the structure 
of royalty contracts. Here, the questions that are 
often posed are the following:
i)  How should a royalty contract be structured 
in terms of the use of royalty payments and 
fixed payments?
ii)  Can it be optimal for the contract to stipulate 
only a fixed payment, that is, a buy-out?
iii)  Is there any benefit in non-linear royalty 
contract structures?
iv)  Should we expect that the same contractual 
terms would be optimal for all cases?
v)  How can we understand and interpret up-
front payments, along with royalties?
vi) How does a contract for access to an 
intellectual product relate risk and 
incentives?
In short, the answers to these six questions are, in 
order, i) outside of very special cases, both aspects 
should be present, ii) it is not generally optimal to 
exclude a royalty, iii) non-linear royalties would be 
more optimal than linear ones for all but one very 
special, and unrealistic, case, iv) we should expect 
different contractual terms to be optimal for different 
cases, v) up-front payments can be interpreted 
as insurance mechanisms, and vi) risk-sharing is 
just as important as financial remuneration as an 
incentive mechanism. In this section I shall discuss 
the two most important strands of literature – that 
regarding contracts and risk-sharing, and that 
regarding contracts and infringement (i.e. piracy).
1.2.2  Copyright royalty contracts and 
risk sharing
As a starting point, consider the paper by Liebowitz 
(1987). This is perhaps the first paper that explicitly 
recognises that the degree to which the risk 
embodied in intellectual products is retained by 
the creator depends entirely upon the terms of 
the contract under which access to the product is 
transferred. A royalty contract, where the royalty 
is calculated as a function of market revenue, 
shares the risk embodied in the revenue stream 
between the parties to the contract, whereas a 
fixed fee contract (where the user pays a fixed sum 
to the copyright holder, independent of revenue) 
transfers all risk away from the copyright holder. 
It is also true that, the greater the degree to which 
outright sale is avoided, for example, under a 
strict royalty agreement, the more the copyright 
holder retains post-contractual risk. The essence 
of the Liebowitz paper is to question the optimality 
of pure royalty contracts, especially when the 
first contracted user may affect the post-contract 
value of the intellectual property in question. The 
quandary is that, when the intellectual property 
is licensed and used, its value after that initial 
contract ends is often dependent upon what has 
happened during that contract. Under a pure 
royalty arrangement, the copyright holder alone 
would own the future income stream after the initial 
contract, but that income stream might well depend 
upon how the intellectual property is used during 
the initial contract. In a sense, under a pure royalty 
arrangement, access to the intellectual property is 
rented to the user for a determined length of time, 
and then after that period of time has expired, 
the copyright holder is once again the sole owner 
of any residual income stream. Most traditional 
economic theory would argue that, in cases such 
as this, the initial user should retain at least some 
of the post-contract income stream, in order that he 
or she has an incentive to maximise the value of 
the intellectual property intertemporarily. 
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As an extreme, the intellectual property might 
be sold outright to the first user, who would then 
retain  the entire income stream after the first use. 
Liebowitz posits the possibility that outright sale, at 
least in some cases, might well be a better option 
for copyright holders.
As a possible research gap, it would be interesting 
to study, both theoretically and empirically, the 
kinds of situation in which outright sale, rather 
than rental type contracts, does appear to hold 
more promise as an efficient mechanism for 
contracting access to copyright material. If the 
empirical analysis does point to a prominence 
of rental arrangements, whereas the theoretical 
analysis suggests outright sale (as appears to be 
the case studied by Liebowitz), then it would be 
very interesting to attempt to address the reasons 
for such a divergence.
As soon as it is recognised that the market value 
of an intellectual product is risky, or subject to 
uncertainty, then it becomes important that any 
contract for access to an intellectual product shares 
this risk among the parties in an efficient manner. 
That is, not only should a contract provide an 
incentive for creators via a monetary remuneration 
from users, but it should also distribute the risks 
involved in an optimal manner among the copyright 
holder and the user. Economics sees both of these 
aspects as being equally important, and indeed 
economics is explicitly concerned with the way in 
which incentives and risk bearing are traded off via 
the contractual terms.
It is, perhaps, important to note clearly that any form 
of royalty arrangement in a contract for access to 
a copyright can only be understood as a manner 
in which risk is shared. That is, in absence of any 
risk or uncertainty as to the final market value of 
the work in question, we should never expect to 
see any royalty payments in contracts, only pure 
transfers of quantities of money. To see this clearly, 
assume that it is agreed by the author and the 
user of a work that it is worth either $100,000 or 
$200,000 in the market. Then the contract that 
they sign would have to stipulate how they should 
share the $100,000 if that is what eventuates, 
or the $200,000 if that turns out to be the case. 
The easiest way that this can be done is for the 
revenue to be shared according to some agreed 
rule, for example, the contract could stipulate that 
20 percent of revenue is paid to the author and the 
remaining 80 percent is retained by the user. In this 
example, there is a royalty rate of 20 percent on 
revenue, and so the author would be paid $20,000 if 
revenue is low and $40,000 if revenue is high. This 
kind of contract shares the risk that is embodied in 
the uncertain revenue stream between the parties. 
On the other hand, imagine that there was no risk, 
and that it was known ex ante that revenue would 
be exactly $150,000. Now there is absolutely no 
need to stipulate a royalty. Even if the parties still 
desired that the author were to retain 20 percent 
of revenue, this can be contracted to by simply 
stating that the user should pay the author $30,000 
for access to the work in question – that is, an up-
front payment now suffices.
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In Alonso and Watt (2003), which follows on from 
Watt (2000; pp. 90-104), the risk sharing aspect 
of royalty contracts for intellectual property is 
explicitly considered. Perhaps the most interesting 
result that arises in Alonso and Watt is the fact 
that, in all but one particular case,34 the contract 
curve does not correspond to the diagonal of the 
Edgeworth box, which implies that any optimal 
contract will normally involve a royalty parameter 
that is a function of the revenue that is earned. 
This, of course, contrasts with the commonly seen 
royalty contract feature that the royalty parameter 
is independent of the amount of revenue earned 
– for instance, as in the example of the previous 
paragraph, it might be 20% of revenue, whatever 
that revenue might turn out to be, rather than 15% 
when revenue is high and 25% when revenue is 
low. Second, as long as both parties to the contract 
are risk-averse to some degree, a contract that 
transfers all risk to one party alone (e.g. a buy-out) 
will never be optimal. Thus, normally, we should 
expect that the contracts will involve a royalty, and 
that the royalty parameter will vary with the amount 
of revenue that the product ends up realising in 
the market. The fact that this does not actually 
tend to occur can perhaps be put down to such 
things as transactions costs (it is far less complex 
to have a single royalty parameter), or perhaps to 
the existence of asymmetrical information, which 
is assumed not to be present in Alonso and Watt.
One aspect of copyright contracts that is often 
observed can indeed be seen to be in harmony 
with economic theory. That is the existence of up-
front payments to creators as remuneration for 
creating the intellectual property. Such payments 
are often stipulated as being forwarded royalty 
payments, in the sense that the up-front payment 
corresponds to a royalty advance, and the royalty 
payments only continue once the revenue from 
the market exploitation of the intellectual product 
has reached the level that would correspond to the 
royalty advanced. Alonso and Watt consider this 
aspect of copyright contracts, and they show that 
it corresponds exactly to a deductible insurance 
contract, where the user is insuring the creator. 
Since economic theory has proven that such a 
contract form is indeed optimal for risk-averse risk-
holders, up-front payments to creators are indeed 
an efficient inclusion in contracts between creators 
and users of intellectual property.
Aside from risk sharing, there is a second aspect 
that suggests royalty contracts rather than outright 
sale might be efficient. The argument is that, since 
new works by a given author might well affect the 
market value of existing works, it is efficient that 
authors retain a financial interest in their works, in 
order that they do have an incentive to continue 
to produce quality creations. This theory has been 
expounded by Towse (2001). It is also a common 
argument for the reason why visual artists should 
retain a resale royalty.
In spite of the theory of royalty contracts being 
relatively well covered in the literature there 
still exists an important research gap, which is 
precisely the relationship between the terms of 
efficient royalty contracts and the legal copyright 
protection standard. Economic theory has yet to 
attempt to analyse the way in which an optimal 
royalty contract would be altered should copyright 
law be somehow altered. If, for example, the risk 
that is encompassed in a copyright transaction 
is reduced by a strengthening of the copyright 
protection standard, then certainly we should 
expect to see alterations in the royalty structure, 
since the royalty structure is exactly what is used 
to share risk. However, such an analysis has yet to 
be attempted. 
34 The case in question is when both parties to the contract have utility functions that are characterised by constant and 
common relative risk aversion. While constant relative risk aversion is believable, it is very hard to believe that copyright 
holders and users will be equally risk-averse.
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1.2.3  Contracts and infringement 
(piracy) 
Other important papers to have considered 
the different options for structuring a contract 
between a copyright holder and potential users 
of the intellectual property are Besen and Kirby 
(1989), and Varian (2000). However, rather than 
concentrating on risk-sharing, both of these papers 
are much more closely related to the relationship 
between the contractual structure used and the 
degree to which the intellectual property may have 
to compete in the market, perhaps with pirated 
versions. This aspect of contracts for access to 
copyright goods was also analysed by Watt (2000).
The relationship between a contract for access to a 
copyright good and piracy can be easily stated. In 
short, if a contract for access to a copyright product 
involves a per-unit royalty, then the marginal cost 
to the legal user has been artificially increased 
over and above the pure marginal reproduction 
cost. Take for example the case of pre-recorded 
music. There are pure costs involved in fixing a 
music track onto a physical format, say a CD rom, 
for sale to consumers. But if the copyright holder 
in the music must also be paid a royalty for each 
and every time a CD is produced, then the per-unit 
cost to the legal supplier of the CD is the sum of the 
production cost and the royalty. On the other hand, 
a pirate producer would avoid paying the royalty, 
and would only face the per-unit production cost. 
Thus, we can easily see that if a contract does 
involve a royalty payment, then it puts the legal 
producer at a marginal cost disadvantage with 
respect to pirate producers. In such a scenario, 
we might expect that the royalty contract acts 
as a device that fosters piracy, and hampers the 
revenue earning capability of the legal operation.
In Watt (2000), the marginal cost differential between 
the producer of originals and a pirate producer is at 
the forefront of the analysis. However, it is shown 
that in a traditional Cournot model of competition 
between the producer of originals and the pirate, 
it is not necessarily true that the existence of 
a royalty contract between the creator and the 
producer of originals will imply a level of piracy that 
is overly costly to the market earnings of originals. 
It also turns out that the optimal royalty parameter 
is very complex to calculate, and depends upon 
many other variables in the model. Nevertherless 
Woodfield (2006) shows that if the copyright 
holder can vary the royalty parameter over the two 
periods of Watt’s model, then significant gains can 
be made.
In a small, but certainly interesting, literature, we 
have a series of similar models that analyse the 
effects of copyright upon welfare. These papers 
tend to concentrate upon the question of how 
copyright protection ends up affecting the profits 
of the firms that produce the protected good, 
consumer surplus, and social welfare generally. 
As a side-effect in these models it is common that 
the researchers include at least a consideration of 
the effects of legal protection (defined in a variety 
of ways) upon the market price of the legitimate 
product. In as much as the market price is a 
contract between the producer and consumers, 
here again we can find some work that explores the 
nature of the effect of copyright upon a contractual 
arrangement. However, it must be stressed that 
in none of the welfare type papers is this effect 
noted as being of primary interest to the papers. It 
is also true that it is customary in this literature to 
consider the author and the distributor as one, and 
so there is typically no room in the models for a 
consideration of the royalty arrangement between 
these two parties.
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Good examples of such papers are Banerjee 
(2006) and Poddar (2006). While both of these two 
papers offer reduced form equations that state the 
market price of the legitimate product as a function 
of, among other things, variables that can be 
understood as representing copyright protection 
in some way, neither paper can conclude as to a 
specific sign for the relevant comparative static 
result. That is, the price at which the good would 
be marketed depends upon many things in the 
models, and so an increase in copyright protection 
will typically have an effect upon the market price 
of originals that depends upon the values of these 
other parameters. Thus, while certainly of interest 
to the relationship between market price and the 
copyright protection standard, these papers do little 
to resolve the question of the effect of copyright 
law upon the contractual terms at the point of sale 
to consumers.
So far, the literature concerning contracts for 
copyright has indicated a certain conflict between 
two opposing objectives. The inclusion of a royalty 
is a necessary ingredient for efficient risk sharing, 
but the royalty may well imply a lower shareable 
revenue due to the possibility that it provides a 
relative advantage to piracy operations. A full 
analysis of the trade-off between risk sharing and 
the amount of revenue to be shared as functions 
of the royalty parameter has yet to be attempted. 
Of course, the relationship between royalty 
contracts and piracy has not, as far as I am aware, 
ever been studied empirically. Such a study would 
be of undoubted value, and this is a clear literature 
gap. An empirical study could be based simply 
upon looking at the prevalence of per-unit royalty 
agreements over different types of copyright good, 
where the differences would be taken in terms of the 
degree to which they are pirated. The theory would 
suggest, at first sight, that with those copyright 
goods for which there are no royalty payments 
there is less piracy. It would certainly be interesting 
to see what an empirical study would say.
1.2.4  The effect of copyright law on 
royalty contracts
In the above, we have looked at how copyright 
royalty contracts might be affected by two specific 
factors; (1) uncertainty of the market value of the 
work, and (2) the presence of a threat of piracy. 
Both of these factors are related in that one expects 
that they are affected by copyright law. Certainly 
it is generally accepted that the stronger the legal 
standard of protection offered the less worrying 
the threat of piracy is. Also, part of the demand 
uncertainty might be due precisely to piracy, and 
so again a stronger copyright standard might 
reduce that uncertainty. However, there are many 
other ways in which copyright law might affect the 
final configuration of the royalty contract. As far 
as I know, there is no concise theoretical paper 
that fully analyses the relationship between the 
legal standard and the terms of royalty contracts, 
but the paper by Muthoo (2006) makes many 
indirect inferences to what one might expect the 
relationship to be.
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Muthoo correctly models copyright royalty contracts 
as the outcome of a voluntary bargaining process 
between two parties – the author and the publisher. 
Of course these two names are purely labels that 
might be altered to suit particular cases, and so we 
might rather prefer to use labels such as ‘copyright 
holder’ and ‘copyright user’. In any case, Muthoo 
applies standard bargaining theory to the case of 
royalty contracts, and points out that the price at 
which the final bargain is struck will depend almost 
entirely upon the relative ‘bargaining powers’ of the 
parties. It is then interesting to see how the relative 
bargaining powers are affected by different aspects 
of the particular problem, and to then understand 
the effect of copyright law.
Muthoo’s analysis is simplified to the extent that 
the contract is represented by a single number – a 
price – rather than a complex contractual structure 
perhaps involving up-front payments and royalty 
amounts that might depend upon intermediate 
outcomes. In reality, as has been argued above, 
this is really nothing more than an assumption of 
non-existence of risk or uncertainty as to the final 
market value of the work in question. Nevertheless, 
using a price as the surrogate for the contract even 
if some demand risk is present is certainly sufficient 
to garner the intuition as to how the copyright law 
standard might affect the final outcome.
Concretely, Muthoo identifies the following factors 
as the determinants of the final outcome:
1.  Reservation values
2.  Impatience
3.  Risk of breakdown in negotiations
4.  Existence and value of ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ 
options
5.  Asymmetric information
Of these factors, copyright law can feasibly have 
an impact upon at least the first four, and can 
thereby have an influence upon the final contract 
that is arrived at. While Muthoo does not explicitly 
mention how copyright law might affect the factors 
that he discusses, we can rather easily consider 
that ourselves here.
The reservation values are the minimum price 
at which the copyright holder would be willing to 
trade, and the maximum price at which the user 
would be willing to trade. Clearly, in order for any 
mutually beneficial trade to occur, the maximum 
willingness-to-pay of the user must exceed the 
minimum willingness-to-accept of the copyright 
holder. We can expect that, if a contract is indeed 
signed, it will involve a price that is strictly between 
the two extremes. That said, the values of the two 
extremes will be of fundamental importance to the 
exact contracted price. For example, for many 
simple bargaining problems the agreed price is 
exactly half-way between the two extremes. Thus, 
if one (or both) of the extreme prices is altered, the 
contract will also be altered. Finally, since copyright 
law might well have a strong bearing upon the 
extreme prices, it influences the contract.
To illustrate, we can use Muthoo’s numerical 
example. There, an author owns the copyright 
to some music, which he values at $100,000, 
which represents the income that he can derive 
by privately distributing the music via the Internet. 
This $100,000 is then the author’s minimum 
willingness-to-accept in a contract with a publisher. 
The publisher values the music at $200,000, which 
is the income that it would derive by recording the 
music on CDs and selling it to consumers. This 
$200,000 is the publisher’s maximum willingness-
to-pay in a contract with the author. Now let us say 
that, given these two extreme prices, the two parties 
agree to contract at a price of $150,000, where 
this is calculated as the number that lies exactly 
half-way between the two reservation prices, and 
that indeed such a deal would always be struck 
whatever the two reservation prices were. 
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What happens, then, if copyright law is 
strengthened? Presumably both reservation prices 
would increase – the music will be more costly 
to pirate, both online and in CD-ROM format, 
and so both the author and the publisher would 
value the music more highly.  As long as the final 
contract is still struck at half-way between the two 
reservation values the contract price must increase 
with the increase in the copyright standard. Note 
that the stronger copyright standard implies a 
greater contract price even if it is not true that both 
reservation prices increase: as long as at least one 
reservation price increases, and the other does not 
decrease, the contract price must increase with the 
copyright standard.35 
However, if (for example) the reservation price 
of the publisher was actually decreased by the 
stronger copyright standard, then it would no longer 
be clear how the contract would be affected. For 
example perhaps it would be the case that, under 
the weaker copyright standard, the publisher was 
able not only to record and sell the music on CD-
ROM format, but that it could also charge radio 
broadcasters for the right to broadcast the music. 
Then, let us say, a change in the copyright law 
conferred the right to charge radio for broadcasts 
only to the author, and not to the music publisher. 
This would likely increase the author’s reservation 
price, and decrease that of the publisher. The point 
that is now half-way between might be greater 
than or less than (or even still equal to) the original 
$150,000.   
The second determining factor noted by Muthoo for 
the contract price is the relative impatience of the 
two parties. Again, copyright law might be a factor 
here, in as much as patience is (at least partially) 
determined by such things as levels of income from 
other sources. Muthoo notes that the final deal 
that is struck will, all other things equal, be more 
favourable to the relatively more patient party. If a 
party is more willing to wait, then it has a greater 
bargaining power when the deal is negotiated. 
However, as is clearly implied by Muthoo, the 
relative degree of patience between the two parties 
will likely be heavily influenced by their abilities to 
earn money from sources other than what is being 
negotiated. For example, let us say the author only 
owns the copyright that is subject to negotiation, 
and he earns money in some other form of 
employment, perhaps as a music teacher. Assume 
that his ability to earn money as a music teacher is 
totally independent of the copyright law standard. 
On the other hand, the publisher will (presumably) 
already be working with other musicians, and the 
profitability of that ongoing business might well 
depend greatly on the copyright standard. In that 
case, a change in the copyright standard will affect 
the patience of the publisher, but not that of the 
author. If the copyright standard is increased, and if 
that increases the patience of the publisher relative 
to that of the author, then the final contract price 
can be expected to decrease.
Third, Muthoo establishes that the risk of 
breakdown in the negotiations is an important 
factor, along with the degrees of risk aversion of 
the two parties. Note that the risk of breakdown in 
negotiation is quite independent and different to 
demand uncertainty. A risk of breakdown occurs 
when, during the process of negotiation of the 
contract and of course before any deal is actually 
struck, events can occur that affect the value of the 
contract. Normally, it is thought that the possible 
events are detrimental to the value of the contract, 
but in principle there could also be events that 
actually increase the value of the contract. When 
these risks are known to exist, they are taken into 
account in the negotiations, and are duly reflected 
in the final contract. 
35 It must be stressed that these are purely theoretical statements, based upon theoretical models of negotiation. Exactly how 
things would turn out empirically would also be of great interest.
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Muthoo argues that, for a given risk of breakdown 
in negotiations, the more risk-averse a party is, 
the less his bargaining power, and thus the less 
favourable the royalty contract will be to him. For 
a given risk of breakdown, the more risk-averse 
party will be more eager to close a deal, and thus 
more willing to accept a less favourable price to 
him personally in exchange for getting the deal 
struck before any breakdown event occurs. It 
is unlikely that copyright law can affect the risk 
aversion of either party directly,36 but it will much 
more plausibly affect the actual probability of 
breakdown, or perhaps the payments to the two 
parties should a breakdown occur, and thereby the 
contract itself.
 
For example, imagine that competing works arrive 
according to some random process. Then, while 
negotiations regarding the contract for the current 
work are ongoing, there is some probability that a 
new work will arrive that can compete successfully 
with the current one. If this happens, it is likely 
to reduce the market value of the current work, 
thereby altering the parameters affecting the current 
contract. Perhaps copyright law is strengthened to 
the effect that the probability of close substitutes 
emerging is reduced. Then the risk of breakdown 
is reduced, and the contract that is signed should 
reflect that fact. So once again copyright law can be 
seen to directly affect the terms on which the deal is 
struck. If the alteration in copyright law does reduce 
the risk of breakdown then, relatively speaking, this 
should benefit the relatively more risk-averse of the 
two negotiating parties more. Thus, the relatively 
less risk-averse of the two should be able to obtain 
more favourable contractual terms.
The fourth important element that is mentioned by 
Muthoo is the existence of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
options. Such options are reflections of what the 
negotiating parties can earn during the negotiation 
process (inside options) and as an alternative 
to striking a deal (outside options). The different 
options available play similar roles to impatience 
and reservation values. The greater a party’s 
inside option, the less urgent it is for that party to 
arrive at a final contractual deal. In essence then, 
that party becomes more patient, and the effects 
upon the contractual terms would be the same as 
those already mentioned when impatience was 
discussed above.
Outside options are similar to, but not the same as, 
reservation values. An outside option only has an 
impact upon the contract if it is credible. To illustrate, 
go back to the original example suggested by 
Muthoo – the copyright holder values the work at 
$100,000 and the publisher values it at $200,000. 
Let us say that they would then contract to yield 
a payment of $150,000 to the author. But then let 
us assume that the author has an outside option 
– an alternative exclusive licensing arrangement 
with some other publisher – that would pay the 
author $x. If x<150,000, then this outside option 
is not credible as a threat, since by exercising 
it the author would be worse off. Thus under 
this assumption the outside option is worthless 
and inconsequential to the contract. But what if 
x>150,000? Now the outside option is credible – 
by exercising it the author would gain more than by 
closing the contract deal with the current publisher. 
In this case, the current publisher has no option 
other than to offer a deal that is equal to the outside 
option, and so we would expect that the final 
contract would stipulate a payment to the author of 
$x (assuming, of course, that x<200,000).
36 If the outside income streams of either (or both) parties are themselves risky, and if that risk is determined at least in part by 
the copyright standard, then a change in the standard can affect the risk aversion of the parties when the current contract is 
being negotiated. This is a case of ‘background risk’, which is rather complex to deal with theoretically, and this will not be 
considered here.
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Again, copyright law might play a part in 
determining the values of outside options. As an 
example, take the case of music that is licensed 
to radio broadcasters. Imagine also that music is 
supplied to radio under a blanket license offered by 
a copyright collective. In many countries, copyright 
law stipulates that the same tariff rate should be 
charged to all radio stations, and that no station 
can be excluded so long as it pays the set tariff. 
But what would happen if this law were to change, 
and the music license could be charged to different 
stations at different prices, or could be offered to 
stations on an exclusive basis? Radio stations 
would be made to bid for music in a kind of auction 
game, and the licensing body’s outside option for 
any exclusive contract with any one station is the 
value that the next station is willing to pay. This 
alteration in copyright law would certainly have 
important consequences for the contractual terms 
that are finally arrived at, and would even have 
major effects upon who the contracting parties are. 
The final important aspect noted by Muthoo for 
contract negotiations is asymmetric information. 
However, it is hard to see how copyright law 
might influence the degree to which asymmetric 
information prevails. Perhaps the only way is when 
the law stipulates compulsory licensing since, as is 
noted by Muthoo, it may turn out that asymmetric 
information is so severe that voluntary contracts 
become impossible. If that is the case, then a law 
that stipulates compulsory licensing would certainly 
affect the contracts that are made, but it is very 
hard to work out exactly what would be the final 
terms of such contracts.
As we have seen in this section, economic 
theory (the theory of risk sharing, the theory of 
incentive contracts, and the general theory of 
bargaining) can all provide enlightening insights 
on how contracts for the access to copyright works 
should be structured. This has largely been done 
in reasonably simple theoretical environments, 
and has not really concentrated upon the effects 
of copyright law per se on the final terms and 
structures that would be involved in such contracts. 
Nevertheless, several interesting and intuitive 
conclusions can be reached by simply considering 
how copyright law affects some of the parameters 
of the negotiation process itself. I have here 
provided a summary synopsis of my own views on 
this enticing topic, but a full and detailed analysis 
has yet to be performed. I see this as being a clear 
gap in the literature, and one that in principle it 
should be possible to fill using standard economic 
theory techniques.
Some of the effects that have been alluded to with 
reference to the Muthoo paper were in fact discussed 
by Michel (2006) in a paper that is perhaps the best 
effort available for attempting to determine the 
effects of the copyright standard upon contracts 
for access to copyright works. Nevertheless, we 
have to read between the lines again to get to the 
results. Michel provides a model in which a profit 
maximising music industry acts as intermediary 
between an author and final consumers of a 
copyright product (Michel specifically assumes the 
product is music). The consumers can copy the 
product, or purchase it, and here is where we can 
stretch Michel’s model a bit to include a treatment 
of copyright law. The assumptions used are that 
consumers face transaction costs for copying, 
and that copies are of inferior quality to originals. 
Both of these factors can be taken to represent, in 
some way, the copyright standard – the stronger 
the protection level offered, the greater the 
transactions costs for copying, and the greater the 
quality differences between copies and originals.37 
Michel follows the lead of other papers in the 
37 The main difference is that Michel assumes that these variables can be different for each consumer, whereas it is more 
relevant to assume that the same copyright standard applies to each consumer in the same way. However, the insights from 
the Michel model are still very important for the case at hand.
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tradition of models of copyright piracy by assuming 
that the contract that the music distributor has with 
consumers (only those who purchase rather than 
copy, of course) is captured by a price, p. On the 
other hand, the contract between the distributor 
and the author is captured entirely by a royalty 
parameter that stipulates how the market revenue 
is shared between them. These are simplified 
contracts, but still relevant enough to be of great 
interest to our current investigation.
The Michel model is solved using backward 
induction. Firstly, the optimal behaviour of the 
consumers is discovered, and this sets the 
demand curve that is faced by the music distributor 
as a function of the sales price. Then the optimal 
sales price can be determined as a function of the 
royalty parameter. Finally, the negotiation between 
the distributor and the author is modelled (using a 
Nash bargaining model) in order to determine the 
appropriate royalty contract parameter.
Of interest here are the comparative statics of 
the equilibrium with respect to what we are here 
interpreting as the copyright standard. It turns out 
that the results are quite clear-cut; an increase in 
the copyright standard leads to a higher market 
price of the work in question, and a higher royalty 
parameter. It is also possible to consider the effect 
on the two contracts while holding the copyright 
standard fixed. If the royalty rate increases, then 
the market price of the work also increases.
While the Michel model takes us quite a distance 
into the relevant framework for analysing the 
effects of copyright upon contracts, this is not 
the real objective of the paper, and we need to 
re-interpret some of the variables to ensure that 
the model does provide insights as to the effects 
that we are interested in here. The model is also 
somewhat simplified, and could be extended and 
improved, although it is not clear to what extent 
such extensions would yield different, or better, 
conclusions.
Finally it is also interesting to note that in the Michel 
model, the effects of the copyright standard can 
only be understood with respect to the relationship 
between the distributor and the consumers, and 
so copyright is not a direct input into the contract 
between the author and the distributor. This is 
exactly as we have already pointed out above – it 
might appear that what is important for the author-
publisher relationship is contract law, with copyright 
law having an indirect effect. On the other hand 
copyright law is fundamental to the contractual 
relationship between the publisher (distributor) and 
consumers. This is, of course, due entirely to the 
incomplete nature of the contracts that can be had 
between distributors and consumers, since there 
is a very high monitoring cost that makes a more 
complex contract unenforceable.
While the Michel model is, perhaps, the only 
attempt thus far at considering the relationship 
between copyright law and contractual terms, it 
still falls well short of being a complete analysis. 
Above all, the model concentrates entirely on the 
effects of copyright law on the contract between 
the distributor and consumers, and any effects on 
the royalty contract between the distributor and 
the author are purely indirect. That is, as we have 
hypothesised above, copyright law will certainly 
have important, and interesting, effects on the 
bargain that is struck between the author and the 
distributor, but the Michel model ignores all such 
effects.
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1.3  ASPECTS RELATED TO THE 
‘FAIRNESS’ OF COPYRIGHT 
CONTRACTS
It has been argued that there exists a disparity 
of bargaining power between the parties to a 
copyright contract that leads to unfair terms and 
conditions being present in the contracts. The 
most frequent point of view is that the contracts 
between artists and the intermediary companies 
that make the works available publicly (e.g. 
producers, distributors, publishers, etc.) are ‘unfair’ 
to the artists and authors who actually create the 
works. This is an important aspect of contracting 
that the economics literature has yet to touch upon. 
Above all, if it is true that there is an element of 
unfairness in the contracts, one is left wondering 
how copyright law might be amended in order that 
the resulting contracts are fairer.
Again, in a certain sense it is strange that 
economists have neglected to study the fairness 
of copyright contracts. Although it is true that 
economics has traditionally been occupied with 
aspects of efficiency, there exists a well developed 
theory of fairness in economic theory (see Baumol 
1987 for a survey of the field).
The economic theory of fairness has, in the past, 
been more concerned with the fairness of an 
allocation of goods over individuals rather than 
the contracts that determine those allocations. 
However, as long as what is really at issue in 
copyright contracts is not the fairness of the 
contracts, but rather the fairness of the resulting 
allocation of revenues (or perhaps of rights 
themselves), then the existing economic theory 
is surely of relevance. The questions that would 
appear to be of maximal interest are the following:
1.  How should ‘fairness’ be defined for the 
context of copyright contracts?
2.   Are existing contracts really ‘unfair’?
3.  Do alternative contracts, within the current 
copyright law, exist that would be perceived 
as being ‘fairer’? If they do exist, do those 
contracts sacrifice efficiency?
4.  To what extent does any perceived 
‘unfairness’ depend upon copyright law?
5.  Can copyright law be altered in order that 
the balance of bargaining positions  is 
changed and the resulting contracts are 
‘fair’?
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The study of fairness in the context of copyright 
contracts is bound to be fraught with difficulties, and 
it is likely to arrive at conclusions that might be seen 
as being provocative. The entire research agenda 
will rest squarely upon the definition of fairness 
that is adopted, and all conclusions reached will of 
course be subject to that definition. Of course it is 
therefore of fundamental importance to arrive at a 
definition of fairness that is itself considered to be 
fair by all parties. Not an easy task, but certainly 
one that is worthwhile working on.
1.4  COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF 
COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS38
In most jurisdictions the copyright law allows for 
copyright holders to join together into collectives 
for the purposes of exploitation of their rights. The 
origins of collective administration may appear 
to be a straightforward response to a problem of 
transaction costs. An evocative story recounts 
the visit of Ernest Bourget, a French composer of 
popular chansons and chansonettes comiques, 
to the Paris café Ambassadeurs in 1847 where, 
among other pieces, his music was being played 
without permission. He then refused to settle the 
bill for his drink of sugared water, at the time a 
fashionable beverage. In the resulting brawl, M. 
Bourget argued ‘you consume my music, I consume 
your wares’ – an argument he won before the 
Tribunal de Commerce de la Seine which upheld 
the revolutionary law of 1793, recognising a right 
to public performance for the first time.39
Ernest Bourget understood that as an individual 
composer he should not devote his life to chasing 
unauthorised performances of his music. Vice 
versa, each venue performing popular music 
would incur considerable costs in tracking and 
negotiating with various holders of the relevant 
performing rights. The solution to the failures of 
individual contracting was collective administration, 
combining a comprehensive monitoring service 
of music usage with a facility to issue licenses, 
i.e. permissions to play against remuneration. 
Ernest Bourget, his colleagues Victor Parizot 
and Paul Henrion as well as the publisher Jules 
Colombier founded an Agence Centrale, the direct 
predecessor of the first modern collecting society 
Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs et Editeurs 
de Musique (SACEM). SACEM, established in 
1851, became the European model, collecting at 
times even in Switzerland, Belgium and the UK. 
Transaction cost economics recognises that there 
are costs of using markets, such as information 
costs, contract costs and governance costs.40 In the 
case of copyright, transaction costs may include (a) 
identifying and locating the owner, (b) negotiating 
a price (this includes information and time costs), 
and (c) monitoring and enforcement costs. The 
sparse economic literature on collecting societies 
tends to accept a transaction cost rationale for their 
existence.41
38 This section draws on Kretschmer 2002 and 2005a.
39 The French Acts of 1791 (regarding performances of theatre and musical drama) and 1793 (regarding the sale and 
dissemination of artistic works of any genre) replaced the old system of publishers’ privileges with a system of authors’ rights.
40 Thus, under certain conditions, non-market structures (such as integrating economic activities into the hierarchy of a firm) 
can be more efficient than individual contracting (Williamson 1975; 1985).
41 Hollander (1984); Besen and Kirby (1989); Besen, Kirkby and Salop (1992); Kay (1993); Towse (1997); Thorpe (1998); Watt 
(2000); Landes and Posner (2003). An excellent survey of this field is Handke and Towse (2007).
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Under collective administration there is typically 
only one supplier of licences to the user of 
copyright works in one particular domain of 
rights (such as public performances). Reciprocal 
agreements with sister societies in other countries 
ensure that access to ‘the world repertoire’ can be 
granted through one licence. From the perspective 
of individual owners of copyright works there may 
be no alternative provider of a rights administration 
infrastructure. In consequence, market prices 
cannot form neither for licences to users nor for 
services to right holders.42 
This monopolistic structure leaves copyright 
collecting societies in control of the terms of 
access and royalty distribution in their particular 
rights domain. In many areas of collective licensing 
administrative costs are high. The cost of collection 
may amount to a quarter of revenues - while for 
other complex services (such as health insurance) 
administrative deductions of 5% are seen as high.43 
The tendency of collective administration to evolve 
into bureaucracies sheltered from competition 
has led to increasing state involvement in the 
supervision of collecting societies. As a general 
rule, collecting societies in all EU Member States 
cannot refuse to license their repertoire; they have 
to admit members subject to certain threshold rules; 
and they have to give some kind of public account 
of their finances. In the case of music performing 
rights and mechanical reproduction societies an 
intriguing feature of collective administration is the 
representation of both authors (composers and 
lyricists) and publishers – enforced by a governance 
structure under which changes to membership 
and distribution rules can only be implemented by 
mutual consent of both groups. Despite market 
pressures to the contrary, author members of 
German society GEMA receive 70% (compared 
to 30% for the publisher) of any performing right 
royalty distribution, and 60% of the mechanical 
rights. The British Performing Right Society (PRS) 
distributes 50:50 between publishers and creators, 
while the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society 
(MCPS) leaves the distribution shares to individual 
contracts between the parties.44 In addition, large 
right holders, whose works are easier to monitor 
and account for, in effect subsidise small members. 
These distribution decisions are treated as internal 
matters, and will not be publicised.
42 One strand of commentators has located the inefficiencies in collective administration in the nature of liability rules (Merges 
1996). The argument derives from R.H. Coase’s seminal paper ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (1960). For a critique of natural 
monopoly analysis, see A. Katz (2005; 2006).
43 To give some examples: PRS performing right income is roughly equally split between income from broadcasting and from 
general performance (i.e. music at pubs, clubs, shops, aircraft, concerts). Unsurprisingly, the costs of collecting are much 
higher for the latter.
44 Naturally, it is hard to know what would be a market rate in the absence of a market (cf. Liebowitz 2006). Two observations 
indicate that the royalty fees available to music writers are above what would be negotiated in a competitive market between 
willing individual sellers and buyers: (i) they are very high compared to other markets, such as performers, or video game 
developers; (ii) authors are under pressure from publishers to accept (and have accepted) a lower percentage of the royalty 
distribution in countries without a tradition of collective author organisation (such as the new EU members which acceded in 
2004 and 2007; see Kretschmer 2005b).
45 At GEMA, so-called ‘evaluation committees’ weigh the distribution of royalties to authors according to considerations of 
length of membership, past income, artistic personality and overall contribution of an œuvre. In the UK, the classical music 
subsidy in the royalty distribution formula was phased out following the Performing Rights Report of the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission (1996). In 1999 a PRS foundation was established for the support of new music, regardless of genre.
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Many European collecting societies also weigh 
their distribution per copyright work according to 
a value judgment, including the amount of skill 
involved, and the cultural contribution of a genre 
or composer.45 Finally, under the guidelines of 
CISAC (Confédération Internationale des Sociétés 
d’Auteurs et Compositeurs), the international 
umbrella organisation of the author rights societies, 
up to 10% of collected licence fees may be 
channelled into socio-cultural funds.46
The analysis suggests that collective administration 
can also be viewed as a form of unionisation. 
Authors no longer enter the market as individuals 
(Peacock and Weir 1975, p. 41). This enables them 
to extract better terms than contracting individually 
with music publishers and music users (such as 
labels and broadcasters), and provide socio-
cultural support to creators. 
There are several ways in which copyright law 
might affect the contractual business of copyright 
collectives, starting with the very fact that they are 
permitted to exist. As discussed, the justification for 
the existence of collectives is traditionally based 
upon the transaction costs savings that they are 
understood to provide. However, in exchange for 
being allowed to exist, and therefore for operating 
as monopolies, the activities of copyright collectives 
– including the prices that they charge for offering 
access to blanket licenses of their repertories – are 
normally subject to regulation. In as much as this 
regulation is understood to be part of copyright 
law, clearly we have an instance of copyright law 
affecting the contracts along the copyright value 
chain. If the regulations were not in force then 
we should expect that copyright collectives would 
operate differently, and so in that sense, we can 
understand that the contracts used by copyright 
collectives lie on the boundary of the contractable 
space, and would be affected by alterations in the 
laws regulating the collectives.
The types of contracts used by collectives and 
that are interesting from an economic theory 
perspective are those that govern the supply 
of repertoire by authors and the way in which 
authors are remunerated by the collective, and 
the contracts under which the collective makes its 
repertoire available to end-users. 
A good deal of the regulatory environment facing 
copyright collectives in the US is discussed by 
Einhorn (2006). In general, it can be seen that 
what is provided is  exactly what the law stipulates 
– when blanket licenses should be offered only on 
a non-exclusive basis they are,47 when a ‘genuine 
choice’ must be offered on a programme basis it is, 
and when there can be no discrimination between 
licensees there is not. Thus it would appear that 
the regulatory environment is truly restrictive in the 
sense that if these regulations were not in force, 
collectives would most likely attempt to contract 
with licensees in ways that would be different to 
what they do under the regulation. Of interest to 
the present survey is the question of exactly how 
the contracts used by copyright collectives would 
look under a different regulatory environment – 
and who would be the winners and losers under 
a regulatory change. Unfortunately, there are no 
economic theory papers that have considered 
this issue. However, again it would seem that 
economic theory is in a good position to analyse 
such questions. 
46 The German law regulating copyright societies (Urheberwahrnehmungsgesetz) explicitly demands that they should foster 
‘culturally important works and contributions’ (§7) and set up pension and social funds (§8). Anglo-American right holders 
often feel that their exported property subsidises foreign social and cultural policy (Harcourt 1996).
47 That is, individual licensing must also be allowed. However, individual licensing is almost never advantageous to the 
individuals themselves, and so is uncommon. 
38
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 1 - ECONOMIC THEORY OF COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS
1.5  OTHER ALTERNATIVES
One of the areas of the economics of copyright that 
has attracted most interest from economists is the 
study of the degree to which copyright is actually 
required. This literature assumes almost exclusively 
that the underlying objective of copyright is to 
provide incentives to authors to create new works 
(presumably by allowing contracts to be written), 
and that the provision of this incentive via a legal 
regulation like copyright law has certain negative 
effects socially. The literature does not typically 
consider that no incentive is required, but rather 
looks for alternative means under which the same, 
or similar, incentives can arise, but under which 
there are fewer harmful side-effects. Examples of 
the types of alternative mechanism that have been 
suggested are indirect appropriability (Liebowitz, 
1985), network effects (Takeyama, 1994), DRM 
systems, bundling and versioning, taxes on blank 
supports and copy technologies, and public 
funding including prizes. A survey of this literature 
up to 2006 can be found in Liebowitz and Watt 
(2006). As a general conclusion from the literature, 
with the exception of the work by Michele Boldrin 
and David Levine (see Boldrin and Levine 2002, 
2004 and 2005) who advocate for no need for any 
copyright protection at all,48 the literature suggests 
that some protection is in order, but that it should 
not be excessive.  
Another good source of information on the 
alternative incentive mechanisms for copyright 
holders is Gallini and Scotchmer (2002). Although 
Gallini and Scotchmer are interested in intellectual 
property in general (i.e. both patent and copyright), 
their analysis is generally relevant to copyright. In 
their conclusions Gallini and Scotchmer find that 
legal protection is ‘probably the best mechanism’ 
when there is asymmetric information regarding 
the costs and benefits of the works in question. It 
would seem that this is likely true for the case of 
copyright. However, and perhaps more relevant 
to the present survey, Gallini and Scotchmer are 
cautious when it comes to the optimal design of 
any IP law, especially in as far as the ability of the 
parties to contract is concerned. In closing they 
note specifically the following: ‘To understand 
whether the property system is strong, too weak, 
or not necessary at all requires us to understand 
the incentives for contracting, and its potential 
anticompetitive consequences.’ Nevertheless, 
Gallini and Scotchmer do not offer any analysis of 
the copyright-contract relationship.
Given these two sources of survey information, here 
we concentrate upon the possible interconnections 
between alternative remuneration mechanisms 
and copyright law itself.
48 Boldrin and Levine assert that the market will work perfectly well without copyright protection, and that the ability for creators 
to earn money is guaranteed by their first-mover advantage. Most economists who have commented on the suggestion of 
Boldrin and Levine find that it is based on an economic reality that, while possibly still appropriate for patent goods, no longer 
exists for copyright goods.
39
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 1 - ECONOMIC THEORY OF COPYRIGHT CONTRACTS
First and foremost, it should be clearly pointed out 
that most alternative remuneration mechanisms 
require some form of protection to be in place. At 
the very least, a formal and legal recognition of a 
property right might be needed for the original author 
to be able to justify any type of mechanism that 
implies payment to him. Take for example the case 
of open-source software. It is widely recognised 
that this new intellectual property paradigm cannot 
exist without legal copyright (see, for example, 
Leveque and Meniere, 2007). Nevertheless, 
open source licensing is seen as an alternative to 
traditional proprietary mechanisms that rely more 
directly upon legal protection for ensuring royalty 
streams. Koski (2005) considers a set of Finnish 
software firms to see how the characteristics of 
the firm affect the type of licensing contracts that 
it might use – open source or proprietary. She 
finds that a firm’s ownership structure has a major 
influence, with family owned firms opting largely for 
traditional licensing contracts, and diffusely held 
companies relying more heavily upon open source 
mechanisms.
With the possible exception of the general idea that 
the worse the copyright protection standard is the 
greater the reliance upon alternative mechanisms 
will be, I am not aware of any study that considers 
the marginal effect of alterations in the copyright 
standard upon the structure of alternative 
mechanisms.
1.6  CONCLUSIONS
It is fair to say that in general the economic 
theory profession has not considered in any detail 
the relationship between the legal institution of 
copyright and the types of contracts that are written 
along the value chain for copyright goods. The topic 
of contracts has been looked at mainly in terms of 
royalty contracts, and then only really between 
creators and intermediaries (e.g. publishers, 
distributors, etc.), whereby copyright itself is not 
explicitly brought into the picture. Perhaps the 
most important research gap, then, is to consider 
exactly how alterations in copyright protection 
(either some measure of enforcement, or perhaps 
some measure of scope, or of course the duration 
of copyright) would affect the terms that would be 
agreed to via royalty contracts. Of primary interest 
is the question of exactly how certain changes in 
copyright would end up affecting the welfare of the 
signatories to royalty contracts, thereby altering 
the balance of revenue flows and incentives.
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A second important research gap would involve the 
explicit consideration of the perceived ‘fairness’ of 
copyright contracts to the parties involved, and how 
(or indeed if) copyright law can be altered so as to 
ameliorate any perceived unfairness. Not so long 
ago such a study would not have been considered 
overly relevant for economics scholars, who are 
renowned for concentrating much more on issues 
of efficiency than issues of equity or fairness. 
However, there does exist an established general 
literature on the economics of fairness, which 
is based on solid economic theory ideals, and 
which could (in principle) be applied to the case of 
copyright contracts.
It is also interesting to consider whether copyright 
and contracts are always to be understood as 
complements, or whether they can also maintain 
a substitute relationship. That is, we are generally 
comfortable with the idea that a contract for a work 
of authorship might not be able to be written unless 
there is a copyright law that establishes the title 
of ownership, and what that owner may legally 
contract to. But it is also the case that contracts, 
being freely negotiated agreements, can also 
establish what can and cannot be done by the 
parties involved, including the remedies available 
for breach. Thus, in a well-defined sense, contracts 
can work as devices that substitute for copyright 
law, at least as far as the signatories to the contract 
are concerned. An important research gap, 
therefore, is to consider the nature of the substitute-
complement relationship between copyright and 
contracts, and above all, to determine what the 
nature of the relationship depends upon (with 
transaction costs being the most logical element). 
Once a clear idea has been achieved of the type of 
relationship that exists, at least for specific points 
along the value chain, then one can determine with 
much more authority the type of policy conclusion 
that is suggestive of how copyright law might be 
amended in order to provide the incentives for 
individuals to use contract terms as protection 
measures instead. 
Finally, a fourth interesting aspect that provides a 
research gap is the relationship between what I 
have called the ‘contractable space’ and copyright 
law itself. If we understand that copyright law sets 
the boundaries of the contract space, then clearly 
the former affects the latter. But it is also likely that 
the types of contracts that are written may well 
affect copyright law, or at least the interpretation 
of copyright law. I therefore suggest as a fourth 
research proposal the issue of the study of the 
interrelationship between the contract space and 
the contracts that are written within it, and copyright 
law’s parameters and interpretations.
Overall I think that a more careful, methodological, 
and above all a more formal application of the 
well-known principal-agent framework to the 
specific case of copyright constitutes the most 
logical first step forward for economists. Of course 
the principal-agent model is very well known to 
economic theory, and it relates directly to the issue 
of contracting. As parameters around the model 
one can easily bring in copyright law with a variety 
of free variables defining the legal protection 
parameters. This would then allow the researcher 
to study how alterations in the legal copyright 
standard affect the final equilibrium outcome. 
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ABSTRACT
Cultural markets are winner-take-all markets. 
They are very risky for both creators and 
investors. The earnings data available from labour 
market statistics, tax and insurance audits, and 
surveys indicate that the top 10% of creators 
receive a disproportionally large share of total 
income in the creative professions. The top 10% 
of literary authors earn about 60-70% of total 
income; the top 10% of composers/songwriters 
earn about about 80% of total income. This 
can be compared to earnings data for the total 
population of employees. Here the top 10% of 
earners earn about 20% of total income (Annual 
Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE), UK 
Office for National Statistics). For most creators, 
‘portfolio lives’ are typical: about two thirds of 
professional creators have earnings from a 
second job. Overall, the income of creators is 
well below the national median income. There are 
some variations by sector, but broadly the picture 
is consistent across the developed world.
The bargaining outcome over rights is tilted 
towards bestsellers. Creators with a track record 
of success are able to negotiate contracts that 
preserve their interests. For most others, in 
particular new entrants to the entertainment 
industries, assignment of rights are common. 
Mechanisms of collective bargaining (for example 
through unions, professional associations and 
collecting societies) appear to have a greater 
effect than statutory (ownership) rights because 
the latter, typically, will be varied and/or transacted 
by contract.
The comparative international review of the 
regulation of copyright contracts uncovered a 
range of regulatory tools that attempt to balance 
the bargaining powers of the parties. These 
provisions relate to Ownership; Requirements 
of form; Scope of rights transferred; Rights to 
remuneration; Effects on third parties; Revision 
and termination; and Unfair contracts. Very 
little empirical evidence is available about the 
effectiveness of these provisions, but this paper 
contains a number of methodological suggestions 
how regulatory tools could be assessed (if policy 
was to desire to adjust the bargaining outcome 
between creators and investors). Options 
identified by the literature include intervening 
in situations of non-exploitation; strengthening 
rights that cannot be transferred (such as the 
right to be credited as the author); and privileging 
instruments of collective bargaining.
2.1.  CREATORS, AND THE PURPOSE  
OF COPYRIGHT LAW
For about 200 years, it has been a fundamental 
tenet of European copyright laws that the term 
of protection should derive from the author’s 
life.49 French revolutionaries50, German 
idealists51,English romanticists52 all were happily 
linking the author’s livelihood to the existence of 
copyright. Even one of copyright’s most eloquent 
early sceptics conceded (Thomas Babington 
Macaulay, Speech of 5 February 1841 in the 
House of Commons):
49 A term of 50 years post mortem auctoris was internationally formalised with the Berlin revision (1908) of the Berne convention 
(1886, last updated at Paris 1979). The US adopted a ‘life plus’ term only with the 1976 Copyright Act, and joined the Berne 
Convention in 1989. As Berne with the exception of Article 6bis (moral rights) has become incorporated into the WTO TRIPS 
Agreement (1994), an author-derived term of protection is now the prevailing law of the global free trade area. As of 23 July 
2008, 153 countries are members of the World Trade organization.
50 Décret du 13-19 Janvier 1791 (regarding performances of theatre and musical drama): life plus 50 years; Décret du 19-24 
Juillet 1793 (regarding the sale and dissemination of artistic works of any genre): life plus ten years.
51 1837 Prussian Copyright Act: life plus 30 years.
52 1842 Copyright Act: life plus seven years or 42 years from publications (whichever longer). Talfourd’s 1837 bill (which failed 
to reach the statute book) had provided for a term of life plus 60 years.
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It is desirable that we should have a supply of 
good books: we cannot have such a supply unless 
men of letters are liberally remunerated; and the 
least objectionable way of remunerating them is 
by means of copyright. You cannot depend for 
literary instruction and amusement on the leisure 
of men occupied in the pursuits of active life. 
Such men occasionally produce compositions of 
great merit. But you must not look to such men 
for works which require deep meditation and long 
research. Works of that kind you can expect only 
from persons who make literature the business of 
their lives.53
Such arguments still underpin contemporary 
lobby efforts for extending the duration, scope and 
enforcement of copyright laws. In the European 
debate surrounding the implementation of the 
1996 WIPO Internet Treaties, 400 recording 
artists signed a petition to the European 
Parliament entitled Take a stand for creativity. 
Take a stand for copyright: ‘We make our living 
through our music. The music that we create 
touches the lives of millions of people all over 
the world. Our creativity and our success depend 
on strong copyright protection. We now need 
your help.’54 The German publishers’ campaign 
against the copyright exception for teaching and 
scientific research (§52a UrhG) argued: ‘If copies 
of books are free, nobody will buy originals. If 
nobody buys originals, nobody will publish books 
or journals. The result: If nobody publishes, 
Germany’s thinkers will soon have to look for a 
different employment’.55 The law suit filed by the 
US Authors Guild against the Google digital library 
project has been advanced under the slogan ‘Not 
at the Writers’ Expense’: ‘The alphabet ought 
to be free, most certainly, but the people who 
painstakingly arrange it into books deserve to 
be paid for their work. This, at the core, is what 
copyright is about. It’s about a just return for 
work and the dignity that goes with it.’56 Similar 
language can also be found in the Recitals to 
several European Directives. Information Society 
Directive (2001/29/EC) – Recital 10: ‘If authors 
or performers are to continue their creative and 
artistic work, they have to receive appropriate 
reward for the use of their work, as must 
producers in order to finance their work…’; Recital 
11: ‘A rigorous, effective system for the protection 
of copyright and related rights is one of the main 
ways of ensuring that European cultural creativity 
and production receive the necessary resources 
and of safeguarding the independence and dignity 
of artistic creators and performers.’57
According to the economic literature underpinning 
these arguments, authors’ livelihoods depend on 
copyright law in the following way: 
- Copyright structured as an exclusive property 
right gives authors something to sell to a third 
party for exploitation.
- Income is then derived from the contract 
assigning or licensing the copyright, typically 
to a publisher or producer.
53 Quoted from Macaulay, Th.B. (1952) Macaulay: Prose and Poetry (ed. G.M. Young), London: Hart-Davis, p. 733. Macaulay 
was created Baron in 1857, and is most commonly known as Lord Macaulay.
54 Petition ‘Artists Unite for Strong Copyright’, led by Jean Michel Jarre with the assistance of IFPI (19 January 1999), signed 
by among others Boyzone, the Corrs, Robbie Williams, Tom Jones, Eros Ramazotti, Mstisalav Rostropovich, Barbara 
Hendricks, Die Fantastischen Vier, Aqua and Roxette.
55 Advert Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 31 March 2003.
56 Nick Taylor (president of the US Authors Guild), Op-Ed Article in Washington Post, 22 October 2005.
57 Cf. Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC), Recital 10: ‘If authors or performers are to continue their creative and artistic 
work, they have to receive appropriate reward for the use of their work, as must producers in order to finance their work…’; 
Recital 11: ‘A rigorous, effective system for the protection of copyright and related rights is one of the main ways of ensuring 
that European cultural creativity and production receive the necessary resources and of safeguarding the independence and 
dignity of artistic creators and performers.’
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As Richard Watt summed it up in Paper 1: 
‘Copyright itself is not an incentive mechanism, 
but (assuming that it is enforced) it does allow 
an incentive mechanism to operate, namely 
contracts.’
2.1.1  Pre-copyright and non-copyright 
contracts
The effects of copyright law on copyright contracts 
are not easy to isolate. Consider two simple 
examples:
The literary author
A typical deal may transfer the copyright in a work 
to a publisher, against an advance and a royalty 
on copies sold. 
The professional footballer
A typical deal may contract a footballer exclusively 
to a club against a signing-on fee, and salary 
payments that depend on appearances and 
success.
What looks like a copyright advance plus 
royalties is, in the case of the footballer, simply 
a contract. There is no Berne Convention for 
footballers. Would it have made a difference if 
footballers’ performances were statutory subject 
matter? Vice versa, could not the literary author’s 
copyright contract be conceptualised as a bilateral 
agreement? Without the existence of copyright, 
an author may still be commissioned for delivery 
of a novel, just as a footballer is paid to play 
football. Similarly, the author may contractually 
receive royalties, just as the footballer may 
receive a bonus for winning a title, or making an 
agreed number of appearances.58
 
The point can be illustrated with a sophisticated 
early publishing agreement. In 1794 Friedrich 
Schiller and publisher Johann Friedrich Cotta 
concluded a contract for the Horen journal (one 
of the most important periodicals of the German 
enlightenment). At that time, there was no 
statutory copyright law in the jurisdiction where 
the publishing house Cottaische Buchhandlung 
was established (the Southern German state of 
Württemberg), and unauthorised reprints in other 
German language jurisdictions were common. 
The Horen contract includes advances, royalties, 
options, and even a moral right type clause.59 
Clause (5) reserves the right of the author to 
make modifications. Clause (8) provides that an 
essay submitted to the journal may not be re-
printed elsewhere until the end of four years after 
the publication in Horen. Clause (9) secures an 
option to the publisher on all future writings of 
the editors, provided that they are not already 
contracted elsewhere. Clause (15) promises a 
royalty to the editors of one third of profits on 
sales beyond 2000 copies.
Although this agreement looks uncannily like 
a copyright contract, it is simply a bilateral 
agreement over the supply of a service (which 
we only now recognise as the exploitation of a 
copyright work). 
58 In economic terms, the research gap could be formulated thus: To what extent can contracts substitute for copyright protection 
at all points along the value chain? (For discussion, see Paper 1, section 1.2.5).
59 The Horen contract is reprinted in full as an Appendix (see p. 80 below). 
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Another strand of literature suggests that an 
author may negotiate what a publisher can, or 
can’t do but both, author and publisher have 
little contractual influence over the behaviour of 
competitors and consumers after publication. 
Here copyright law matters. To return to the 
football analogy, anybody may copy Ronaldo’s 
step-over, but not the turn of phrase that is 
a substantial part of a copyright work. And 
presumably, the effects of subsequent copying 
are discounted in the price a publisher is 
prepared to pay for a work, depending on ‘indirect 
appropriability’.60
If the relationship between creator (author) and 
investor (publisher/producer), such as duration, 
royalties, options etc, can be negotiated as a 
bilateral legal relationship sans droit d’auteur, it 
is only by conceptualising the further relationship 
of right holders to competitors and consumers 
that the regulatory function of copyright statutes 
becomes visible. In limiting competition, copyright 
statutes enable right owners to charge higher 
prices. Empirically, it remains an open question 
if this translates into higher earnings for the 
creator.61
2.2  SOURCES OF EARNINGS
If ‘copyright law only lays down the rights of 
creators and performers, not their conditions 
of work’62, are there any methodologies for 
examining the effects of copyright contracts? One 
approach in the literature starts from the empirical 
phenomenon of artistic production, and considers 
the professional life of authors. As authors need to 
make a living in order to be productive, it should 
be possible to generate a taxonomy of possible 
sources of earnings (of which copyright contracts 
will be only one!) that can be empirically captured 
for each professional group. However there are 
very few studies that can be used as a starting 
point for this exercise. It is part of artistic folklore 
that many authors have lived at some stage of 
their career on the breadline, are holding down a 
second job, or are supported by members of their 
family. But is this true? If so, does it hold equally 
for all professions copyright law treats as authors 
in the sense of the Berne Convention: e.g. 
novelists, journalists, photographers, composers, 
screen-writers or architects? To what extent does 
it apply to professions that are populated by non-
Berne artists, such as musical performers and 
actors (who are protected by related rights)63, or 
television format developers, sound engineers, 
set designers or gourmet chefs (who may have no 
statutory rights at all)?
60 Under the concept of ‘indirect appropriability’ developed by Stan Liebowitz, record companies or journal publishers may 
be able to charge higher prices because of unauthorised private copying: S.J. Liebowitz (1985), ‘Copying and Indirect 
Appropriability’, Journal of Political Economy 93(5): 945-957.  For further discussion, see R. Watt (2005), ‘Indirect 
Appropriability: 20 Years On’, Symposium RERCI, 2(1), and Section 1.4 below.
61 The effects on authors’ earnings of digital rights management systems (DRM) are even harder to gauge. Some proponents 
of DRM technologies claim that by tailoring prices to the customer’s ability to pay, DRM protected markets become more 
efficient: ‘The prescription, then, is to so structure rights that they enable differential pricing, except where transaction 
costs–the costs to copyright owners and users of locating and negotiating with each other–will defeat the practice, as they 
presently would with book resales.’ – P. Goldstein (2003 [1994]), Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial 
Jukebox, Stanford UP, p.  201. Even if this proposition held (for counter-arguments, see for example J. Litman (2001), Digital 
Copyright, NY: Prometheus), what would follow for the author’s share of the surplus?
62 Ruth Towse, invitation to Bournemouth Symposium on Copyright, Contract and Creativity (25 September 2009): http://www.
cippm.org.uk/symposia/symposium-2009.html.
63 The most important international treaties for related or neighbouring rights are the Rome Convention (1961) ‘for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations’, the WTO TRIPS Agreement (1994), 
and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (1996).
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In an earlier paper64,  I have suggested that the 
earnings’ portfolio of cultural professionals can be 
analysed under the following four categories:
(a) Statutory right: Individually negotiated  
income
This type of income is likely to be based on 
publishing or production contracts, and poses 
conceptual problems in identifying the effects of 
the underlying statutory right.
(b) Statutory right: Collectively negotiated 
income
This type of income income is collected and 
distributed via collecting societies, typically for 
secondary use of protected subject matter that 
is difficult to monitor. These fees can often be 
directly linked to regulatory intervention, such as 
a statutory licence or a licence set in a copyright 
tribunal.65
(c) Income from artistic activity: Non-statutory 
subject matter
This type of income includes fees for live 
appearances (such as performances or readings), 
grants, teaching in the artist’s field.
(d) Income from non-artistic sources
This category includes income from any non-
artistic ‘day time job’, family support, capital 
income and benefits derived from the social 
security system.
Empirical data in these four categories are not 
easily available, unless collected through a 
specifically designed questionnaire instrument. 
However, there is a context of income, tax and 
insurance data available from government 
statistical sources that can be applied to the 
cultural professions. There is also useful 
information contained in surveys of creators. 
Finally, it is possible to make inferences on the 
likely balance of incomes from the published 
distributions of copyright collecting societies.66 
Before the empirical evidence on artists’ earnings 
is reviewed in detail, the conceptual approach 
is illustrated through the income profiles of two 
creators. 
64 M. Kretschmer (2005), ‘Artists’ Earnings and Copyright: A review of British and German music industry data in the context of 
digital technologies’, First Monday 10/1 (January): pp. 1-20. The approach has been used for the 2007 ALCS survey Authors’ 
Earnings from Copyright and Non-Copyright Sources which provides an important source of data for this review.
65 Several European Directives have created rights that can only be exercised via collecting societies (rental 1992/100/EEC; 
cable retransmission 1993/83/EEC; droit de suite 2001/84/EC).
66 The UK collective licensing bodies include: Authors Licensing & Collecting Society (ALCS) – secondary reproduction and 
audio-visual rights in the literary and dramatic copyright area; Broadcasting Dataservices – licenses programme listings; 
Christian Copyright Licensing International (CCLI) – licenses the reproduction of songs and hymns; Copyright Licensing 
Agency (CLA) – licenses reprographic copying of literary works; ComPact Collections – licenses cable retransmission 
rights for films; Design and Artists Copyright Society (DACS) – administers reproduction rights for visual artists; 
Educational Recording Agency Ltd (ERA) – licenses recording off-air by educational establishments;Filmbank and 
Motion Picture Licensing Corporation – licenses the showing of films in public; MCPS – mechanical reproduction rights of 
composers, lyricists, publishers;Newspaper Licensing Agency (NLA) – issues licences for copying of newspapers;  
Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) – licenses certain uses of copyright sound recording; Publishers Licensing 
Society (PLS) – administers certain rights on behalf of publishers; PRS – performing rights of composers, lyricists, 
publishers; Video Performance Limited (VPL) – licenses certain uses of music video recordings. There are currently more 
than 150 collecting societies acting for right holders in the EU. Europe’s largest society is Germany’s GEMA (administering 
music performing and mechanical rights) with an annual turnover exceeding €800m (Annual Report 2008).
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2.2.1  Two professional profiles
The electronica artist
X grew up in the techno/dance scene of the 
1980s, forming various bands. His music is 
entirely produced on a computer, and the 
traditional subject matter categories of copyright 
law are difficult to apply. However, contracts and 
income follows these categories: the composition 
as musical work67 (also known as ‘publishing’); the 
sound recording68 (also known as ‘master tape’); 
and the performance69.
Following a record deal with a major company, 
three of X’s tracks made it into the UK Top Ten. 
The recording contract was structured as advance 
plus royalties, with ownership of the master tape 
resting with the record company. As is usual in the 
business, the advance was never recouped as 
the label can offset ‘clearing samples’, production 
and promotion costs. Thus no royalties have been 
paid, and a notional debt was retained against 
subsequent releases.  ‘You spend your pipeline 
before you get paid. The record companies don’t 
want you to stop working.’  X eventually changed 
the record company and now works on a ‘per 
release’ basis with an independent label. 
The delivery of the master tape to the record 
company includes a payment for the performance 
of musicians who have been recorded (which 
may well be a MIDI file created by X). Subsequent 
broadcasts and rental of the recording entitle the 
performer to a small collectively negotiated royalty 
administered by collecting society PPL. 
X also has concluded a separate exclusive 
contract with a music publisher, which now 
covers 30 tracks (including his three chart 
hits). Publishing income on the one hand is 
automatically linked to the sales, rental and 
broadcasting of sound recordings of the musical 
work (i.e. the work of the record label); on 
the other hand it depends on the promotional 
activities of the publishing company itself which 
may attempt to place tracks for advertising or TV. 
The composer’s share of revenue for ‘air-time’ 
is collectively negotiated, and according to the 
statutes of collecting society PRS, the publisher’s 
share cannot exceed 50%. This income stream 
therefore is less vulnerable to bargaining 
pressures.
Thirdly, X’s band gives live concerts, and X 
personally is regularly invited to perform as DJ at 
major clubs, nationally and internationally. Due to 
X’s fame, these gigs are well paid. 
Looking at X’s current income, there are three 
major elements: (i) advances paid by the record 
label; (ii) publishing royalties (of which the 
performing royalties for ‘air-time’ paid via PRS are 
the most important); and (iii) live performances 
as a DJ. (i) is based on a recording contract 
assigning statutory subject matter; (ii) is based on 
a publishing and collective administration contract 
licensing statutory subject matter; (iii) is not based 
on statutory subject matter.
The children’s book illustrator
After graduating from art college, Y worked as a 
graphic designer in the advertising industry. For 
a period, she was employed for a major agency 
that under her contract of employment owned her 
artwork70. 
67 In the UK, CDPA 1988, s. 1(1)(a) and s. 3
68 In the UK, CDPA 1988, s. 5A
69 In the UK, CDPA 1988, ss. 191, 192
70 An artistic work under CDPA 1988, s. 4(a) includes ‘a graphic work’. Section 11(2) provides that ‘[w]here a literary, dramatic, 
musical or artistic work, or a film, is made by an employee in the course of his employment, his employer is the first owner 
of any copyright in the work subject to any agreement to the contrary’. See section 2.5.1 below.
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In mid-career, Y decided to have a break in order 
to establish a family. The advertising agency 
continued to commission work from Y on a project 
basis against one-off fees.
Through a number of chance encounters, Y also 
began to illustrate children’s texts, initially for free. 
Her partner continued to work full-time. Following 
a surprise best-selling success of one of her titles 
(for which she had received only a buy-out fee), 
Y briefly became one of the best-paid illustrators, 
commanding royalties in excess of 10% of the 
retail price but has been unable to repeat her 
early success. Her best-selling book is still a 
public library favourite. She now visits schools, 
and gives creative seminars for which there is a 
steady demand.
Y’s income profile has been very different during 
the three phases of her professional life. As an 
employed or commissioned graphic designer (i) 
her income was derived from the production of 
statutory subject matter, but her payment structure 
was that of an employee or freelancer. It is not 
clear whether the statutory protection of artistic 
works was relevant to the income received.
During the second phase, artistic production 
was undertaken in an environment in which the 
main source of income was non-artistic (ii): the 
partner’s job. During the third phase, income 
shifted to art-related, but non-statutory subject 
matter activity (iii): seminars and workshops, but 
there was also (iv) a small royalty stream from 
some of her earlier publication contracts and via 
the public lending right (which collects fees for the 
lending of books from public libraries).71
It is not claimed that either of these profiles is 
typical. In fact, studies on artists’ labour markets 
stress that cultural workers constitute a very 
heterogeneous population.72 The historical 
example of pre-copyright contracts (section 2.1.2 
above), and the earnings profiles constructed 
here merely demonstrate the methodological 
constraints that need to be overcome in order to 
identify the monetary contribution of copyright 
contracts to creative production.
The remainder of this paper is structured as 
follows: The next two sections review the 
available data on creators’ earnings (2.3) and 
to what extent they can be assumed to reflect 
the current empirical outcome of contract 
bargaining (2.4), the final two sections provide 
an international comparative review of regulatory 
tools that may be used to adjust the bargaining 
outcome (2.5), and their potential effectiveness 
(2.6).
71 In the UK, the public lending right (PLR) scheme was established under the Public Lending Act 1979. The Act defines PLR 
as an intellectual property right, entirely separate from copyright. In the conceptual framework presented in this paper, PLR 
is closest to category (2) ‘Statutory right: Collectively negotiated income’.
72 F. Benhamou (2003), ‘Artists’ Labour Markets’, pp. 69-75 in R. Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar.
73 The sections on Copyright Earnings draw on M. Kretschmer and P. Hardwick (2007), Authors’ Earnings from Copyright and 
Non-copyright Sources, Bournemouth: CIPPM and ALCS. Exchange rates are calculated at the average exchange rate for 
the year in question.
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2.3  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON 
COPYRIGHT EARNINGS73
The available data on authors’ and artists’ 
earnings come from three different sources: (a) 
government statistics (census, labour market 
surveys, tax); (b) questionnaire surveys of 
specific professional groups; and (c) collecting 
society payments. For the purposes of assessing 
the possible contribution of copyright law to 
authors’ and artists’ earnings, two aspects are of 
particular interest. (i) The level and distribution of 
earnings for cultural workers, compared to other 
professions; (ii) Earnings from the principal artistic 
activity compared to other sources of earnings.
2.3.1  The distribution of earnings in the 
cultural professions 
A simple tool for making comparable the 
distribution of income for different groups of 
workers in a given population is the so-called 
Lorenz Curve. To construct a Lorenz curve, 
the cumulative percentage income in the 
vertical y-axis is plotted against the cumulative 
percentage of the population in the horizontal 
x-axis. The Lorenz curve is used to calculate the 
Gini Coefficient.
In what follows, the distribution of income is 
reported in terms of the mean (‘average income’), 
and median (‘income at mid-point of the sample’). 
In some sense, the median is the income of a 
‘typical’ member of the population, as the mean 
may be distorted by some very high or low 
earners.
Distribution of UK employee earnings
As a baseline example, consider the distribution 
of earnings (gross) for all UK employees in 2005 
derived from the Annual Survey of Hours and 
Earnings (ASHE). ASHE is run by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) and based on a 1% 
sample of employees on the Inland Revenue 
PAYE register, weighted to be representative 
of the whole population. The Survey provides 
information about the levels, distribution and 
make-up of earnings and hours worked for 
employees in all industries and occupations.74
In re-formatting the earnings data into a Lorenz-
curve it is easy to see that the bottom 40% of 
employees earn about 20% of total income; and 
that the top 10% equally earn about 20% of total 
income. This deviation from the diagonal equal 
distribution line produces a Gini Coefficient of 
0.33.75
74 The job-types that are under-represented tend to be males, tend to be working in London and the Southeast and tend to be 
in Standard Occupational Classification  (SOC) 2000 major groups 1 to 3 (1: Managers and Senior Officials; 2: Professional 
Occupations; 3: Associate Professional and Technical Occupations).  Therefore these jobs receive larger weights (cf. Bird, 
2004). ASHE data can be downloaded as Excel files from the website of the Office for National Statistics (http://www.
statistics.gov.uk).
75 For comparison, consider the distribution of income for all households as given by the United Nations Human Development 
Programme Report (2004, pp. 50-53): Germany: 0,274 (2003); France: 0,327 (1995); UK: 0,360 (1999); Japan: 0,249 (1993); 
USA 0,408 (2000). Within the UK, equal earnings professions include ‘skilled metal and electrical trades’ (occupational class 
52; Gini = 0.22) and ‘health and social welfare associate professionals’ (occupational class 32; Gini = 0.25). Higher inequality 
professions include ‘corporate managers’ (occupational class 11; Gini = 0.39).
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Figure 2.1
• Artists (class 3411, no member in  
 sample)
• Authors, writers (class 3412, 14  
 members insample)76
• Actors, entertainers (class 3413,  
 no member in sample)
• Dancers and choreographers  
 (class 3414, no member in sample)
• Musicians (class 3415, no member  
 in sample) Arts officers, producers  
 and directors (class 3416, 9   
 members in sample)
 In any case, ASHE data does         
 not capture self-employed earnings  
 (which copyright earnings   
  would be almost by definition).
Artists’ insurance data Germany
A fine-grained large-scale data set on artists’ 
earnings is available as part of a unique German 
policy experiment: a compulsory insurance for 
freelance authors and artists that was introduced 
with the 1981 Künstlersozialversicherungsgesetz 
(‘social insurance law regarding artists’).77 
Similarly to the structure for employees, self-
employed artists in the four sectors  ‘Word 
authors’, ‘Visual arts/design’, ‘Music’ and 
‘Performing arts’ (actors, directors) become 
members of a subsidized national health and 
pension insurance scheme. The insured artist 
pays 50% of the contribution, while ‘exploiters of 
art’ (e.g. publishers, record companies, galleries) 
contribute 30%, and 20% comes from the Federal 
Government (general taxation).
76 An analysis of ONS Labour Force Survey data by the GMB union identifies 11,000 authors/writer jobs, and calculates a mean 
gross annual pay for 2005 as £32,296 (Independent, 21/08/2006).
77 The political process culminating in the legislation was a response to a detailed survey of the professional and social 
circumstances of authors and artists: Fohrbeck, Karla; Wiesand, Andreas Johannes (1972), Der Autorenreport. Reinbek 
b. Hamburg; Fohrbeck, Karla; Wiesand, Andreas Johannes (1975): Der Künstler-Report: Musikschaffende, Darsteller/
Realisatoren, Bildende Künstler/Designer. München-Wien.
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The Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) separates out earnings data for 
occupational class 34: Culture, Media and Sport 
Occupations (sample size: 204), a sub-class 
of major class 3: Associate Professional and 
Technical Occupations (sample size: 2785). Mean 
(£27,474) and median (£22,919) earnings for 
this group (class 34) are both above average, 
while the Gini Coefficient (0.34) is in line with all 
employees. However, the data are not broken 
down to a sufficient level of detail, covering a 
diverse range of professions from designers 
(class 3422) and journalists (class 3431) to public 
relations (class 3433) and fitness instructors 
(class 3443). The sample for the core group of 
Artistic and Literary Occupations (class 341) is 
too small to draw reliable probabilistic inferences: 
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In order to set their individual contribution rate, 
artists have to declare their yearly income. 
These insurance data have been published in 
aggregate form in a report by the Federal Ministry 
of Employment.78 In 1999, 107,167 authors and 
artists were insured in the insurance scheme 
Künstlersozialkasse. Of those that could be 
allocated unambiguously to one professional 
group, there were 29,245 (‘Word’) authors, with 
an average annual income (mean) of DM 25,686 
(€13,133); 45,486 visual artists, with an average 
annual income of DM 19,889 (€10,169); 29,720 
musicians, with an average annual income of DM 
17,392 (€8,892); and 12,433 performing artists, 
with an average annual income of DM 18,920 
(€9,674). Overall, mean earnings per annum for 
all insured artists were DM 21,868 (€11,181); 
median earnings were DM 15,753 (€8,054). 
This compares to an average (mean) German 
net income in 2004 of  €31,157, and a median 
of €28,730.79 The typical (median) German self-
employed artist earns about one third of the 
income of a typical (median) worker.
For each sector, the data can be narrowed 
down to the copyright professions, i.e. the 
groups that depend most clearly on a statutory 
right. For example, for the music sector the 
table below shows that the average annual 
earnings for a German composer in 1999 (total in 
Künstlersozialkasse: 3,670) were in the region of 
DM 22,000 (€11,225). 
78 Bericht der Bundesregierung über die soziale Lage der Künstlerinnen und Künstler in Deutschland, Bundesministerium für 
Arbeit und Sozialordnung, 31. März 2000; cited in the following as Künstlersozialkasse (2000).
79 Ergebnisse des Mikrozensus 2004, Wiesbaden: Statistisches Bundesamt (cited as Mikrozensus 2004). Mikrozensus is an 
annual representative survey of 1% of the population. Three possible distortions of the Künstlersozialkasse insurance data 
should be noted. (i) Artists have an incentive to under-declare their income, as that reduces their annual contribution. For 
example, according to the 2000 Mikrozensus data, workers in the occupational group Publizistik (including writers, translators 
and editors) earned an average (mean) of DM 37,199 (€19,020) per annum, and a median of DM 35,160 (€17,977). This is 
about €5,000 per annum more than members of the insurance scheme in comparable self-employed professions declared. 
(ii) As a subsidised scheme the insurance is attractive to many self-employed workers who are not primarily artists (such as 
music teachers, graphic designers or part-time journalists). (iii) Top-earners can opt out of the scheme in favour of private 
insurance.
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Table: Künstlersozialkasse occupational group music (1999)
Activity Number of artists Total income in DM 
1,000
Average annual 
income (DM)
Composer 3,670 80,570 21,954
Lyricist 215 5,770 26,837
Arranger 428 7,702 17,995
Conductor 265 6,916 26,098
Choirmaster 400 8,026 20,065
Instrumentalist Solo 1,618 24,971 15,433
Orchestra Player (E) 553 7,928 14,336
Singer (opera, musical) 492 8,400 17,073
Singer (concert) 398 5,963 14,982
Singer (choir) 50 746 14,920
Singer (popular) 1,632 32,412 19,860
Pop musician 2,661 42,508 15,974
Kurorchester 483 8,241 17,062
Jazz and Rock 2,899 42,084 14,517
Technical staff 506 10,260 20,277
Teacher 11,838 197,490 16,683
DJ 691 12,186 17,635
Others 921 14,708 15,970
Total 29,720 516,881 17,392
Source: German Federal Ministry of Employment, Künstlersozialkasse (2000), p. 14
Figures for the distribution of earnings were only 
available for an aggregate of all musicians. About 
90% of musicians earned below DM 30,000 
(€15,339). 2,650 musicians earned above DM 
30,000, with 125 musicians earning above DM 
102,000 (approximately €52,152). 
The large number of teachers in the sample 
(who tend to earn similar amounts), as well as 
the absence of privately insured top-earners may 
account for a relatively flat Lorenz curve, and a 
Gini Coefficient (0.31) that is similar to the total 
population. 
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Germany: Annual earnings from self-employed 
writing (2001)
The German federal office for statistics has 
calculated the declared taxable income from self-
employed writing for 2001 (the most recent year 
for which these data were available).1 In 2001, 
24,436 German taxpayers had such income. The 
following two figures represent the distribution of 
earnings for all tax-paying self-employed writers, 
and for a sub-sample (10,220): all tax-paying 
self-employed writers who earn more than 50% of 
their income from writing.
 
Mean (‘average’) earnings €17,306 (£10,557)
Median (‘typical’) earnings € 7,163 (£4,369)
Gini Coefficient (‘measure of inequality’) 0.83
(2001 exchange rate: €1 = £0.61)
Source: 
Commissioned 
analysis of 24,436 tax 
payers (2001)
Statistisches
Bundesamt (federal 
office for statistics)
Germany: Annual earnings from self-employed writing (2001)
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UK Society of Authors earnings survey 2000
For the UK there exist a number of smaller 
questionnaire surveys of specific regional sub-
groups conducted during the 1990s at the 
instigation of the Arts Councils in England, Wales 
and Scotland. These studies, reviewed in Towse 
(2001), are based on small samples but paint 
a similar picture to the German experience.80  
Average earnings are low, and are typically 
supplemented by income from other, often 
non-artistic, sources (see section 2.2). For 
example, Ruth Towse’s study of 2000 artists in 
Devon (1989/90) gives mean annual earnings of 
£8,344, and median annual earnings of £6,900. 
Interestingly, the distribution of income from 
artistic activity alone (a sub-set of total earnings) 
is more skewed. According to Towse, mean arts 
earnings (net of expenses) is £5,881 per annum, 
while the median is only £2,100. In other words, 
the typical (median) artist living in Devon in 
1989/90 earned £2,100/year from his/her artistic 
activity. The large gap between mean and median 
suggests the presence of many low and some 
very high earners in the sample.
A larger scale study bearing this out clearly is the 
questionnaire survey of authors’ earnings reported 
by the Society of Authors in 2000. The Society of 
Authors is the largest professional body of writers 
in the UK, with a membership in 1999 of 6,600. 
According to the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting 
Society (ALCS), which can reasonably claim 
to have almost all commercially published UK 
authors on its database (41,701 payees in 2005), 
the profile of the Society of Authors membership 
(e.g. age, gender, genre) corresponds to the 
total population of UK writers.81 1,711 authors 
responded to the questionnaire (this is a very high 
response rate of more than 25%) and, according 
to the analysis published by Kate Pool82, the 
profile of respondents again mirrored the Society’s 
membership as a whole.
The questionnaire only asks about the author’s 
earnings as a self-employed writer, excluding 
salaried writing, second job earnings, investment 
income, family or social security support. Thus it 
can be assumed that all reported figures derive 
from a copyright-related sub-set of the author’s 
principal artistic activity.
The survey revealed average (mean) earnings 
of £16,600 per annum, with median earnings of 
£6,333, again indicating the presence of many 
low earners and some very high earners in the 
sample. 75% earned under £20,000 per annum, 
61% under £10,000 and 46% under £5,000. 
Writing was the sole source of income for only 
230 people (13,5% of respondents). In the Society 
of Authors sample, the typical (median) writer 
earns about a third of the national median wage.
80 Towse, R. (2001). Creativity, Incentive and Reward: An Economic Analysis of Copyright and Culture in the Information Age. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; esp. Chapter 3 (‘Economics of Artists’ Labour Markets’).
81  Personal communication, Owen Atkinson, CEO ALCS.
82  Pool, K. (2000), ‘Love, Not Money’, The Author (summer 2000), pp. 58-66.
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Figure 2.3
 
Mean (‘average’) earnings £16,600
Median (‘typical’) earnings £6,333
Gini Coefficient (‘measure of inequality’) 0.6
Source: 
Society of Authors
survey, published 
2000 (professional 
body sample,
1711 respondents)
UK: Annual earnings from self-employed writing (1998-9)
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83 This excludes many part-time writers that were captured by the Society of Authors survey. Kretschmer and Hardwick’s survey 
sampled all members of the UK collecting society ALCS and the members of two German writers’ organisations (VS and VDD). 
The questionnaire started with a self-definition question: ‘How would you introduce your profession when meeting someone for 
the first time… If you feel you have more than one profession, please indicate how much of your time you spend on each’.
ALCS survey 2007
In the largest comparative study to date, 
Kretschmer and Hardwick’s (2007) survey the 
earnings of 25,000 literary authors in Germany 
and the UK. For comparison and policy relevance, 
we define a sub-sample of ‘professional authors’ 
as those who allocate more than half their time 
to being an author.83 We find that the median 
gross earnings of professional writers (£12,330) 
are about 64% of the median wage of all UK 
employees (£19,190). In Germany the median 
earnings of professional writers (€12,000) are 
only about 42% of the national net median wage 
(€28,730/£19,536). 
The top 10% of professional writers in the UK 
earn about 60% of total income (they earn 
£68,200 or more); the bottom 50% earn about 
8% of total income (Gini: 0.63).  In Germany, the 
top 10% of professional writers earn about 41% 
of total income (they earn €40,000/£27,600 or 
more); the bottom 50% earn about 12% of total 
income (Gini: 0.52).
UK: Annual earnings fro  self-e ployed writing (1998-9)
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Figure 2.4
 
Source:
ALCS Survey
UK w rit ing income
(sub-sample 
“professional authors”)
Mean (‘average’) earnings £28,340
Median (‘typical’) earnings £12,330
Gini Coefficient (‘measure of inequality’) 0.63
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UK: Annual earnings from self-employed writing (2004-5)
“professional authors” (= more than 50% of time allocated to writing)
Figure 2.5
 
Source:
ALCS Survey
German writing income
(sub-sample 
“professional authors”)
Mean (‘average’) earnings €20,113 (£13,878)
Median (‘typical’) earnings €12,000 (£ 8,280)
Gini Coefficient (‘measure of inequality’) 0.52
Germany: Annual earnings from self-employed writing (2005)
“professional authors” (= more than 50% of time allocated to writing)
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Table: PRS distribution (1994)
Bands of net 
domestic 
distributed 
revenue* £
Number of 
writers
% Cumulated 
% from top
£m % Cumulated 
% from top
Up to 24 4,812 31.0 100.0 0.04 0.19 100.0
25 – 49 1,624 10.5 69.0 0.06 0.29 99.8
50 – 74 1,001 6.5 58.5 0.06 0.30 99.5
75 – 99 800 5.2 52.0 0.07 0.34 99.2
100 – 149 920 5.9 46.9 0.11 0.56 98.9
150 – 199 632 4.1 40.9 0.11 0.54 98.3
200 – 249 460 3.0 36.8 0.10 0.50 97.8
250 – 499 1,481 9.6 33.9 0.53 2.6 97.3
500 – 749 750 4.8 24.3 0.46 2.2 94.7
750 – 999 452 2.9 19.5 0.39 1.9 92.4
1,000 – 2,499 1,130 7.3 16.6 1.79 8.8 90.5
2,500 – 4,999 590 3.8 9.3 2.11 10.4 81.7
5,000 – 9,999 389 2.5 5.5 2.75 13.5 71.4
10,000 – 19,999 255 1.6 3.0 3.50 17.2 57.9
20,000 – 49,999 164 1.1 1.3 4.98 24.5 40.7
50,000 – 99,999 30 0.19 0.26 2.04 10.0 16.2
100,000 and 
over
10 0.06 0.06 1.26 6.2 6.2
Total 15,500 100 20.35 100
*Note: Excluding earnings equalisation allowances, unlogged performance allocations, and revenue from performance of films.
Source: Monopolies and Mergers Commission: Performing Rights (1996)
84 Performing Rights (1996), UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission, HMSO Cm 3147.
Performing Right Society (PRS) payments 
1994
The emerging trend in the distribution of income is 
confirmed by the payments of copyright collecting 
societies. These data are privately held, and 
thus not easily accessible. A 1996 report by the 
UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission (now 
Competition Commission) 
on the UK Performing Rights Society (PRS) is the 
most reliable source.84
The figures show that in 1994, the PRS paid a 
total of £20,350,000 to 15,500 entitled composers 
and songwriters for the public performance and 
broadcasting of their works.
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We see that, in 1994, 10 composers earned more 
than £100,000; 204 more than £20,000; 459 more 
than £10,000; 848 more than £5,000; 1,438 more 
than £2,500; and 8,237 under £100. The typical 
(median) composer earned £84 in performing 
rights income. Despite dramatically increased 
turnover and a doubling of the membership to 
30,000 by 2000, the distribution of earnings from 
PRS payments appears to have remained similar. 
In 2000, 200 composers and songwriters received 
more than £100,000; 700 more than £25,000; 
1,500 more than £10,000; 2,300 more than 
£5,000; 16,000 under £100.85 
The distribution of earnings again can be plotted 
as a Lorenz curve:
Figure 2.6
 
Lorenz Curve: PRS (1994) 
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Source: From data in Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission: Performing Rights (1996)
Average earnings/year (Mean): £1,420
Median earnings/year: £84
Gini Coefficent: 0.88
In addition to performing royalties, composers/
songwriters can expect to earn a similar amount 
from mechanical royalties for the sale of sound 
recordings. The figures for 2000 suggest that in 
the UK about 1500 (5%) composers/songwriters 
reach the average (mean) national wage from 
copyright earnings alone. According to the 
German collecting society GEMA (administering 
both performing and mechanical rights for 
musical works), about 1,200 German composers/
songwriters (2.4%) can live from their creative 
output.86
Summary: In this sub-section we have narrowed 
the analysis of the distribution of earnings in the 
cultural professions from the total self-declared 
income of authors and artists (Künstlersozialkasse 
insurance data), to income from self-employed 
artistic activity (Society of Authors), to collectively 
negotiated copyright income (PRS). It appears 
that the more copyright related the income 
stream, the more extreme  the distribution of 
income (reflected in very high Gini Coefficients).87 
A small number of very high earners earn a 
disproportionate share of total income. 
85 PRS Annual Report 2000, cited in Bently, Lionel (2002), Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The problems facing   
 freelance creators in the UK media market-place, London: Institute of Employment Rights.
86 A. Dümling, Musik hat ihren Wert: 100 Jahre musikalische Verwertungsgesellschaft in Deutschland (Regensburg: ConBrio, 
2003), 313; citing Wahren, 1995. ‘Creative output’ in this quote may include income from commissions or grants that would 
not qualify as copyright income.
87 It may be possible to differentiate this picture further by contrasting the situation for literary authors, audio-visual authors, 
actors, visual artists, composers, performers etc. It appears that the greater the presence in global English speaking markets, 
and the less dependent on localised ‘live’ activity, the more tilted earnings will be towards winners. For example, an analysis 
of contemporary art sold at British auctions reveals a Gini Co-efficient of 0.72, the second highest Gini we found after music 
(own data, based on K. Graddy and S. Szymanski, A study into the likely impact of the implementation of the Resale Right 
for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work of Art, London: Intellectual Property Institute, 2005). 
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2.3.2  Earnings from principal artistic 
activity
How do the majority of authors and artists who 
cannot claim to make a living from copyright 
income balance their books? In order to make 
progress on this question, it needs to be defined 
more precisely who counts as a member of the 
population for which copyright earnings should 
matter. 
In 1989, Bruno Frey and Werner Pommerehne 
suggested eight criteria for identifying an artist88: 
(i) the amount of time spent on artistic work, 
(ii) the amount of income derived from artistic 
activities, (iii) the reputation as an artist among 
the general public, (iv) recognition among other 
artists, (v) the quality of artistic work produced, 
(vi) membership of a professional body, (vii) a 
professional qualification in the arts, and (viii) a 
subjective self-evaluation as an artist. In practice, 
the definition of the relevant population of artists 
often has been constrained by the available 
samples. 
(a) Government statistics usually use an 
occupational group approach. For example, 
under the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE), an employee falls under class 3411 
(artists) or class 3412 (authors, writers) if the 
employer says so.  
(b) Questionnaire surveys often rely on the 
membership of particular professional bodies, 
such as the Society of Authors.  
(c) On-line surveys typically are circulated within 
professional networks, and depend on the 
participation of respondents who aspire to be 
artists.  
(d) Being a recipient of payments from a copyright 
collecting society is yet another criterion. 
If, as it already has become clear, most creative 
workers cannot live from their artistic earnings, 
perhaps the relevant population should be 
reduced to those creators in each discipline who 
can live, or at least aim to live from their principal 
artistic activity. This may be expressed by a 
threshold amount of creative earnings, or by a 
threshold amount of time allocated to creative 
activity. Perhaps copyright law is only designed 
for best-sellers.
At the other end of the conceptual spectrum, 
the literature on the creative industries tends to 
overstate the size of the cultural sector (including 
administrative, technical, managerial and retail 
workers). For example, the EU assumes from 
consolidated national data that about 4,164,300 
workers (or 2.5% of the total workforce) are 
occupied in the cultural sector. In the UK alone, 
the relevant figures are 877,100 workers (or 3.2% 
of the total workforce).89
From a third perspective, the relevant population 
where copyright law should matter is constituted 
by all potential cultural workers from whose 
increased activity society would benefit. 
There are only a small number of pioneering 
studies that have attempted to capture the 
professional earnings profile of specific groups 
of creators. The populations of all the studies 
discussed rely on an element of sustained 
practice, typically expressed by membership of a 
professional organisation.
Austrian composers report (1993)
A questionnaire survey of 630 Austrian composers 
by a group of sociologists from the Vienna 
Hochschule für Musik und Darstellende Kunst 
(now Musikuniversität), arrived at the following 
income profiles.90 
88 B.S. Frey and W.W. Pommerehne (1989), Muses and Markets: Explorations in the Economics of the Arts, Oxford: Blackwell 
(p. 47).
89 Eurostat, press release 68/2004 of 26/05/2004 (table 13 in M. Söndermann, 2004, Kulturberufe, Bonn: Beauftragter der 
Bundesregierung für Kultur und Medien).
90 The sample was taken from a professional body. 283 returns were received, with an average respondent age of 37 years: 
Smudits, A., I. Bontinck, D. Mark, E. Osterleitner (1993), Komponistenreport, Wien: WUV Universitätsverlag.
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Table: Income from compositions as 
percentage of total income 
Below 10%: 36.8%
10-20%: 31.2%
21-49%: 14.1%
50% and more: 17.8%
Table: Composers also received income from
Other musical activity 
(performance & 
teaching):
82.0%
Non-music 
professional activity:
25.6%
Family members: 18.2%
Social security 
benefits:
3.9%
Investment income: 1.1%
Other sources: 3.5%
 
     
Finnish music business study (2003)
A survey of 688 members of the Finnish Society 
of Composers and Lyric Writers conducted in 
2001/02 by members of the Media Group at 
the Turku School of Economics and Business 
Administration91 found a large gap between 
total annual individual income and income from 
composing.
Table: Income from composing compared to 
total income 
Music 
creators 
(n= 253)
Lower 
Quartile
Median Upper 
Quartile
Copyright 
remunerations
3,500 
FIM
(€ 589)
11,649 
FIM
(€ 1,959)
43,572 
FIM
(€ 7,328)
Other 
income from 
composing
3,000 
FIM
(€ 505)
(€ 1,959)
FIM
(€ 1,682)
30,000 
FIM
(€ 5,046)
Total Annual 
Income
96,000 
FIM
(€ 16,146)
153,00 
FIM
(€ 25,732)
231,000 
FIM
(€ 38,851)
Australia Council study of practising 
professional artists (2003)
Over a period of 20 years, David Throsby has 
conducted a number of studies on the economic 
circumstances of Australian artists. The 2003 
report used as its basis a 2002 interview survey 
of 1063 writers, visual artists, craft practitioners, 
actors, directors, dancers, choreographers, and 
‘community cultural development workers’ (of a 
total estimated population of 45,000 Australian 
professional artists, defined as those ‘who operate 
at a level and standard of work and with a degree 
of commitment appropriate to the norms of 
professional practice within their artform’).92
91 A.-M. Hansen, V. Pönni, R. G. Picard (2003) Economic Situation of Composers, Lyric Writers and Arrangers in Finland, Turku 
School of Economics and Business Administration. Thanks to Ruth Towse for the reference.
92 D. Throsby and V. Hollister (2003), Don’t Give Up Your Day Job: An economic study of professional artists in Australia, 
Sydney: Australia Council (available at http://www.australiacouncil.gov.au/research/artists/reports_and_publications/
dontgiveupyourdayjob).
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Table: Australian artists’ sources of creative income (per cent)  
Source: Throsby and Hollister (2003), p. 103 (* indicates less than 1%; – indicates nil)
Writers Visual 
artists
Craft 
practitioners
Actors Dancers Musicians Composers Community 
cultural 
development 
workers
All artists
Salaries, wages, fees 55 34 21 94 90 95 38 78 63
Gross sales of work, incl. 
commissions
13 54 68 3 1 2 25 12 22
Royalties, advances 18 2 2 2 1 1 22 – 6
Other copyright earnings * * – * 1 1 1 – *
Grants, prizes, 
fellowships
5 10 7 1 7 1 11 6 6
Public lending right 4 * – – – * – – 1
Educational lending right 5 * – – – * – – 1
Other creative source * * 2 – – * 3 4 1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Throsby and Hollister find that on average, 
Australian artists tend to be older than the general 
workforce or the total population. They attribute 
this to the time it takes for an artist to become 
established and careers beyond the normal 
retiring age. The average (mean) age of artists is 
about 46 years. 
Writers and composers are the oldest groups on 
average, with a mean age of 49; dancers make up 
the youngest group with a mean age of 31. 63% 
of those surveyed had more than one job, 56% 
had two jobs, and 7% had three.
Half of the artists in the survey had a (median) 
creative income of less than $7,300 (Australian 
dollars; financial year 2001-02). The familiar 
distribution of artists’ creative incomes with many 
low incomes and few high incomes resulted in a 
(mean) creative income of just over $17,000. 
The median income from all income sources was 
less than $30,000, compared to $43,700 for full 
and part-time (‘main job’) employees classified 
as ‘professional’, and $54,500 for occupations 
classified as ‘managerial/administrative’. 
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Pew study: American artists, musicians and 
the Internet (2004)
A study conducted in 2004 by the Pew Internet & 
American Life Project tried to capture ‘how artists 
and musicians use the internet, what they think 
about copyright issues, and how they feel about 
online file-sharing’.93 The study focuses on artists’ 
attitudes and does not provide systematic data on 
the relative weight of copyright and non-copyright 
earnings. However, among three instruments, 
the study includes a web survey of 2,755 self-
declared musicians that divides the sample into 
four useful profile groups: 
(1) Success Stories (musicians who spend 30 or 
more hours per week in music-related activities, 
drawing 80 per cent or more of their income from 
music); 
(2) Starving Musicians (also spending 30 or more 
hours per week but earning less than 20 per cent 
of their total income from music); 
(3) Part-timers (spending less than 30 hours per 
week but earning some income from music); and 
(4) Non-working Musicians (currently inactive, 
including aspiring and formerly active musicians 
not earning money from music). 
The numbers of PEW respondents falling into 
these respective groups were: Success Stories: 
296 (10.7%); Starving Musicians: 1,021 (37%); 
Part-timers: 578 (21%); Non-working Musicians: 
851 (30.9%). 78% of respondents had a second 
job, while 41% earned less than 20% of their 
income from music-related activities. 
Study of self-employed German authors and 
artists (2006)
A more recent study of self-employed artists in 
Germany uses a conceptual approach developed 
in the entrepreneurship literature. Artists are 
treated as micro-entrepreneurs who, typically, do 
not separate business and household finances. 
Three categories of self-employment are 
distinguished: (i) main self-employed occupation – 
defined as the activity with the highest income; (ii) 
additional self-employed occupation – defined as 
the only activity of artists who are not otherwise 
part of the workforce (e.g. students, pensioners, 
housewives/husbands); (iii) part-time additional 
self-employment (i.e. as a second job).
93 Pew Internet & American Life Project (2004), Artists, Musicians and the Internet (researcher Mary Madden), Washington, 
DC, p. ii.
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 2 - CREATOR CONTRACTS
62
Occupational 
group
main occupation additional occupation part-time 
(2nd job)
number % number % number %
Music 70 70.7 14 14.1 15 15.2
Literature 92 65.2 20 14.2 29 10.6
Visual arts 79 65.3 18 14.9 24 19.8
Performing arts 36 64.3 11 19.6 9 16.1
Total 277 66.4 63 15.1 77 18.5
 
A questionnaire survey of 5,745 self-employed 
artists on the database of the media union 
(Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft – sector 
art and culture) finds that for 66%, artistic self-
employment is the main occupation. The figures 
for respondents in four occupational groups are 
presented in the table above.94 
The contribution of self-employed artistic earnings 
to total household earnings from all sources 
(including partner’s income) is given as 42% 
(literature), 42% (visual arts), 53% (music) and 
67% (performing arts).95 Between 70% and 80% 
of respondents had previously been in employed 
occupations, and more than 50% of respondents 
had continued their employed and/or pre-artistic 
occupation at least for a time. For 40-60% 
of artists there had been prolonged periods 
when self-employed creative activity had been 
interrupted (sometimes for years). Both figures 
can be explained to a large extent by a need to 
balance the household income.
ALCS survey 2007
In our comparative survey of 25,000 British 
and German literary authors, Kretschmer and 
Hardwick (2007) find that most writers supplement 
their income from other sources, such as a 
second job, or household earnings contributed 
by a partner. We captured this data by asking 
separate questions for income from writing, total 
individual income and total household income. 
The data show that only 20.3% of UK writers earn 
all their income from writing. For cross-country 
comparison, we used the category of professional 
authors. 60% of professional writers hold down a 
second job, both in Germany and the UK.
94 Dangel, C., M.-B. Piorkowsky and Th. Stamm (2006), Selbstständige Künstlerinnen und Künstler in Deutschland – zwischen 
brotloser Kunst and freiem Unternehmertum?, Bonn: Deutscher Kulturrat, p. 17.
95 ibid. at 75.
Table: Artistic self-employment as main, additional or part-time occupation
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Table: How many professional authors can live from writing alone?
Percentage of UK professional authors 
for whom writing income contributes: % of authors
Mean writing 
income
Median writing 
income
More than 50% of total individual income 59.6 £41,186 £23,000
More than 75% of total individual income 48.4 £48,101 £26,500
More than 90% of total individual income 42.8 £50,090 £27,696
100% of total individual income 40.0 £49,542 £27,500
Percentage of German authors for whom 
writing income contributes: % of authors
Mean writing 
income
Median writing 
income
More than 50% of total individual income 63.1 €27,544 (£19,005)
€20,000 
(£13,800)
More than 75% of total individual income 52.9 €29,225 (£20,165)
€20,000 
(£13,800)
More than 90% of total individual income 45.5 €30,287 (£20,898)
€20,000 
(£13,800)
100% of total individual income 40.1 €29,475 (£20,337)
€20,000 
(£13,800)
It is striking that the typical (median) earnings 
do not increase in line with the percentage of 
income derived from writing. This suggests that 
many authors are not only motivated by money, 
as their income does not increase with their effort 
(an effect common to the population of writers 
both in Germany and the UK). However, German 
authors are prepared to devote more than 50% 
of their time to writing at a much lower mean and 
median income than UK authors. In other words, 
the hurdle to being a professional author appears 
to be lower in Germany. 
As the income of authors is uncertain and 
highly skewed (reflecting the winner-take-all 
characteristics of cultural markets), non-copyright 
income sources are important to writers. It 
appears that risk mitigation is an important 
effect of these other sources of earnings. For 
UK professional authors the Gini Coefficient for 
writing income is 0.63, for total individual income 
it is 0.51, and for total household income it is 
0.47. For German professional authors, the Gini 
Coefficient is 0.52, for total individual income it is 
0.43, and for total household income it is 0.42. 
The distribution of income for collecting society 
payments (which follows actual use) is even more 
skewed than writing income. This suggests that 
writers’ contracts (which often include advances) 
may already contribute to risk mitigation.
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Table: Contribution to household earnings by UK professional writers (2004-5)
UK professional writers Writing income Individual income Household income
 Valid responses  525  514  501
 Mean (£)  28,340  41,017  55,620
 Median (£)  12,330  25,337  37,000
 Coefficient of Variation (%)  204.9  146.4  115.1
 GINI COEFFICIENT  0.63  0.51  0.47
Table: Contribution to household earnings by German professional writers (2005)
German professional writers Writing income Individual income Household income
 Valid responses  169  168  164
 Mean (£)  20,113 (£13,878)
 27,913
 (£19,260)
 41,644
 (£28,734)
 Median (£)  12,000 (£8,280)
 21,000
 (£14,490)
 30,000
 (£20,700)
 Coefficient of Variation (%)  132.7  96.4  87.7
 GINI COEFFICIENT  0.52  0.43  0.42
The typical UK professional writer contributes 
33% to the income of his/her household. The 
typical German professional writer contributes 
40% to the income of his/her household. Taking 
account of these other sources of individual and 
household income, writers and their families 
earn well above the national average. UK writers’ 
households earn almost double the amount of 
their German counterparts.
Summary: The picture that emerges in this sub-
section from the previous empirical studies of 
artists’ occupational profiles reveals risky, often 
stuttering careers. Earnings from non-copyright, 
and even non-artistic activities are an important 
source of income for most creators. Many more 
creators attempt to embark on artistic careers 
than are able to sustain them. 
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2.4   THE ‘HARMONY OF INTERESTS’ 
ASSUMPTION
In the light of the review of empirical data on 
artists’ earnings, what can be said about the role 
of copyright contracts in rewarding artists and 
authors? Paul Goldstein argues:96
Mostly … copyright is about money. It can 
cost a lot to conceive, execute, produce, 
and market a creative work. The right to 
stop the copying of a work implies the power 
to allow it – at a price – and prospective 
copyright owners usually rely on the hope of 
eventual copyright revenues to repay their 
initial investment. A songwriter assigns the 
copyright in a song to a music publisher, for 
example, in return for the promise of royalties 
paid on each copy sold or performed. The 
publisher sells a film company the right to 
use the song in a movie sound track, again in 
return for a share of anticipated profits.  Only 
the market place will determine whether a 
work has commercial value. But if the work 
has commercial value, copyright’s aim is to 
put that value into the owner’s pocket. 
The argument needs to be made more precise. 
Is the proposition that authors earn a living by 
allowing copying ‘at a price’ simply a version 
of the incentive justification of copyright (see 
Paper 1)? As the costs of conceiving, executing, 
producing and marketing creative works will be 
above the costs of copying, creative production 
would not take place without the incentive of 
artificial scarcity that copyright law provides. 
‘The resulting difference between price and 
marginal cost, summed over the number of copies 
sold, will generate revenues to offset the cost of 
expression.’97
Although, under copyright law, the first owner 
of a work is usually the author, in practice most 
works are owned by a third party specialising in 
commercial exploitation, such as a publisher or 
producer. Under the orthodox economic analysis, 
this distinction does not matter. According to 
Landes and Posner, any legal or institutional 
devices that limit the assignability of copyright 
‘reduce the incentive to create by preventing the 
author or artist from shifting risk to the publisher 
or dealer’; if ‘future speculative gains’ must be 
shared, the author will be paid less.98
In 1841, Macaulay had put the same point rather 
differently:  ‘I say, therefore, that, from the very 
nature of literary property, it will almost always 
pass away from an author’s family; and I say, that 
the price given for it to the family will bear a small 
proportion to the tax which the purchaser, if his 
speculation turns out well, will in the course a long 
series of years levy on the public.’99
96 P. Goldstein (2003 [1994]), Copyright’s Highway: From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox, Stanford: Stanford UP, at 4.
97 W. Landes and R. Posner (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law’, Journal of Legal Studies 18: 325-366, at 327. 
The article contains the best-known formal expression of the incentive argument.
98 Ibid. at 327. In their 2003 chapter ‘The Optimal Duration of Copyrights and Trademarks’ (in The Economic Structure of 
Intellectual Property Law, Harvard UP), Landes and Posner go even further, arguing for a transferable perpetual copyright 
term from Congestion Externalities (without copyright, works may become over-used) and Maintenance Incentives (for 
example, to invest in works that may be brought back in use after the current term has expired). The theory does not sit 
easily with empirical data: Paul Heald (2008), ‘Testing the Over- and Under-Exploitation Hypotheses: Bestselling musical 
compositions (1913–32) and their use in cinema (1968–2007)’, paper presented at Annual Congress of the Society for 
Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI), Geneva, July 10–11, 2008 (available at http://papers.ssrn.com).
99 Speech of 5 February 1841 in the House of Commons, quoted from Macaulay: Prose and Poetry (ed. G.M. Young), London: 
Hart-Davis, p. 748.
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The ‘harmony of interests’ assumption can be 
assessed through the empirical data reviewed in 
this paper. The poor median earnings of authors 
and artists, combined with frequent interruptions 
to income from the principal artistic activity and 
multiple job-holdings indicate an oversupply in the 
labour market.100
On the demand side, the extremely skewed 
distribution of earnings suggests that cultural 
markets are subject to so-called ‘winner-take-
all’ effects. These have been first analysed in 
the economics of superstars. According to these 
models, in certain markets small differences 
in perceived ‘relative performance’ become 
magnified.101
The information process determining consumption 
may even lead to a totally random selection of 
talent.102
The combined forces of an oversupply of creative 
ambitions and ‘winner-take-all’ demand patterns 
appear to have two main effects on copyright 
contracting - 
1.  Since many more products want to enter 
the market than can be consumed, there 
is an important role for the commercial 
intermediary, acting as selector or 
gatekeeper.103 Publishers, record companies, 
promoters, broadcasters, galleries or clubs 
will play this role for different markets. The 
bargaining power of artists early in their 
career is therefore weak.
2. Despite ever more sophisticated marketing 
efforts, commercial intermediaries have 
been unable to predict demand patterns in 
winner-take-all markets. Nobody knows the 
next hit. Only a small percentage of releases 
will repay their initial investment.104 Market 
intermediaries tend to favour known artists 
with a track record. The bargaining power of 
consistently successful artists is therefore 
high.  
Thus Landes and Posner’s ‘harmony of interests’ 
argument appears plausible for bestselling artists. 
They may rationally decide if they want to shift 
the risk for their next release to a commercial 
intermediary. Similarly, publishers or producers 
may rationally wish to share the risk through 
royalty contracts, or acquire the risk through a 
buy-out.
100 This point is frequently made by cultural economists: D. Throsby (2001), Economics and Culture, Cambridge: CUP, p. 121.
101 R.H. Frank and P.J. Cook, The Winner-Take-All Society (New York: Free Press, 1995). Sherwin Rosen characterises artistic 
labour markets as lotteries (‘The Theory of Equalizing Differences’, pp. 641-92 in O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard (eds.), 
Handbook of Labour Economics (vol. 2), Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985).
102 According to Adler, information costs lead consumers to choose, in a mimetic process, what other people have already 
selected: Adler, M. (1985), ‘Stardom and Talent’, American Economic Review 75: 208-12. For a sociological analysis of the 
value consumers derive from other people’s consumption, see Kretschmer, M., G.M. Klimis, C.J. Choi (1999), ‘Increasing 
Returns and Social Contagion in Cultural Industries’, British Journal of Management 10, S61–S72.
103 The gatekeeper concept is developed in Hirsch, P. (1972), ‘Processing Fads and Fashions: An Organisation Set Analysis of 
Cultural Industry Systems’, American Journal of Sociology 77/4: 639-670.
104 For the music industry, the ratio is about 1:10 – Kretschmer, M., G.M. Klimis and R. Wallis (2001), ‘Music in electronic 
markets: An empirical study’, New Media and Society 3/4: 417-441. The ‘nobody knows’ doctrine is expounded in Caves, 
R.E. (2000), Creative Industries: Contracts between Arts and Commerce, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP.
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How about the wider community of non-
bestselling creators? In which way do copyright 
contracts incentivise and remunerate these 
authors and artists?
2.4.1  What follows from winner-takes-
all?
The evidence reviewed in this paper reveals that 
the distribution of earnings linked to copyright is 
highly skewed. For the payments of collecting 
societies (which reflect actual use of copyright 
works), the top 10% of authors receive 60-
90% of total income. For self-employed income 
from writing (which may include non-copyright 
payments, such as time-sensitive commissions, 
grants, or live events), the top 10% of authors 
receive about 40-70% of total income.  Only in 
supplementing their earnings from non-copyright 
and non-artistic sources (e.g. second job, 
partner’s income), does the measure of inequality 
for artists begin to approximate that of many other 
occupations – albeit at a lower median and mean.
Two arguments can be found for why a winner-
take-all distribution of copyright earnings does 
not conflict with the aims of copyright law to 
provide an efficient incentive for the creation and 
distribution of culture.
Argument (1): 
 The market picks the winner. Copyright law 
must not presume cultural judgment.
Under this argument, ‘best’ means ‘bestselling’, 
and bestselling titles are indeed the only ones 
copyright law is meant to incentivise and reward. 
Interestingly, exponents of the author rhetoric 
rarely make this point. This may be because 
bestsellers include a large share of industrial 
products (such as singles tied in to populist TV 
shows, or ghosted autobiographies). It is evident 
that much that is culturally worthwhile is not 
reaching, and will never reach, the charts. To 
admit that much, however, would concede that 
diversity of cultural production, and support for 
niche communities is not an aim of copyright law. 
In turn, this would open the door to arguments 
treating copyright law as a patent law for industrial 
cultural production (with a much shorter term of 
protection).
A second argument insists that copyright law does 
not only foster bestsellers. Wider cultural aims are 
served by offering prospects of high earnings to 
all potential creators:
Argument (2): 
 Creators are risk takers. Without the 
prospects of potential superstar earnings, 
nobody would become an author or artist.
In the literature, attention has been drawn to the 
puzzle of an intrinsic motivation that seems to 
drive many authors and artists (at variance with 
economic premises).105 It is unlikely that artistic 
production by lower earning creators would cease 
without the incentive of copyright royalties from a 
possible bestseller.  In addition, many developed 
countries provide non-copyright support for 
culture as a matter of public policy, be it through 
broadcasting licence fees, grants, tax incentives 
or social security benefits. Still, the prospect of 
financial success appears to be a significant 
motivation for many emerging artists. The 
oversupply of creators, and the resulting failure of 
many authors and artists to make a sustainable 
living, may be simply due to an overestimation of 
their chances of success.
105 Cf. B.S. Frey (1997), Not Just For the Money: An Economic Theory of Personal Motivation, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; R. 
Towse (2001), ‘Partly for the Money: Rewards and Incentives to Artists’, KYKLOS, 54(2/3): 473 - 490. For literary production, 
see W. St Clair (2004), The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kretschmer 
suggests, drawing on eight in-depth interviews with mid-level artists in the music sector, that creators have four main 
interests: to see their work widely reproduced and distributed; to receive credit for it; to earn a financial reward relative to the 
commercial value of the work; and to be able to engage creatively with other works (in adaptation, comment, sampling etc): 
M. Kretschmer (2005), ‘Artists’ Earnings and Copyright: A review of British and German music industry data in the context of 
digital technologies’, First Monday 10/1 (January): pp. 1-20.
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 2 - CREATOR CONTRACTS
68
The implications of this position could be 
summarised thus: although, empirically, copyright 
contracts do not secure the remuneration of the 
population of artists and authors, as an incentive 
they ensure that creative production does take 
place.
It appears that in many countries the legislator 
has not been satisfied that an incentive that 
appears to be based on a systematic cognitive 
mistake (namely an overestimation of likely 
success) can be the end of the matter.106 In 
the jurisdictions reviewed, there are specific 
formalities associated with copyright contracts, 
and a number of other provisions that intervene in 
the contractual freedom of parties with the aim to 
improve the financial position of authors.
2.5   THE REGULATION OF COPYRIGHT 
CONTRACTS
The characteristics of contracts over the 
exploitation of copyright works will be analysed 
under the following headings. 
-  Ownership
-  Specific contract formalities
-  Scope of the rights transferred
-  Rights to remuneration
-  Effects on third parties
-  Provisions relating to the revision and
 termination of contracts
-  General doctrine relating to unfair contracts
The comparative international survey of legal 
provisions draws on the work of Guibault and 
Hugenholtz (2002), Bently (2002) and Lucas-
Schloetter (2004). Rather than analysing doctrine 
in detail, for the purposes of this review we aim (i) 
to summarise a range of regulatory options, (ii) to 
survey the empirical evidence on their effects. 
2.5.1 Ownership
Under the so-called ‘creator doctrine’ (underlying 
the concept of literary and artistic works in the 
Berne Convention), the initial owner of the 
copyright in a work is the natural person who 
created it. However, in all countries there are 
certain ownership rules and assumptions for 
specific, more entrepreneurial kinds of work, and 
for works created under employment.107
From an economic perspective, it is not initial 
ownership but transferability that matters. It may 
be useful to illustrate briefly the UK position for 
works created under employment, commissioned 
works and moral rights.
Creation under employment
Under section 11(2) of the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988, for work made ‘by 
an employee in the course of his employment, 
his employer is the first owner’. The language 
preserves earlier case law.
In Stevenson Jordan v. MacDonald & Evans 
[1953] 69 RPC 10, an employed accountant who 
gave public lectures on budgetary controls could 
not be ordered to prepare lectures. The employee 
owned the copyright.
106 There can be more fundamental doubts about the efficiency of the copyright system. New empirical data appear to show 
(E. Höffner, Das Urheberrecht: Eine historische und ökonomische Analyse, Munich: VEW Verlag, forthcoming 2010) that 
in Germany, authors’ salaries increased quite dramatically during the rapid growth of the reprinting industry (from around 
1770). The introduction of a federal copyright in 1837 appears to have caused a drop in remuneration (cf. Directive for 
reciprocal copyright protection within the German Confederation (1837), in Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), 
eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org). A possible explanation is that an increase in demand due to 
stronger competition and lower consumer prices in a non-copyright environment may increase the bargaining power of 
authors. It also has been suggested that the concentration of back catalogues of rights in an oligopolistic industry structure 
is an unintended effect of copyright law, creating a barrier to entry for new firms and artists: P. Tschmuck (2009), ‘Copyright, 
Contracts and Music Production’, Information, Communication and Society 12(2): 251-266.
107 For related or neighbouring rights, national laws typically are silent on the question of first ownership.
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In Missing Link Software v. Magee [1989] FSR 
361, a programmer was employed to write 
programs of the disputed kind: even though a 
program was produced outside working hours 
on the employee’s own equipment, the employer 
owned copyright.
In Noah v. Shuba [1991] FSR 14, a consultant 
created copyright material in the course of 
employment (in this case by the NHS). Still, the 
court implied a term that the employee owned 
because it was customary for the employee by 
assigns copyright to publisher and/or collects 
royalties.
Indicators that inform assessment of employer 
ownership include the contractual scope of 
employment, level of responsibility, creation in 
work time, using work resources (equipment) and 
the financial risks taken by the employee.
Commissioned works
For commissioned work, the default ownership 
remains with the creator. In Robin Ray v. Classic 
FM [1998] FSR 622, a consultant produced a 
database of recordings under commission. An 
implied licence to Classic FM was inferred but not 
for subsequent exploitation abroad.
Moral rights
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention (1928 Rome 
revision) states:
‘Independently of the author’s economic rights 
and even after the transfer of the said rights, the 
author shall have the right to claim authorship of 
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action 
in relation to, the said work, which would be 
prejudicial to his honour or reputation.’108 
These so-called ‘paternity’ and ‘integrity’ rights are 
also known as droit moral from their roots in 19th 
century French case law.
The UK gave formal recognition with the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988. 
The main provisions are the right to be identified 
as author or director (ss 77-79), and the right to 
object to derogatory treatment (ss 80-83).
However, there are extensive exceptions (ss 79 
and 81) for computer programs, newspapers, 
reference works and works produced under 
employment. Moral rights can be waived (s 
87: ‘any of those rights may be waived by 
instrument in writing’). Moral rights can fail for 
lack of assertion (s 77(1): right to be identified 
‘is not infringed unless it has been asserted in 
accordance with section 78’).
If moral rights could not be waived (and it is the 
intention of the Berne provisions that they persist 
‘after the transfer’ of the economic rights) they 
would have the effect of an automatic term written 
into any exploitation contract. In most civil law 
countries (e.g. Belgium, France, Germany) moral 
rights are inalienable.109
2.5.2  Specific contract formalities
Many countries regulate the formalities of 
copyright contracts. In the UK, copyright is 
transmissible by assignment, by testamentary 
disposition or by operation of law, as personal or 
moveable property (CDPA s. 90(1)). However, an 
‘assignment of copyright is not effective unless it 
is in writing…’ (s. 90(3)).110
108 Under Berne Convention Article 5, ‘[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any formality’. The 
UK legislation arguably does not comply: Ginsburg, J.C. (1990), ‘Moral Rights in a Common Law System’, Entertainment 
Law Review 121.
109 Some countries have also non-Berne disclosure and retraction rights that derive from personality interests: le droit de 
divulgation (France): right to decide whether at all, when and how to release a work to the public; le droit de repentir (France, 
Germany: Rückrufungsrecht, Italy, Spain): right to withdraw work from circulation.
110 Similar provisions can be found for example in Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the US.
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Griggs v. Evans [2003] EWHC 2914 (Ch) (Doc 
Martens case): a commissioner may achieve 
equitable ownership (commissioned logo = artistic 
work) despite failure to obtain assignment (legal 
title) ‘if the Client needs in addition to the right to 
use the copyright works the right to exclude the 
Contractor from using the work and the ability 
to enforce the copyright against third parties’ (at 
35, citing Lightman J in Robin Ray v. Classic FM 
[1998] FSR 622).
Requirements of form may offer an 
encouragement to negotiate. However, the issues 
are similar to those for shrink-wrap, click-wrap 
and browse-wrap licences where non-negotiable 
terms are standard practice (see discussion in 
Paper 3). According to Guibault and Hugenholtz 
(2002, p. 32), the copyright legislations of Austria, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden contain no 
requirement of form, and thus appear to allow oral 
transfer of rights (as does the United States).
2.5.3  Scope of the rights transferred
Many civil law jurisdictions have either by 
statute or through case law developed doctrine 
on the interpretation of copyright contracts. An 
example of the statutory approach is Germany’s 
Zweckübertragungstheorie (‘theory of the purpose 
of transfer’) under which author contracts have to 
specify uses to which a work is put (§31(5) UrhG). 
Uses not envisaged by the parties at the time of 
the contract traditionally remained outside the 
scope of contract (i.e. the rights were retained by 
the author). Under the new Urhebervertragsrecht 
of 2002, authors can now transfer rights to 
yet unknown exploitations but subject to fair 
or equitable compensation (angemessene 
Beteiligung).111
Under the legislation of several European states 
(e.g. Belgium, France), copyright contracts must 
specify the duration, place of exercise, and the 
amount of remuneration for each of the rights 
transferred.
UK law does not have any special principles 
applying to the interpretation of copyright 
contracts, and recognises ‘global’ assignments 
of rights (i.e. for all jurisdictions, all uses etc). In 
line with general principles on the interpretation 
of contract, copyright licences do not extend to 
uses not contemplated at the time of the contract. 
Non-expressed licences can only be implied if 
necessary to regulate the rights of the parties 
at the time of the contract. For example, in 
Robin Ray v Classic FM [1998] FSR 622, Ray’s 
consultancy agreement for creating a database 
for use in the UK did not imply a licence for 
foreign radio stations to exploit the database. 
Similarly, in Grisbrook v. MGN112 Mirror Group 
Newspapers was held to infringe copyright in 
photographs supplied under a licence for print 
publishing by marketing back editions containing 
these photographs through a website.
111 §31(5) UrhG also specifies: ‘If the types of use to which the exploitation right extends have not been specifically designated 
when the right was granted, the scope of the exploitation right shall be determined in accordance with the purpose envisaged 
in making the grant. Appropriate factors to consider for the question of whether a right to use is granted are whether it 
concerns a simple or exclusive right to use, the extent of the right to use and the right to prohibit, and what restrictions affect 
the right to use.’
112 Grisbrook v. MGN Ltd [2009] EWHC 2520 (Ch). Patten LJ at 65: ‘any licence represents a derogation from or relaxation of 
the copyright owner’s statutory rights. It must therefore be for the defendant to justify (absent any express agreement) the 
basis for extending the licence to cover what would be otherwise separate acts of infringement.’
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In the United States and Canada, there has been 
high profile litigation regarding the interpretation 
of contracts of freelance journalists. Did 
assignments from the analogue era envisage the 
transfer of rights for digital exploitation? In the 
case of Robertson v. Thomson113, the Canadian 
Supreme Court implied a permission for CD-ROM 
re-publication of articles by the commissioning 
newspaper (but not database exploitation), and 
affirmed the primacy of contract (thus allowing 
global assignments in the future). In Tasini v New 
York Times114 again the newspaper had engaged 
free-lance journalists under oral contracts that 
did not contemplate electronic publication. The 
US Supreme Court held that the New York 
Times could not license on back issues of the 
newspaper for inclusion in electronic databases 
such as LexisNexis.
2.5.4  Rights to remuneration
A right to remuneration can either be introduced 
as a direct regulation of contract terms, or through 
rights that will be exercised by collecting societies 
(either voluntary or by statute).
Collecting societies
As discussed in paper 1, copyright collecting 
societies are often seen as operating for 
the benefits of right holders only: Where the 
transaction costs of individual licensing are too 
high, it appears advantageous for copyright 
owners to inject exclusive rights into a collective 
organisation that monitors use, issues licenses 
and distributes royalties to its members. As a 
collectively negotiated income stream, royalty 
terms can also be more advantageous to authors 
than might be achieved in individually negotiated 
markets. Almost inadvertently, collective licensing 
may also turn out to deliver important user 
benefits. A radio station, for example, gets easy 
access to the world repertoire of music; libraries 
may offer generous dissemination arrangements. 
In European countries, this regulatory strategy of 
creating statutory rights that can only be exercised 
by collecting societies has taken hold since the 
1965 German Urheberrecht law that introduced 
a claim to remuneration for unauthorised private 
copying, compensated via a levy on copying 
media and equipment.  Rights that can only be 
exercised via collecting societies under European 
Directives include the rental right (1992/100/EEC), 
the cable retransmission right (1993/83/EEC) and 
the resale right or droit de suite (2001/84/EC).
The behaviour of collecting societies has been 
challenged under European Competition Law 
(Arts. 81 and 82, EC = Arts. 101 and 102, TFEU), 
since they are joint ventures creating a super-
dominant market position in at least two respects: 
towards users and right holders. The Article 82 
case law on collecting societies falls into two 
groups: abusive conduct towards members, and 
abusive conduct towards users. These will be 
briefly summarised.
113 Robertson v. Thomson Corp (2001) 15 CPR (4th) 147 (SCJ); (2004), 34 CPR (4th) 161 (Ont CA); 2006 SCC 43: ‘Parties are, 
have been, and will continue to be free, to alter by contract the rights established by the Copyright Act.’ 25 Robertson SCC 
(at 58). For commentary, see G. D’Agostino (2007), ‘Canada’s Robertson Ruling: Any Practical Significance for Copyright 
Treatment of Freelance Authors?’, 2 EIPR 66.
114 Tasini v. New York Times, 533 U.S. 483, 121 S Ct 2381 (2001).
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Members
- Collecting societies cannot discriminate on 
grounds of nationality.115 
-  There can be no preferential treatment for 
groups of members, but threshold conditions 
to full membership, and distribution variations 
according to genre and cultural value have 
been tolerated.116
-  There must be maximum freedom for 
members to decide which repertoire to inject 
into collective administration. However, 
collecting societies can insist on transfer of 
whole groups of rights, and rights in future 
works if that is indispensable to the operation 
of the society.117
-  Right holders must be able to withdraw from 
membership, and assign their repertoire 
elsewhere. Collecting societies can insist on 
lengthy notice periods.118
-  Collecting societies can limit the influence of 
members who are economically dependent 
on users (i.e. if a publisher is part of the 
same parent company as a record label). 
However the least restrictive measure has to 
be adopted.119
-  There is no specific ECJ case law on the 
freedom (or otherwise) of collecting societies 
to refuse the administration of individual 
rights and right-holders.120
-  There is no ECJ case law on the legitimacy 
of socio-cultural deductions.
115 Membership and collection cannot be restricted to domestic citizens or residents (GEMA I, OJ L134/15, decision of 20 
June 1971; Phil Collins v. IMTRAT Handels GmbH). Foreign members (authors and publishers) cannot be excluded from 
participating in the governance of a society, nor from socio-cultural benefits (GVL).
116 GEMA II (decision of 6 July 1972, OJ L166/22). However, there is a recent policy trend requiring that royalty distribution must 
match actual use as closely as possible (MMC report on PRS, 1996; COM 261). There is no case law to that effect.
117 A required blanket assignment of all present and future rights was ruled to be abusive in BRT v. SABAM. In GEMA I, the 
Commission identified seven categories of rights members may assign separately: (1) public performance, (2) broadcasting, 
(3) film performance, (4) mechanical reproduction, (5) film synchronisation, (6) video reproduction and performance, (7) 
new categories of right. The MMC report on the PRS (1996) added for the UK the rights to live performances. A mandatory 
requirement to assign on-line exploitation was held to be an unfair trading condition under Art. 82(a) (Daftpunk decision, 
Case C2/37.219, Banghalter et Homem Christo v. SACEM, 6 August 2002). Authors also must be able to assign different 
groups of rights to different societies in different countries (Case 22/79, Greenwich Film Production, Paris v. SACEM, [1979] 
ECR 3275, [1980] 1 CMLR 629). However, collecting societies can resist cherry-picking (for example, only having those 
rights assigned that are expensive to administrate).
118 In GEMA II, the commission allowed a minimum membership term of three years. Retaining right for five years after a 
member’s withdrawal is likely to be unfair (BRT v. SABAM). In the CISAC Decision (Case COM/C2/38.698 of 16 July 2008), 
the Commission prohibited membership clauses applied by 23 collecting societies that prevent an author from choosing or 
moving to another collecting society.
119 For example, conditions on the exercising of votes are acceptable, exclusions from membership are not (GEMA I). 
Restrictions can be imposed that strengthen a society’s negotiation power toward users (SABAM, para. 9). In GEMA III (OJ 
L94 /12, decision of 4 December 1981), the Commission authorised the societies statutes imposing uniform effective rates 
of remuneration (thus preventing members from making payments to users).
120 The general Article 82 case law on refusal to supply applies (e.g. Cases 6 and 7/73, ICI and Commercial Solvents v. 
Commission, [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1CMLR 309; Magill: Cases C-241&2/91, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR 1-743; 
[1995] 4 CMLR 586). Some national laws provide for a duty to administer rights for all nationals or residents of EU and EEA 
states (e.g. the German law regulating copyright societies – §6 WahrnG, so-called Wahrnehmungszwang).
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Users
-  As a dominant undertaking, a collecting 
society cannot refuse to license a user in its 
own territory without a legitimate reason.121
-  Refusal to license only part of the repertoire 
is acceptable if necessary for functioning of a 
society.122
-  Excessive pricing of licences is abusive but 
hard to prove.123
-  Price discrimination between large and small 
users has been raised as an abusive trading 
condition, but the Court did not rule on the 
point.124
-  There is no ECJ case law on the nature, or 
lack of an appeals procedure making tariffs 
contestable.125
-  Case law is awaited on the introduction of 
competition between societies.126
It appears that the European Courts accept 
trading conditions with respect to collecting 
societies that would be considered abusive in 
many other contexts. The main line of reasoning 
is a familiar principle of proportionality: restrictive 
conditions are justified if they are required for the 
society to carry out its activities on the necessary 
scale. Yet, there is no clarification of the function 
of collective administration beyond managing 
private interests. What are the activities that are 
necessary? The ECJ has tolerated, not always 
consistently, a number of practices relating to 
collective bargaining, licensing conditions and 
redistribution of royalties that can only be justified 
on social and cultural policy grounds. 
Economists argue that the pie does not 
automatically get bigger by creating new rights.127 
121 There are no specific rulings on refusal to license with respect to collecting societies. Again, the general Article 82 case law 
on refusal to supply applies (supra note Solvents v. Commission).
122 In the French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier), the impracticability of setting up a monitoring system in the foreign 
territory was deemed an acceptable reason.
123 If tariffs in other member states are appreciably different, the collecting society needs ‘to justify such a difference by reference 
to objective and relevant dissimilarities between copyright management’ (Lucazeau, para 33). Including a mechanical fee for 
public performances in a discotheque is acceptable in the context of differences in national licensing systems (Case 402/85, 
Basset v. SACEM, [1987] ECR 1747, [1987] 3 CMLR 173).
124 In the French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier), the appellants complained that large scale users, such as radio 
and TV broadcasters, obtained lower tariffs. I. A. Stamatoudi, ‘The European Court’s Love-Hate Relationship with Collecting 
Societies’ (1997), European Intellectual Property Review 19(6): 289-297.
125 According to AG Jacobs in Tournier, the fact that there is no regulatory control of the price charged by a society is relevant. 
For discussion, see Temple Lang 1998, p. 57. Germany and the UK are the only EU countries with a formalised appeals 
procedure. For analyses of the jurisprudence of the UK Copyright Tribunal, see W. Cornish and D. Llewelyn, Intellectual 
Property (6th ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell 2007), sections 13-54 to 13-58; L. Bently and B. Sherman, Intellectual Property 
Law (3nd ed.) (Oxford: OUP, 2009), pp. 299-301.
126 In the CISAC decision (Case COM/C2/38.698 of 16 July 2008), the Commission declared territorial restrictions unlawful that 
prevent a collecting society from offering licences to commercial users outside their domestic territory. It was found to be a 
concerted practice in violation of Art. 81 EC and Art. 53 EEA, resulting in a strict segmentation of the market on a national 
basis. Reciprocal representation contracts between collecting societies in effect make it impossible for commercial users 
to obtain pan-European licences. The Commission decision is under appeal to the General Court (formerly CFI): CISAC 
v. Commission, Case T-442/08. The French Discothèques cases (Lucazeau, Tournier) hinted at problems with SACEM’s 
administrative overheads due to lack of competition, but had left the issue to national regulation.
127 R. Towse and M. Taylor (1998), ‘The Value of Performers’ Rights: An Economic Analysis’, Media, Culture and Society 20(4): 
631-652
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A gallery (droit de suite) or record company (rental 
right) may simply pay the artist or performer a 
lower fee to allow for further earnings arising from 
secondary usage. There are also considerable 
costs associated with the system needed to 
administer these rights. 
Further analytic and empirical work is needed in 
this area.128
General entitlement to equitable remuneration
The German copyright contract law of 2002 
(Urhebervertragsrecht) introduced a new 
general entitlement to equitable remuneration 
(§32 – angemessene Vergütung) from any 
copyright contract into the Copyright Act 
(Urheberrechtsgesetz – UrhG). §32 was said to 
codify a long established principle in German 
copyright jurisdiction.129 Before 2002, a so-called 
bestseller clause (Bestseller-Paragraph) existed. 
It was applied in only very few cases where 
the courts held that the contractually agreed 
remuneration was ‘strikingly disproportional’ (in 
einem groben Mißverhältnis, §36 UrhG pre-2002) 
to the publishers’ profits. The 2002 amendment 
extended the scope of application considerably. 
According to the parliamentary records, the new 
copyright contract law attempted to ‘achieve 
contract parity’.130 Authors who have received a 
non-equitable remuneration (or no remuneration 
at all) are entitled to a retrospective variation of 
their contracts up to a level that the courts regard 
as common and honest practice in the trade (§32 
(2) – üblicher- und redlicherweise) at the time the 
contract was concluded. 
§36 of the 2002 copyright contract law provides 
that collectively negotiated tariffs are deemed 
to be equitable. However, up to 2009 it was 
only the writers’ professional body VS (Verband 
der Schriftsteller, a subsection of the services 
union Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft 
VERDI), that succeeded in reaching an 
agreement on recommended tariffs (Gemeinsame 
Vergütungsregeln) with a number of publishers in 
2005.131 
Greece imposes a minimum royalty for books 
sales (10% per 1000 copies), and repeat 
broadcasts (50% of original fee for first repeat).132 
Other countries have so-called bestseller 
clauses similar to the German model that are 
supposed to ensure the participation of authors in 
disproportionate profits. 
From an economic perspective, regulating the 
terms and conditions of copyright contracts 
may not lead to higher payments for authors 
and artists. Remuneration clauses within 
individual contracts are difficult to implement 
and monitor, and residual ties generally increase 
the uncertainty of investment decisions. There 
has been little systematic research comparing 
individually and collectively negotiated contracts.
The earnings data reviewed earlier in this paper 
indicate that the distribution of collecting societies’ 
payments is more skewed than income from rights 
that are individually managed. Kretschmer and 
Hardwick (2007) show that, for collecting society 
income, the top 10 percent of writers receive 
128 Slovenia appears to be the only country that has a system of mandatory collective administration for the ‘making available’ 
right. It covers all online communications directed to the public. However, in practice no effective mandated collecting society 
appears to exist that may administer the right: M. Bogataj (2009), ‘Mandatory collective management for making available 
in Slovenian Copyright Act. A mistake or an opportunity?’ paper presented at the Communia Project, available at http://
communia-project.eu/downloads.
129 For decisions of BGH and Reichsgericht, see Wandtke and Bullinger (2009, p. 520). Many thanks to Dr Friedemann Kawohl 
for locating references on German copyright contract jurisprudence.
130 ‘Ausgleich der gestörten Vertragsparität’. Bundestagsdrucksache 14/6433, 2. Available at dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/14/064/1406433.pdf.
131 http://www.bmj.bund.de/enid/Urheberrecht/Gemeinsame_Verguetungsregeln_uf.html.
132 Greek Copyright Act of 1993. Articles 33-37 contain detailed remuneration rules summarised in Guibault and Hugenholtz 
(2002, p. 91).
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about 60% (Germany) - 70%  (UK) of collecting 
society payments, while for total individual income 
from writing, the top 10 percent of writers account 
for 50% (Germany) - 60% (UK) of total wealth. 
Under another economic perspective, 
membership in a collecting society may be 
conceived as analogous to joining an insurance 
scheme (cf. Snow and Watt, 2005). However, for 
risk mitigation, creators would need to agree a 
‘progressive’ re-distribution of wealth from higher 
to lower earners.
2.5.5  Effects on third parties
In Barker v. Stickney [1919] 1 K.B. 121, the 
company to which copyright in Barker’s book ‘The 
Theory and Practice of Heating and Ventilation’ 
had been transferred went into liquidation. The 
copyright was sold on to a third party (Stickney) 
who was found not to be bound to pay royalties 
to Barker that had been agreed in the original 
contract of assignment. The ruling in Barker v. 
Stickney is one instantiation of the doctrine of 
privity of contract in English law, under which a 
third party cannot be burdened by a contract to 
which it is not a party. The rule has potentially 
severe consequences in an environment in which 
copyright assignments, and subsequent transfers 
to third parties, have become common.133
Across the countries reviewed there is some 
variation about the possibility of transferees to sell 
on, pledge or secure acquired rights. Generally 
consent of the author is required, but often that 
will be given in the initial contract assigning or 
licensing a work.  The ruling in Barker v. Stickney 
appears to be an anomaly.
133 John N. Adams (1998), ‘Barker v Stickney revisited’, Intellectual Property Quarterly 1: 113-115. Mark Anderson proposes to 
make contractual obligations in intellectual property assignments binding on subsequent owners (2009) ‘Assignment and 
royalties don’t mix’, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 4(4): 283-288.
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2.5.6  Provisions relating to the revision 
and termination of contracts
Common interventions by the courts include 
imposing duties on the assignee to promote and 
exploit, and presumptions in the construction 
of contracts (for example, regarding uses 
unforeseen at the time of the contract, as 
discussed under 2.5.3).
In the UK, the contract doctrine surfacing 
frequently in copyright disputes is the principle 
that an agreement which unreasonably restricts 
a person’s ability to carry on his trade cannot be 
enforced (so-called ‘restraint of trade’).134
Renewable terms that fall back to the author, 
or reversionary terms, dramatically increase 
the bargaining power for works that are still in 
demand after the first term has expired (or term 
reversion). This could be an effective way of 
improving the earnings of authors. Under the 
Statute of Anne of 1710 copyright fell back to the 
author after a term of 14 years, and the author 
could then assign it again for one further term.135 
Until the 1976 Copyright Act, the United States 
still followed this structure, with an initial copyright 
term of 28 years that could be renewed once. 
Under Section 304(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act, a 
copyright owner (or his or her heirs) can terminate 
all grants, licences or transfers of rights (made 
prior to 1978) beginning on the 56th year after 
that assignment was made.
Under the Italian Copyright Act (Art. 122), 
publishing contracts are restricted to 10 years, 
after which the remainder of the term reverts to 
the author. However, this is without prejudice to 
the rules governing employment contracts and 
contracts for services. It is unclear what effect 
Article 122 has in practice.
Under the Proposed Directive extending the term 
of protection for sound recordings, the performer 
may terminate the contract in the extended term 
if copies of the recording are no longer available 
online.136
134 In Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Macaulay [1974], 3 All ER 616, an extended term without an obligation on the publisher 
to exploit was held to be ‘in restraint of trade’. See also Zang Tumb Tuum (ZTT) v. Johnson (Frankie Goes to Hollywood) 
[1993], EMLR 61; Panayiotou (George Michael) v. Sony Music Entertainment [1994], EMLR 2. In addition, contracts 
concluded under ‘undue influence’ are void: O’Sullivan v. Management Agency [1985] 3 All ER 351; Elton John v. James 
[1991], FSR 397. ‘Restraint of trade’ and ‘undue influence’ are both general doctrines applying to all contracts.
135 The 1814 Act extended the term to 28 years, renewable once, or life. The 1911 Copyright Act provided that under certain 
circumstances, copyrighted works granted to a third party revert to the author’s heirs, successors, or legal representatives 
25 years after the death of the author.
136 Amending Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the term of protection of copyright and 
certain related rights (proposal presented by the Commission, COM(2008) 464/3), Article 10a (Transitional measures relating 
to the transposition of directive), subsection (6): If, after the moment at which, by virtue of Article 3 (1) and (2) in their version 
before amendment by Directive [insert: Nr. of this amending directive] EC, the performer and the phonogram producer 
would be no longer protected in regard of, respectively, the fixation of the performance and the phonogram, the phonogram 
producer ceases to offer copies of the phonogram for sale in sufficient quantity or to make it available to the public, by wire or 
wireless means, in such a way that members of the public  may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen 
by them, the  performer may terminate the contract on transfer or assignment. Where a phonogram contains the fixation of 
the performances of a plurality of performers, they may terminate their contracts on transfer or assignment only jointly. If the 
contract on transfer or assignment is terminated pursuant to sentences 1 or 2, the rights of the phonogram producer in the 
phonogram shall expire.
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The renewed interest in bringing non-exploited 
works to market is also reflected in a failed 
amendment to the Digital Economy bill tabled by 
Conservative Peer Lord Lucas that proposed an 
‘artists’ right to re-market’ if a work is not available 
in all common current electronic formats in all 
geographical regions within two years after first 
publication, or five years after its creation, it had 
not been published.137
2.5.7  General contract doctrine / Unfair 
contracts
In the UK discussion, arguments have been 
raised that the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (as 
amended at 1st October 2003) should be made 
applicable to copyright contracts. 
Schedule 1 of the Section 1(2)(c) does not extend 
its provisions to–
(c) any contract so far as it relates to the 
creation or transfer of a right or interest in any 
patent, trade mark, copyright [or design right], 
registered design, technical or commercial 
information or other intellectual property, or 
relates to the termination of any such right or 
interest;
The reason for this exclusion is unclear but in 
any case the language of the Unfair Contracts 
Terms Act is intended to protect consumers, and 
applies to clauses in agreements that attempt to 
limit liability, not to terms that create, transfer or 
terminate an interest in intellectual property.
Thus, parties to a copyright contract have to 
rely on general contract doctrine which will not 
normally review agreements that are otherwise 
lawful because they are lop-sided or ‘unfair’. For 
further details, see Paper 3, section 3.4 ‘Doctrinal 
analysis of contract limits’.
137 Digital Economy Bill, Amendments debated in the House of Lords (6 January 2010): http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/ld200910/ldbills/001/amend/ml001-ire.htm
286 Insert the following new Clause—
   ‘Artists’ right to re-market
(1)   The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2)   After section 18A insert—
‘18B Artists’ right to re-market (1)
(1)   The original creator of copyright work may compel the copyright owner to licence him to market the work in 
electronic form if—
(a)   two years after the first publication of the work, it is not available in all common current electronic formats in all 
geographical regions, or
(b)   five years after its creation, it has not been published.
(2)   A licence under this section shall be on the terms that the copyright owner receives 50 per cent of the gross 
proceeds of any sale, while the copyright creator receives the balance and pays all associated costs.
(3)   A licence under this section shall require the creator to sell the work at a price not less than could be obtained 
by the copyright owner if he sold the work in the market and in the format specified.
(4)   Any dispute as to the price described in subsection (3) shall be settled by binding arbitration, with neither party 
being required to pay costs in excess of £1,000.’
287 Insert the following new Clause—
   ‘Artists’ right to re-market (2)
(1)   The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 is amended as follows.
(2)   After section 18A insert—
‘18B Artists’ right to re-market (2)
(1)   The orginal creator of copyright work may compel the copyright owner to licence him to market the work in 
electronic form if five years have passed since its creation.
(2)   A license under this section shall be on the terms that the copyright owner receives 50 per cent of the gross 
proceeds of any sale, while the copyright creator receives the balance and pays all associated costs.
(3)   A licence under this section shall require the creator to sell the work at a price not less than could be obtained 
by the copyright owner if he sold the work in the market and in the format specified.
(4)   Any dispute as to the price described in subsection (3) shall be settled by binding arbitration, with neither party 
being required to pay costs in excess of £1,000.’
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2.6  CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL 
RESEARCH 
The only empirical attempt to investigate the 
effects of different legal frameworks on the 
earnings of creators appears to be our own 
survey of British and German literary and audio-
visual writers (Kretschmer and Hardwick, 2007).
In Germany, moral rights (Persönlichkeitsrechte) 
are inalienable – in the UK, these rights can 
be waived. This difference in implementation is 
reflected in German commercial practice, which 
is more responsive to the author’s non-economic 
rights. Moral rights disputes (mainly relating to 
being credited as the author) are more than twice 
as likely in Germany (24.6 % of German writers 
have had such a dispute, compared to 11.4% of 
professional UK authors).  
Other findings include that about 43% of 
professional UK authors have succeeded in 
changing the terms of a contract offered in 2005, 
compared to 44% in Germany. In both countries, 
only about 65% of professional authors take 
professional advice before signing a publishing or 
production contract. 
In both countries, authors who have engaged 
in disputes with their publishers or producers 
tend to earn significantly more than their more 
compliant colleagues.  This is likely to be a two 
way relationship: publishers or producers may 
only listen to authors with bargaining power – but 
equally, engaging in bargaining may increase the 
author’s bargaining power. 
Table: Writing income of professional literary 
authors in Germany and the UK with and 
without contractual changes
(a) UK (2004-5)
Have you 
succeeded 
in changing 
the terms of 
a contract in 
2005?
Valid 
Responses
Mean writing 
income (£)
NO 245 (57%) 22,950
YES 180 (43%) 40,507
t statistic 2.87***
  
(b) Germany (2005)
Have you 
succeeded 
in changing 
the terms of 
a contract in 
2005?
Valid 
Responses
Mean writing 
income (£)
NO 95 (56%) 13,080
YES 76 (44%) 28,964
t statistic 3.73**
Source: Kretschmer and Hardwick (2007, p. 31)
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 2 - CREATOR CONTRACTS
79
2.7  CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between copyright and contract 
law lies at the heart of the regulatory system 
governing the creation and dissemination of 
cultural products. This is so because the exclusive 
statutory rights provided by copyright law only 
turn into financial reward, and thus incentives 
to creators, through a contract with someone 
who wants to exploit or use a protected work. 
Copyright law is what allows contracts to be 
written (i.e. defines the characteristics of the 
work and the property rights in the work - the 
contract space). Yet, it turns out that this general 
statement, plausible as it seems, is neither 
theoretically well understood, nor empirically 
supported. 
We have robust knowledge about creators’ labour 
markets and earnings, derived from government 
statistics and several independent empirical 
studies: artists’ occupational profiles over time 
reveal self-employed, risky often stuttering 
careers. Many more creators attempt to embark 
on artistic careers than are able to sustain them 
(‘oversupply’). Earnings from non-copyright, and 
even non-artistic activities are an important source 
of income for most creators. A small number of 
very high earners earn a disproportionate share of 
total income (‘winner-take-all’).
Copyright law will only have effects upon the 
contracts that are written when those contracts 
lie on the boundaries of the contractable space 
that copyright offers (see Paper 1). We don’t know 
where these boundaries lie, and therefore the 
empirical role of copyright law in remuneration 
remains uncertain. The introduction of new rights 
(such as the rental right, or the droit de suite) 
does not automatically lead to higher earnings. A 
gallery (droit de suite) or record company (rental 
right) may simply pay the artist or performer a 
lower fee to allow for further earnings arising from 
secondary usage.
Overall, it remains an open question whether 
there is a negative or positive relationship 
between the strength of copyright protection and 
the total earnings of creators. We also do not 
know if there is a negative or positive relationship 
between the strength of copyright protection and 
the distribution of earnings of creators. Although 
the orthodox economic theory of copyright law 
assumes that there is a harmony of interests 
between creators and intermediaries (such as 
publishers and producers), much of the attempted 
legal regulation of copyright contracts assumes 
that the incentives of creators and intermediaries 
are not aligned.
The contractual bargaining outcomes are tilted 
towards bestsellers. Creators with a track record 
of success are able to negotiate contracts 
preserving their interests. For most others, in 
particular new entrants to the entertainment 
industries, assignments of rights are common.
Lord Macaulay, in his 1841 speech, had 
recognised only two means to remunerate 
authors: patronage and copyright.136 Even if 
we accept, with Macaulay, that neither intrinsic 
motivation nor accidental private wealth are 
sufficient to ensure the supply of a desirable 
mix of cultural products, (i) copyright and (ii) 
patronage are not the only alternatives.
The financial position of creators may also 
be improved (iii) as the result of collective 
negotiations with publishers or producers 
(facilitated by the professional bodies of cultural 
workers), (iv) as the result of regulatory public 
policy measures, such as a favourable tax, 
insurance or benefit system, (v) by directly 
funding desirable products through grants, or 
indirectly via bodies with a public service mission 
(e.g. broadcasting quotas for certain contents). 
Options (ii), (iv) and (v) have been beyond the 
scope of this review.
138 ‘It is then on men whose profession is literature, and whose private means are not ample, that you must rely for a supply for 
valuable books. Such men must be remunerated for their literary labour. And there are only two ways in which they can be 
remunerated. One of those is patronage; the other is copyright’ (op. cit., p. 734).
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1.  An issue of the journal will appear every 
month, consisting of 8 sheets, printed in 
German type, each page having 30 lines.
2.  All essays included in it must deal with 
either historical or philosophical or aesthetic 
matters, and should also be comprehensible 
to the general reader.
3.  It is the Editor’s responsibility to ensure that 
each issue includes something from each of 
these 3 areas.
4.  A small Committee of 5 members will judge 
the articles that are received, and in each 
case a majority verdict will decide whether an 
article is accepted for publication. 
5.  Neither the Committee nor the Editor 
have the right to make changes to the 
contributions received: they must instead 
always send them back to the author if 
something therein requires amendment.
6.  The minimum fee is 3 louis-d’or, the 
maximum, 8 louis-d’or. The average fee 
is 5 louis-d’or. The fee for each article will 
be decided on by a majority vote in the 
Committee, except where it is already 
specified in the contributor’s particular 
contract.            
7.  The contributors are either permanent or 
temporary. There must always be at least 12 
permanent contributors. Each of the former 
will receive 3 issues of the monthly journal 
for free, whilst each of the latter will receive 1 
free issue. 
8.  An article which has been published in ‘Die 
Horen’ may only be printed elsewhere after 4 
years have elapsed.
9. The Publisher of ‘Die Horen’ has the right 
of first refusal of any other works written by 
the permanent contributors, except where 
they had already bound themselves by other 
contracts drawn up before ‘Die Horen’ was 
founded.
10. [In addition to the fees for his articles], the 
Editor will also receive 100 ducats extra.
11.  The 4 other members of the Committee 
responsible for selecting articles, will each 
receive 10 louis-d’or extra every year for their 
efforts as critics.
12.  Payment of the fee is due as soon as the 
articles are published, except where the 
author has arranged otherwise. 
13.  Postage expenses for the journal will be 
borne by the Publisher.
139 An important title (approx. equivalent to ‘Privy Counsellor’) with which civil servants in the German principalities were 
rewarded. It was conferred on Schiller in 1790 through the mediation of the Duke of Weimar in recognition of his literary 
achievements. – Translator’s note.   
Contract signed on 28th May 1794 by J.F. Cotta, for the J.G. Cotta publishing-house, and Friedrich Schiller 
regarding the publication of the journal ‘Die Horen’ (‘The Horæ’).
Manuscript in the German Literature Archive (DLA)/ Schiller National Museum in Marbach, Cotta archive. 
Translation by Luis Sundkvist for the digital archive project Primary Sources on Copyright (1450-1900), eds. 
L. Bently & M. Kretschmer (www.copyrighthistory.org).
Contract   
Concerning the monthly literary journal, entitled ‘Die Horen’, which will appear under the supervision of 
‘Hofrat’139 Schiller.
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14.  Anonymous articles will not be accepted.
15.  If more than 2000 copies of any month’s 
issue of the journal are sold, the Publisher 
will hand over to the Editor and the 
Committee a third of the profits for each 
copy sold above this number. The Editor will 
receive half of this dividend, and the rest will 
be shared out between the Committee. 
16.  In the case that this enterprise should thrive 
and that the Publisher should wish to use 
part of his surplus profit to further encourage 
the journal’s contributors, each year a Prize 
of, say, 30 or 50 louis-d’or may be awarded 
for the article which the Committee deems to 
be the most important of that year. 
17.  The names of the members who form part 
of the Committee are not to be disclosed, 
although their names will, of course, appear 
in the list of permanent contributors. 
18.  All contributors agree to use the orthographic 
conventions adopted by the journal. 
19.  Articles which contain either personal attacks 
or derogatory remarks on Institutions which 
stand in public esteem, will not be accepted 
by the journal.
20.  If the Editor should die, the contract is to 
be renewed with the surviving Committee 
members. The articles, however, which have 
already been received and selected are to be 
paid according to the previously agreed fee.
21.  If the journal should outlive the present 
Editor, his widow will receive 10 percent of 
the fees paid out to its contributors.
22.  If the Publisher should die or withdraw from 
the journal, that which is stipulated in clause 
20 regarding articles which have already 
been received, still holds.
23.  Provided the obligation mentioned in clause 
22 is fulfilled, the Publisher can cancel his 
participation in the journal without any notice, 
whereas the permanent contributors must 
give half a year’s notice. 
24.  The price of the journal is 5 thaler 8 groschen 
(Leipzig rate) for a whole year’s set of issues. 
Sold separately, the price of each issue is 12 
groschen. 
25.  At the beginning of each year a list of the 
subscribers, including their names, will 
be published, unless they have arranged 
otherwise. 
26.  Payments are to be made in ‘Convention’-
money, whereby the ‘Convention’ thaler is 
calculated at 1 Imperial thaler 8 groschen 
(Leipzig rate).
27.  The publishing-house has to decide at the 
latest by the beginning of July 1795 whether 
it is prepared to undertake publication of 
the journal. Should it fail to do so by that 
date, the contributors who have committed 
themselves to the journal have the right 
to cancel their obligations towards the 
publishing-house. 
28.  As soon as the Cotta publishing-house 
agrees to bring out ‘Die Horen’, all articles 
already received by then will be judged in 
due order by the Committee, and those that 
are selected will be treated as stipulated in 
clauses 20 and 22.
29.  As regards [our] true commitment to publish 
the journal, this contract comes into force 
only as from the day it has been signed.
Jena, 28th May 1794
J.G. Cotta publishing-house of Tübingen
J.F. Cotta   Friedrich Schiller             
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ABSTRACT
A number of doctrinal concerns have been 
expressed regarding user contracts. To what 
extent do the terms of these licences depart from 
copyright law? Are the rights they grant to the owner 
broader or more restrictive? Are the entitlements 
of users, beneficiaries of copyright limits, hindered 
in some form? Whilst no comprehensive empirical 
study has hitherto been conducted to analyse the 
different types of licensing agreements deployed 
on the market and their impact on copyright limits, 
a body of theoretical legal literature exists on this 
issue.
This paper provides an overview of the doctrinal 
debate on this topic, with a particular focus on 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium, 
Ireland and Portugal. The latter three countries 
are interesting for our discourse because they 
have enacted legislation protecting copyright limits 
from contracts, by declaring contractual clauses 
that override some copyright limits null and void. 
This literature review is not only concerned with 
copyright exceptions to the exclusive rights of the 
author, but all of copyright’s limits, namely the idea-
expression dichotomy, the originality requirement, 
the first-sale (or exhaustion) doctrine, the extent of 
the economic rights and the copyright term.
The review of user contracts is organised as 
follows:
Section 1 examines the nature of copyright limits 
and their potential impact on the possibility of 
being contracted out in current licensing practices. 
It subsequently describes the legislation of the 
countries examined in this literature review141 that 
define copyright limits and exceptions, especially 
the provisions restricting freedom of contract. It 
also reviews any relevant case law. 
Section 2 discusses the terms of the debate. The 
copyright literature is divided among a) those who 
believe that contracts override users’ ‘rights’, and 
therefore legislators should render imperative 
some or all copyright limits; b) those who believe 
that contracts are more efficient than copyright 
law, and therefore we should entrust digital 
copyright matters to ‘private ordering’, c) and those 
who believe the entire question as being falsely 
posed, because contracts and copyright belong 
to different but complementary worlds, that act in 
useful synergy. This section examines all these 
arguments.
140 The authors would like to thank Professor Severine Dusollier (Belgium), Dr Patricia Akester (Portugal) and Dr John Cahir 
(Ireland) for the information they provided on the legal situation in their respective countries. Unless otherwise stated, the 
paper exclusively summarises the statutory law, the case law and the literature and does not reflect the views of the authors.
141 The UK, the US, Belgium, Portugal, Germany and Ireland; EU legislation is considered as well.
PAPER 3: USER CONTRACTS (‘DEMAND SIDE’)140, Estelle Derclaye and Marcella Favale
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Section 3 reviews the types of contract currently 
utilised by right holders to license copyright material 
to users. The analysis is divided by sector of users: 
a) consumers (natural persons); b) libraries and 
universities; c) commercial users (broadcasting 
institutions, leisure-related businesses, audio/
video producers, etc.). This section focuses on the 
enforceability of electronic standard form contracts 
(shrink-wrap, click-wrap, browse-wrap), as 
opposed to arm-length agreements, and on their 
current and potential impact on users’ privileges.
Section 4 examines the limits to freedom of 
contract residing within copyright law (preemption, 
misuse), contract law, consumer protection 
legislation, competition law, and constitutional 
principles. Current and prospective limits to 
contracts embedded within copyright law are also 
discussed in this section. The focus of the analysis 
is on the law of the countries examined in this 
literature review and on the international legislation 
impacting on them, from the point of view of the 
legal copyright literature. 
Section 5 deals with Digital Rights Management 
(DRM) and its interplay with contracts. It 
considers the interaction between technological 
protection measures (TPMs) and end-user licence 
agreements. It examines the doctrine for or against 
a right of access of the owner, or of the user. It 
also briefly reviews the remedies provided to users 
against DRM which override copyright limits. It 
concludes with a comparison between contracts 
and TPMs.142
Section 6 identifies gaps in copyright research, 
either doctrinal or empirical, that may have policy 
implications in the regulation of the relationship of 
copyright (including related rights) and contract 
law. 
3.1 THE LIMITS OF COPYRIGHT LAW
3.1.1   The effects of copyright limits on 
contracting out
Copyright is limited in many ways: at its outset, by 
the exclusion of certain works from protection (idea-
expression dichotomy and originality requirement); 
during its exploitation, by economic limits (limited 
duration and exhaustion of the distribution right) 
and by exceptions to the economic rights.
The requirements for protection are based on the 
idea-expression dichotomy and on the principle of 
originality. That is, copyright protects the expression 
of the ideas, not the ideas themselves and only a 
sufficiently original creation is protected. Copyright 
is also protected for a limited term. The copyright 
duration is at the basis of the general ‘contract’ 
between the author and the public, according to 
which authors accept a limited control on their work 
in exchange for exclusive rights that would grant 
them a fair reward for their ‘sweat of the brow’.143
142 TPMs and DRM will be defined in section 4.5.
143 Patterson and Lindberg 1991, at 236.
144 Guibault 2002, at 15.
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Further, once copyright products embodied in 
a physical object are introduced in the market 
in a given territory, the right holder loses control 
of them: they can be freely resold, lent, or given 
away by the purchaser.144 This is the principle 
of exhaustion or first sale. The rationale behind 
the principle of exhaustion is the preservation of 
the free movement of goods145 and also market 
failure.146 Finally, copyright exceptions are special 
allowances made to benefit particular categories 
of users such as libraries, teachers, students, 
researchers, and people with disabilities. All 
the above exclusions from copyright protection, 
taken as the general boundaries of copyright, are 
traditionally underpinned by freedom of expression 
and access to information or culture.147
The debate on the nature of copyright limits is 
extensive. Whilst some copyright exceptions like 
those for the purposes of parody, criticism, and 
news reporting, and copyright exclusions like the 
idea-expression dichotomy are obviously based 
on fundamental rights like freedom of expression, 
other economic limits (e.g. the first-sale principle) 
and some exceptions (e.g. private copying) are 
based on market failures. 
The distinction among the underpinnings of 
copyright limits is however not always easy. Even 
copyright limits that are based on some market 
failures can have implications on fundamental 
public interests. For example, the first-sale doctrine 
is based on the impossibility to control the following 
uses of a purchased copyright work, but it also 
allows greater access to the work by the public, 
thus enhancing the circulation of culture. Moreover, 
some copyright literature considers the exception 
for private copy as supported by the fundamental 
right to privacy.148
The answer on the nature of copyright exceptions 
cannot therefore be uniform. Some European 
commentators have defined copyright limits not 
as rights but either as interests or liberties or as 
a ‘claim to the application of a rule of objective 
right’.149 
145  Derclaye 2008, at 185.
146 See Professor Peter Jaszi’s testimony before the US Government on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, available at http://
www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/testimony/jaszi.pdf. The first sale doctrine is based on market failure in the United 
States but in the EU it is also based on the principle of the free movement of goods and services.
147 This is classic copyright doctrine, underscored by some case law (Associated Newspapers v. News Group Newspapers 
[1986] RPC 515, and Hyde Park v. Yelland [2001] Ch. 183. See Burrell and Coleman 2005 at 20-21, although the authors 
state that this construct is currently discredited, at 21.
148 See Cohen 1998, at 1103-1108. See also Hugenholtz 1997.
149 Dusollier 2005a, at 486.
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Others claim they are ‘rights’ of the user, and there 
should be a clear definition and protection for them 
in copyright law.150 Similarly, in American doctrine 
the entitlements of the user have been sometimes 
qualified as ‘rights’,151 and sometimes as a mere 
remedy against market failures.152
How does the rationale behind exceptions 
impact on their status? For many authors, the 
first group of exceptions (i.e. parody, citation, 
private copying, criticism, news reporting), which 
safeguard fundamental freedoms, has a public 
policy character.153 In other words, such exceptions 
cannot be limited unless we question the principles 
from which they derive, and this is not possible in 
a democratic society. Consequently, a user cannot 
be forced by contract to relinquish their freedom 
of speech or their privacy, as contracts cannot 
override public policy norms.154    
Similarly, commentators believe that private 
agreements cannot supplant the exceptions that 
are based on the general interest.155 However, 
since copyright is also an instrument at the service 
of the general interest, a balance should be struck 
between the interests of the users and those of 
the authors, for instance by way of an equitable 
remuneration to the authors. Furthermore, as these 
exceptions affect less fundamental principles of 
society, they should be imperative rules rather than 
public policy norms.156  
The rationale underlying the exceptions based 
on the regulation of industry practices or on the 
facilitation of trade, conversely, is less strong. 
Exceptions based on regulatory practices could 
therefore be overridable. On the other hand, 
the decompilation exception which regulates 
competition has already been made mandatory 
in Europe, on the basis that a loyal and free 
competition is in the public interest.157
The exceptions exclusively founded on market 
failure, which therefore do not reflect a fundamental 
value of society or the general interest, are bound 
to disappear in the digital environment, as authors 
can now prevent the digital copying of works and 
enforce their copyright. Examples are the exception 
for ephemeral recordings made by broadcasting 
organisations,158 for the incidental inclusion of a 
work or other subject-matter in other material,159 
and the exception for the use in connection with 
the demonstration or repair of equipments.160 In 
the opinion of some commentators, each Member 
State should be allowed to attribute a default 
character to these exceptions.161
150 Grosheide 2001.
151 Litman 1994.
152 Hugenholtz 1997. Merges 1993 and 2004, Bell 1998, Gordon 1982, but see Gordon 2003 for an adjustment of this argument.
153 Buydens and Dusollier 2001, at 13-14. Dusollier 2005a at 508-509.
154 Netanel 2005, p. 143.
155 Buydens and Dusollier 2001 at 14; Vinje 1999 at 193; Dusollier 2005a at 508-509, arguing that exceptions for public lending, 
handicapped people, teaching, libraries and archives should be imperative as well as the exception for normal use.
156 Buydens and Dusollier 2001, at 14.
157 Derclaye 2008 at 181.
158 Art. 5 (2)(d) of the InfoSoc Directive. Note that this exception is classified differently by L. Guibault, as an exception intended 
to regulate industry practices.
159 Art. 5(3)(i) of the InfoSoc Directive.
160 Art. 5(3)(l) of the InfoSoc Directive. Buydens and Dusollier 2001 at 14.
161 This means that they would be overridable by contract. See Buydens and Dusollier 2001, at 14; Dusollier 2005a, at 508-509. 
86
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 3: USER CONTRACTS
In conclusion, the nature of each copyright limit is 
crucial to determine its overridability by contract 
law. Following the views of the above literature 
we can assume that, while a clause impeding, for 
example, any criticism of a work would be clearly 
unenforceable, market failure-driven exceptions 
can be safely contracted out. In practice, this is 
currently decided on a case-by-case basis. 
For example, case law in a few EU Member States 
clearly determined the nature of ‘defence’, and not 
‘right’, of the entitlement of the user to perform a 
copy for personal use;162 whereas in US courts, fair 
use seems to be generally prevailing on contract 
clauses.163
162 Stéphane P, UFC Que Choisir v. Universal Pictures Video France et Autres - Tribunale de Grande Instance de Paris, 3ème 
chambre, 2ème section, Jugement du 30 avril 2004; Cour d’Appel de Paris, 4ème chambre, section B, Arrêt du 22 avril 
2005; Cour de Cassation - Première chambre civile Arrêt du 28 février 2006. Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, 
L’ASBL Association Belge des Consommateurs TestAchats v. SE EMI Recorded Music Belgium, Sony Music Entertainment 
(Belgium), SA Universal Music, SA Bertelsmann Music Group Belgium, SA IFPI Belgium, Jugement du 25 mai 2004, No 
2004/46/A du rôle des référes.
163 DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996); Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 
(4th Cir. 1990). However, this must be taken with a pinch of salt as other decisions such as ProCD (see below) have enforced 
contracts which overturn copyright limits. 
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3.1.2    Comparative review of copyright 
limits in various countries
All copyright regimes analysed in this study share 
the same limits to copyright protection: the idea-
expression dichotomy; the originality requirement; 
a limited term of protection; the exhaustion or first-
sale doctrine and a limited number of economic 
rights. 
However, each of the countries studied in this 
literature review adopts a different approach on 
copyright exceptions, and the way they can be 
varied by contract. This section examines the 
statutes of these countries on the specific matter 
of copyright limits, and investigates whether the 
law provides some protection against private 
agreements containing clauses that override or 
modify them.
The United States
The idea-expression dichotomy in the US in 
stipulated by §102(b) of the Title 17 of the United 
States Code (USC), which states that ‘in no case 
does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery….’. Further, some originality of the work 
is required for copyright protection also in the US, 
but the requirement is not very strict, as set by 
Feist v. Rural Telephone in 1991.164 Moreover, the 
term of copyright has been extended by the Sonny 
Bono Act (from 50 to 70 years).165
Finally, the first-sale doctrine applies to digital works 
stored on physical media,166 but it does not apply 
to works downloadable from the Internet, which are 
considered services rather than goods.167
Copyright exceptions, on the other hand, are 
protected under the fair-use doctrine codified at 
§107, which reads:168
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, 
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include—
(1)  the purpose and character of the use, 
including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes;
(2)  the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3)  the amount and substantiality of the portion 
used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole; and
(4)  the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
164 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). Here it was stated: ‘only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal 
degree of creativity… even a slight amount will suffice.’ 
165 The Sonny Bono act of 1998 is available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/s505.pdf.
166 Title 17 of the United States Code (hereinafter USC) Section 109(a). 
167 The exclusion of Internet goods from the first-sale doctrine is discussed within the copyright doctrine. Some believe that 
technology could help in rendering digital Internet works similar to those stored on physical carriers, and therefore subject to 
the first-sale rule (Calaba 2002). Others believe that digital works that can be permanently stored in a computer hard drive 
have features more similar to products than to services (Mazziotti 2008, at 67).
168 Title 17,  §107 of USC.
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Fair use therefore is an open-ended exception 
that allows a court to excuse acts that would 
normally amount to infringement, both in the cases 
defined in §107 and in other similar cases. The 
United States Code contains also a specific list 
of exceptions in §§108-122.  They can be divided 
into the following categories: Limitations to support 
freedom of information;169 Limitations for a specific 
social action or purpose;170 Limitations for private 
use;171 Limitations concerning activities that are 
necessary accessories to other permitted actions 
and economically reasonable;172 compulsory 
licenses, which may be justified by transaction 
costs of negotiating licenses, by the importance of 
certain industry sectors, or by other factors.173
Fair use is a mobile concept, always in evolution. 
For example, during the fair-use history, case 
law adapted this exemption to the peculiar 
characteristics of the technology. In Sony Corp. 
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,174  the 
Supreme Court held that private videotaping of 
free TV broadcast did not amount to copyright 
infringement. Likewise, in Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp.,175 the court held that making thumbnails out 
of photographs for use on a search page was fair 
use. 
Also the exceptions for libraries in the US have 
been ‘updated’ to meet the needs of the digital 
environment. The Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) of 1998176 modified the limitations for 
libraries, permitting the latter to perform up to three 
copies for preservation and replacement purposes. 
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act 
of 1998 (Sonny Bono Act) also expanded library 
exceptions by giving libraries a limited right to use 
the works in the last 20 years of their copyright 
term for purposes of preservation, scholarship or 
research, if the works are not subject to normal 
commercial exploitation or are not available at a 
reasonable price.177
With regard to the relationship between copyright 
limits and contracts, we need to state at the 
outset that freedom of contract in the US is 
paramount. Article 1(10) of the US constitution 
forbids the States to pass legislation impairing the 
Obligation of Contract without the consent of the 
Congress.178 Moreover, case law has interpreted 
the 14th Amendment as protecting the freedom 
of contract.179 Therefore, a legally enforceable 
contract is likely to be able to override copyright 
limits. 
169 §108 allows qualified libraries and archives to make and distribute noncommercial copies for preservation or research 
purposes, under specific conditions. §§110(1) and (2) allow performance and display of copyrighted works, through 
transmissions or otherwise, in connection with nonprofit teaching activities, under specific conditions.
170 §110(3); §110(4); §§110(8), (9) and §121; §118; §120(a). 
171 §§109(a) and (c) §1008. 
172 §110(7); §112; §§113(c); §113(d) and §120(b); §117; §512. 
173 §111; §114(d)(2); §115; §116; §§ 119 and 122. 
174 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
175 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
176 Available at http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf.
177 Sonny Bono Act, Section 104.
178 Guibault 2002, at 116.
179 Allgeyer v. Louisiana 165 U.S. 578 (1879) at 589, but see following case law limiting the freedom of contract within the terms 
of reasonable clauses, in Glynn v. Margetson & Co. [1893] A.C. 351 ; London and North Western Railway Co. v. Neilson 
[1922] 2 A.C. 263; Cunard Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Buerger [1927] A.C. 1; and by Canada Steamship Lines Ltd. v. The King 
[1952] A.C. 192 and Sze Hai Tong Bank Ltd. v. Rambler Cycle Co. Ltd. [1959] A.C. 576 in the Privy Council.
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The US copyright act does not contain a provision 
making copyright limits imperative, i.e. not 
overridable by contract.
The European Union
In the European Union, most of the limits to 
copyright are set by the Directive on Copyright and 
related rights in the Information Society (InfoSoc 
Directive),180 the Directive for the legal protection 
of computer programs (Software Directive)181 and 
the Directive for the legal protection of databases 
(Database Directive).182 In the latter two is also set 
the originality requirement, which states that a work 
has to be the author’s own intellectual creation.183 
The copyright duration has also been harmonised 
by the Copyright Term Directive of 1993, modified 
by the Term Directive of 2006.184 The latter is now 
in the process of being modified: the proposal 
mainly purports to extend the protection of sound 
recordings from 50 to 95 years.185 
The principle of exhaustion (corresponding to 
the American first sale doctrine) has been made 
uniform in EU law by Article 4.2 of the InfoSoc 
Directive, which limits the distribution right.186 This 
limit, as observed in relation to the US, does not 
apply to copyright works distributed on demand.187
The Software and Database Directives stipulate 
imperative exceptions to copyright, not overridable 
by contracts. Article 9(1) of the Software Directive 
of 1992 expressly provides that ‘any contractual 
provision contrary to Article 6 or to the exceptions 
provided for in Article 5(2) and (3) shall be null 
and void’. These articles protect, respectively, 
decompilation,188 lawful use,189 observation, study 
and testing of computer programs.190
180 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019.
181 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs, Official Journal L 122, 
17/05/1991 P. 0042 - 0046.
182 Council Directive 96/9/EC of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases, Official Journal L 077, 27/03/1996 P. 0020 
– 0028.
183 Software Directive Article 1.3 and Database Directive Recital 16.
184 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights, 
Official Journal L 290, 24/11/1993 P. 0009 – 0013. According to Article 1(1) of the Term Directive 1993 copyright is protected 
for 70 years from the death of the author. Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2006 on the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights Official Journal L 372 , 27/12/2006 P. 0012 
– 0018.
185 Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive, amending Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Related Rights Brussels, 16.7.2008 COM(2008) 464 final.
186 InfoSoc Directive Article 4(2): ‘The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in respect of the original or 
copies of the work, except where the first sale or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made by the 
rightholder or with his consent.’ 
187 For the debate on this issue, see Calaba 2002 and Mazziotti 2008 at 67.
188 Software Directive, Article 6.
189 Software Directive, Article 5(1).
190 Software Directive, Article 5(3).
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Article 15 of the Database Directive states that ‘any 
contractual provision contrary to Articles 6(1) and 
8 shall be null and void’. Article 6(1) stipulates that 
‘the performance by the lawful user of a database 
or of a copy thereof of any of the acts listed in Article 
5 which is necessary for the purposes of access 
to the contents of the databases and normal use 
of the contents by the lawful user shall not require 
the authorisation of the author of the database’. 
Finally, Article 8 allows a lawful user of a database 
to extract and/or to re-utilise for any purposes 
whatsoever insubstantial parts of the contents of 
a database protected under the sui generis right.
The above suggests that, in the domain of software 
and databases, copyright exceptions are protected 
against contracts. However, copyright literature 
has raised some concerns. Problems, for example, 
have been identified as to the practical applications 
of the provisions of the Database Directive.191 
Moreover, uncertainty has been voiced on the 
ability of the Software Directive to establish the 
statutory nature of its exceptions, whose modes 
of exercise can be defined by contract.192 Further, 
dissatisfaction has been expressed because 
the above provisions leave uncovered optional 
copyright exceptions, copyright exclusions (e.g. 
works not protected by copyright, idea-expression 
dichotomy) and copyright economic limits (duration 
and first sale).193 Finally, the EU Member States 
implemented the above provisions in different 
ways, creating different levels of protection within 
the EU.194
However, the most discussed piece of legislation of 
EU copyright law was the InfoSoc Directive, which is 
mandated to settle owners’ and users’ entitlements 
relating to copyright in the digital environment. In 
its Article 5 the InfoSoc Directive lists a number 
of copyright exceptions to the reproduction right 
and to the communication right of the owner. Of 
these exceptions, only the first (caching copying 
for technical reasons)195 is mandatory for Member 
States. They can choose whether or not to 
implement any of the other exceptions.196 Article 
5 has been extensively criticised by the literature. 
The main criticisms regard both the optional nature 
of the list and its misguided ambition of being 
exhaustive.197
Therefore most of the copyright exceptions, 
according to the InfoSoc Directive, are optional. 
However, in Article 6(4) the InfoSoc Directive 
lists seven mandatory exceptions that have to be 
respected by technological protection measures. 
According to some, this suggests that at least 
these exceptions should be considered mandatory 
against licensing agreements, a fortiori.198 But 
according to the letter of the Directive, this is 
anything but certain. Rather, the opposite appears 
to be true, and this is indicated by a number of 
factors.
191 Derclaye 2006 at 184.
192 Dusollier 2007, at 498.
193 See Derclaye 2008, at 176 and Guibault 2006, at 94-97.
194 Guibault 2002, at 219 and 2006, at 97.
195 InfoSoc Directive, Article 5(1).
196 This led a commentator to define the exceptions in the InfoSoc as a ‘shopping list’: Hugenholtz 2000a.
197 Heide 2000; Hart 1998, at 171; CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis; Hugenholtz 1997; Dusollier 2003, at 
473; and Guibault 2003, at 39-40.
198 Hugenholtz 2000a.
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First, the InfoSoc directive is posterior to the 
Software and Database Directives; and the latter 
two directives contain express provisions on the 
mandatory nature of the exceptions to the rights 
they grant. Therefore, if the EU legislators also 
wanted to stipulate imperative copyright exceptions 
in the InfoSoc Directive, they would probably have 
done so.199
Second, the above is confirmed by the second 
reading of the Proposal for the Directive, in which 
amendment 156 proposed the introduction of 
a new Article 5(6) stating that ‘[n]o contractual 
measures may conflict with the exceptions or 
limitations incorporated into national law pursuant 
to Article 5’. This amendment was not accepted 
by the Commission, and this clearly indicates its 
position on the matter.200 
Third, not only is there no express protection of 
copyright limits from private contracting, but there 
are also specific allowances for rights or privileges 
that can be contracted out. Recital 45 states that ‘[t]
he exceptions and limitations referred to in Article 
5(2), (3) and (4) should not, however, prevent 
the definition of contractual relations designed 
to ensure fair compensation for the rightholders 
insofar as permitted by national law.’ Further, Article 
6(4) excludes from the application of copyright 
exceptions on-demand services ‘available to the 
public on agreed contractual terms in such a way 
that members of the public may access them 
from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them’[emphasis added].
Recital 45 has been differently interpreted by the 
doctrine. Some believe the Recital clearly states 
that the exceptions in Article 5(2) to 5(4) can be 
overridden by contracts.201 Others argue that the 
meaning of this Recital is that ‘the ability to perform 
legitimate uses that do not require the authorisation 
of rights holders is a factor that can be considered 
in the context of contractual agreements about 
the price’.202 This interpretation suggests that the 
leeway of right holders does not concern contracts, 
but the determination of the price, with reference 
to those exceptions that are compensated for 
compulsory licensing. 
However, no doubt exists on the interpretation 
of the relevant part of Article 6(4), which clearly 
excludes works made available online from the 
application of the exceptions listed in Article 6, and 
leaves the matter to private ordering. This provision 
has been criticised by legal scholars for setting a 
two-tier protection for copyright exceptions, and a 
reform of Article 6(4) has been advised.203
Finally, not all legal commentators are convinced 
that the above provisions stipulate the contractual 
overridability of copyright exceptions. Some reckon 
that the question is left to national legislators.204 
Moreover, others argue that the interpretation of the 
existing national and European copyright law may 
provide a sufficient shelter especially for copyright 
limits based on fundamental rights or liberties and 
on the public interest.205
199 See Heide 2003, arguing that the Software Directive should have served as a model to the InfoSoc Directive, because its 
‘copyright exceptions interface’ is the most efficient.
200 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs and the Internal Market, 17 January 2001, PE 298.368/5-197, cited in IViR 
2007 Part I, at 138.
201 Bechtold 2006, at 371; Dusollier 2007, at 502; Heide 2003, at 327.
202 IViR 2007 Part I, at 137.
203 Dusollier 2007, at 502. Akester 2009, at 122. For a more cautious position on this matter see also Burrell and Coleman 2005, 
at 309.
204 Dusollier 2007, at 503.
205 Hugenholtz 2000b; Derclaye 2006, at 186 et seq. 
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However, the part of the examined literature that 
calls for a clear formulation of the imperative and 
non-overridable nature (by contract or TPMs) of a 
number of copyright exceptions seems to prevail 
(see Section B).
No EU case law helps to clarify the prevalence of 
copyright exceptions on contract, or vice versa. 
A few rulings in some EU Member States have 
examined only the question of the exception for 
private copying, by declaring that it is not a ‘right’.206 
Moreover, these judgements focussed on the 
duty of the right holder to disclose the existence 
and functioning of a technological protection 
measure, considered an essential feature of the 
product. They were addressed therefore with the 
instruments of consumer protection. The terms of 
the licence (probably forbidding the reproduction) 
were not examined. In conclusion, the EU case law 
so far leaves open the question of the contractual 
overridability of copyright limits (except those 
clearly made imperative in the Software and 
Database Directives207). 
The United Kingdom 
The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 
2003 (SI 2003/2498) came into force on October 
31, 2003 and modified the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 (CDPA) to bring it into line with 
the InfoSoc Directive. Other legislation impacting 
on the protection of copyright includes: 
-  The Copyright (Computer Programs) 
Regulations 1992;
-  The Duration of Copyright and Rights in 
Performance Regulations 1995;
-  The Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 1996;
-  The Copyright and Rights in Databases 
Regulations 1997;
-  The Copyright and Related Rights 
Regulations 2003;
-  The Copyright (EC measures relating to 
pirated goods and abolition of restrictions on 
the import of goods) Regulations 1995.
206 Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, L’ASBL Association Belge des Consommateurs TestAchats v. SE EMI Recorded 
Music Belgium, Sony Music Entertainment (Belgium), SA Universal Music, SA Bertelsmann Music Group Belgium, SA IFPI 
Belgium, Jugement du 25 mai 2004, No 2004/46/A du rôle des référes. For France, see François M. v. EMI France, Auchan 
France - Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanterre, 6ème chambre, Jugement du 2 septembre 2003; Cour d’Appel De 
Versailles, 1re Chambre, 1re section, 30 septembre 2004; Stéphane P, UFC Que Choisir v. Universal Pictures Video France 
et Autres - Tribunale de Grande Instance de Paris, 3ème chambre, 2ème section, Jugement du 30 avril 2004; Cour d’Appel 
de Paris, 4ème chambre, section B, Arrêt du 22 avril 2005; Cour de Cassation - Première chambre civile Arrêt du 28 
février 2006; and Christophe R., UFC Que Choisir v. Warner Music France, Fnac - Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris 
5ème chambre, 1ère section Jugement du 10 janvier 2006. For Germany, see BVerfG: ‘Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen 
urheberrechtliche Kopierschutz-Regelungen’(Beschl. v. 25.07.2005 - Az: 1 BvR 2182/04). See also Lucas 2006.
207 Although there is no case law, it seems pretty clear that courts would respect the provisions of the directives providing for 
imperativity.
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The idea-expression dichotomy in the UK is 
not defined by statutory law. However, as Lord 
Hoffmann stated in Designers Guild ltd v. Russell 
Williams,208 it is defined in TRIPS,209 to which the 
UK is a signatory.  Article 9.2 TRIPS states that 
‘copyright protection shall extend to expressions 
and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation 
or mathematical concepts as such’. 
The requirement of originality, on the other hand, 
was recently redefined in Hyperion Records Ltd v 
Sawkins,210 where it was stated: 
‘In the end the question is one of degree – how 
much skill, labour and judgement in the making 
of the copy is that of the creator of that copy? 
Both individual creative input and sweat of brow 
may be involved and will be factors in the overall 
evaluation.’
The level of originality in the UK and Ireland is 
arguably now governed by the Infopaq case211, 
which requires intellectual creation and is thus 
higher than skill, judgement and labour. No decision 
from the UK or Irish courts has been handed down 
to confirm this as the Infopaq case is still very 
recent. The above case law shows that the criteria 
of idea/expression dichotomy and of originality 
are intertwined, and it is a very delicate matter to 
identify a subject of protection on the basis of these 
requirements.212
208 [2001] E.C.D.R. 10
209 Agreement on the Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 1994, OJ L 336/213, Article 9.2.
210 Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins  [2005] EWCA Civ 565 (19 May 2005). 
211 Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, case C-5/08, (ECJ). 
212 See also Burrell and Coleman 2005, at 22.
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With regard to other copyright limits, the UK has a 
list of statutory exceptions defined in SS 28a-76, 
CDPA. These exceptions are for:
• making of temporary copies
• fair dealing for research and private study
• fair dealing for criticism, review and news 
reporting
• incidental inclusion of copyright material
• visual impairment defences
• education defences
• libraries and archives defences
• public administration, parliamentary and 
judicial proceedings, (...)
• computer programs: lawful users (including 
back up copies and decompilation)
• databases
• designs and typefaces
• works in electronic form
• anonymous or pseudonymous works: acts 
permitted on
• assumptions as to expiry of copyright or 
death of author
• use of notes or recordings of spoken words 
in certain cases
• public reading or recitation
• abstracts of scientific or technical articles
• recordings of folksongs
• representation of certain artistic works on 
public display
• advertisement of sale of artistic work
• making of subsequent works by same artist
• reconstruction of buildings
• lending to public of copies of certain works
• films: acts permitted on assumptions as to 
expiry of copyright
• recording for purposes of time-shifting
• photographs of broadcasts
• free public showing or playing of broadcast 
for certain purposes
• recording for archival purposes
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CDPA’s Schedule 5A sets out the permitted acts to 
which section 296ZE applies213:
• section 29 (research and private study)
• section 31A (making a single accessible copy 
for personal use)
• section 31B (multiple copies for visually 
impaired persons)
• section 31C (intermediate copies and 
records)
• section 32(1), (2) and (3) (things done for 
purposes of instruction or examination)
• section 35 (recording by educational 
establishments of broadcasts)
• section 36 (reprographic copying by 
educational establishments of passages from 
published works)
• section 38 (copying by librarians: articles in 
periodicals)
• section 39 (copying by librarians: parts of 
published works)
• section 41 (copying by librarians: supply of 
copies to other libraries)
• section 42 (copying by librarians or archivists: 
replacement copies of works)
• section 43 (copying by librarians or archivists: 
certain unpublished works)
• section 44 (copy of work required to be made 
as condition of export)
• section 45 (Parliamentary and judicial 
proceedings)
• section 46 (Royal Commissions and statutory 
inquiries)
• section 47 (material open to public inspection 
or on official register)
• section 48 (material communicated to the 
Crown in the course of public business)
• section 49 (public records)
• section 50 (acts done under statutory 
authority)
• section 61 (recordings of folksongs)
• section 68 (incidental recording for purposes 
of broadcast)
• section 69 (recording for purposes of 
supervision and control of broadcasts)
• section 70  (recording for purposes of time-
shifting)
• section 71 (photographs of broadcasts)
• section 74 (provision of sub-titled copies of 
broadcast)
• section 75 (recording for archival purposes)
213 S. 296ZE provides a mechanism in the event users are not able to benefit from an exception because of a TPM.
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The implementation of the InfoSoc Directive 2001 
has slightly modified the above list of exceptions. 
For example, the exception to make temporary 
copies has been introduced, according to Article 
5(1) of the Directive. Other existing exceptions 
have been curtailed, as for example the exception 
for research and private study, that now needs to 
be carried out only for non-commercial purposes 
and with acknowledgement of the source, in order 
to be exempted from infringement.
Moreover, Section 29 of the CDPA stipulates 
the exceptions for fair dealing for the purposes 
of research and private study, while Section 30 
defines fair dealing for the purposes of criticism, 
review and news reporting. The definition of fair 
dealing, operated by the above statute and by 
some case law214 makes it rather more restrictive 
than the American fair use, to the extent that some 
commentators raise concerns about its consistency 
with free speech issues.215
Nothing in the Copyright Act forbids contracting 
out the above exceptions. A notable exception 
is section 36(4) CDPA which makes section 36 
imperative. Section 36(4) states: ‘the terms of a 
licence granted to an educational establishment 
authorising the reprographic copying for the 
purposes of instruction of passages from published 
works are of no effect so far as they purport to 
restrict the proportion of a work which may be 
copied (whether on payment or free of charge) 
to less than that which would be permitted under 
this section’. As to the other exceptions, existing 
legal doctrines outside copyright statutes may 
impact on contracts varying them. For example, 
commentators argue that fundamental principles 
as freedom of expression, and the common law 
defence of ‘public interest’, now codified under s. 
171(3), have to be taken into account.216
214 See Beloff v. Pressdram [1973] 1 All ER 262; and ProSieben v. Carlton [1998] FSR 43, 49. For the exclusion of unpublished 
works from fair dealing see Hubbard v. Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84. On the use for an approved purpose, necessary for the fair 
dealing exemption, see Pro Sieben v. Carlton [1999] FSR 610, 621. For the issue of criticism and review see Time Warner 
v. Channel 4 [1994] EMLR 1 and Ashdown v. Telegraph Group [2001] Ch 685; [2002] Ch 149; and Hyde Park v. Yelland 
[1999] RPC 665, 661, for news reporting.
215 Burrell and Coleman 2005, at 45 et seq.
216 Burrell and Coleman 2005, at 80-112.
217 CDPA 1988 s. 50D.
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Finally, in UK law the Software Directive and the 
Database Directive have been implemented, and 
therefore it is not possible to override by contract 
the lawful access to and use of a database, 
including everything that is necessary for it,217 the 
carrying out of a back-up copy,218 the right 
to decompile a computer program,219 or the 
observation, study and testing of it.220  Moreover, 
fair dealing to report current events cannot be 
contracted out with reference to the inclusion of a 
broadcast in another broadcast.221
Belgium222
Copyright in Belgium is regulated by the Law of the 
30th of June 1994 on Copyright and Neighbouring 
Rights (the Copyright Act),223 which has been 
modified by the Law of the 31st of August 1998, 
implementing the Database Directive,224 and by 
the Law of the 22nd of May 2005 implementing the 
InfoSoc Directive.225
Software is protected in a separate law, of the 
30th of June 1994,226 and the sui generis right 
protecting databases is enshrined in the Law of the 
31st of August 1998, implementing the Database 
Directive.227
Some consumer rights related with copyright might 
be protected by a consumer law of the 14th of 
July 1991228 or a competition law of the 1st of July 
1999.229
218 CDPA 1988, s 50A.
219 CDPA 1988, s. 50B.
220 CDPA 1988, s 50BA.
221 Broadcasting Act 1996, s. 137.
222 General notions on the Belgian legislation have been drawn by the National Report presented at the ALAI conference in 
Barcelona 2006 (published by ALAI, ALADDA 2008 - hereinafter ALAI 2008). The report was drafted by Carine Doutrelepont, 
François Dubuisson, Joris Deene, and Katrien Van der Perre. Regarding the lists of copyright exceptions, free translations 
and summaries are provided by the author of the present work.
223 M.B., 27 juillet 1994, 19297; err. M.B., 5 novembre 1994, 27467 et M.B., 22 novembre 1994, 28832.
224 M.B., 14 novembre 1998
225 Loi du 22 mai 2005 transposant en droit belge la directive européenne du 22 mai 2001 sur l’harmonisation de certains 
aspects du droit d’auteur et des droits voisins dans la société de l’information, M.B., 27 mai 2005, 24 997.
226 Loi transposant en droit belge la directive européenne du 14 mai 1991 concernant la protection juridique des programmes 
d’ordinateur, M.B., 27 juillet 1994, 19315
227 Loi transposant en droit belge la directive européenne du 11 mars 1996 concernant la protection juridique des bases de 
données, M. B. 14.11.1998, p. 36914 
228 Loi du 14 juillet 1991 sur les pratiques du commerce et sur l’information et la protection du consommateur, M.B., 29 août 
1991.
229 Loi du 1er juillet 1999 sur la protection de la concurrence économique (coordonnant la loi du 5 août 1991), M.B., 1er 
septembre 1999. See also Strowel and Tulkens 2006, at 9, arguing that author’s rights are always subject to competition law.
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Copyright in Belgium is excluded if the work is 
not original; and the requirement of originality 
has been defined by the case law.230 The Belgian 
copyright act makes no mention of the idea/
expression dichotomy but it is clearly applicable in 
Belgium owing to TRIPs, and the case law takes it 
into account.
The Copyright Act stipulates a list of exceptions to 
the exclusive rights of the author, which is intended 
to be exhaustive, in Articles 21-23. Further 
exceptions are enshrined in Article 22bis (for 
databases) and in Articles 46-47 (for neighbouring 
rights). They are defined by some literature as 
a ‘partial derogation’ to the exclusive rights.231 
According to the current legal doctrine the above 
exceptions can be divided into: a) legal exceptions; 
and b) compulsory licences (‘exceptions légales’ 
and ‘licences légales’).232
Amongst others, compulsory licences include: 
Private reprography; Reprography for teaching 
and research; Copying for teaching and research; 
Communication for teaching and research; Private 
copying.
The legal exceptions are for: Citation; Anthology 
purposes; Temporary reproduction; News reporting; 
Reproduction/communication; 
Reproduction in family circles; Parody; Public 
examinations;  Archiving; Access from a terminal; 
Radio broadcasting; Disabled people; Exhibitions 
in art galleries; Social Institutions; Public Lending.
A similar list of exceptions is stipulated for 
neighbouring rights, with the addition, in some 
instances, of the provision for compulsory licences 
for the fair compensation of the right holder. 
In the legal framework envisaged for the protection 
of databases, the Belgian legislator added two 
new exceptions from the Database Directive: a) 
the exceptions for acts necessary to a lawful user 
for the normal utilisation of the work; and b) the 
utilisation for reasons of public security or within 
administrative or judicial proceedings. 
Moreover, the Belgian copyright legislation provides 
with reference to databases protected by copyright 
many of the exceptions reserved for copyright 
(Private photocopying; Photocopying for teaching 
and research; Copyright for teaching and research; 
Communication for teaching and research; News 
reporting; Incidental reproduction/communication; 
Reproduction in family circles; Parody; Public 
examination; Public lending).
Finally, in the field of computer software, the Law 
of the 30th of June 1994 authorises the back-up 
copy, the normal utilisation of the program, the 
software testing, studying, and reverse engineering 
exceptions. In this case however the exceptions 
provided for copyright in general were not extended 
to computer software.233 
230 For the originality requirement see Cass., 25 October 1989, Bidelot c/ Egret et Stas, Pas., 1990, I, 238. and Cass., 11 
March 2005, Balta Industries S.A. c/ R. Vanden Berghe S.A., http://www.juridat.be. See also Strowel 1991, at 515; for the 
fixation requirement see Civ. Bruxelles (réf.), 17 July 2001, Cortina c/ État belge, A. & M., 2002, p. 69 , Palouzie c/ S.A. 
Épithète Films et Faraldo, J.L.M.B., 2001, p. 1444; all cited in the Belgian response to the questionnaire in ALAI 2008. On 
the originality requirement, see also Strowel and Derclaye 2001, at 23. 
231 Voorhoof and Van der Perre (2003) at 268, cited in ALAI 2008, Belgian Report.
232 Strowel and Triaille (1996), cited in ALAI 2008 Ibid.
233 However some literature suggests the application of the traditional copyright exceptions also to software. See Strowel and 
Derclaye 2001, at 242 nn. 280-281; apart from the exceptions for study and private copy, which are already regulated by the 
directive, these authors think that all the other exceptions stipulated by the Copyright Act are applicable to software.
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In Belgium, all the exceptions to the sui generis 
right (i.e. the equivalent of Art. 8, 9(a), 9(b) and 9(c) 
of the Database Directive) have been implemented 
and are mandatory.234 Accordingly, users cannot 
be presented with either standard form or fully 
negotiated contracts which would restrain the 
scope of the exceptions or which would allow some 
remuneration for acts that are in principle excepted. 
The preparatory texts to the Belgian Database 
Act explain that the mandatory nature has been 
provided to avoid exceptions being overturned 
by the application of other laws less favourable 
to users. Article 11 forbids contractual clauses 
providing the application of a foreign law.235 
Furthermore, the exceptions to copyright exclusive 
rights in Belgium are expressly declared imperative 
and not overridable by contract. The law of 31st 
August 1998 implementing the Database Directive 
provides, in Article 23bis, that ‘the provisions 
of articles 21, 22, 22bis et 23(1) and (3), are 
imperative’. In other words, no derogation is 
permitted. Every contrary clause is considered null 
and void. 
The choice of the Belgian legislator, to declare 
all exceptions imperative without distinguishing 
between fundamental rights and market failures 
appears puzzling to some commentators.236
It has been argued that, in consequence of this 
choice, these provisions introduced a recognition of 
the ‘rights’ of the user;237 although admittedly they 
did not establish a ‘right of access’ of the user.238 
However, the law of the 22nd of May 2005, which 
implemented the InfoSoc Directive, added another 
sub-paragraph to Article 23bis (and to Article 47bis 
for neighbouring rights), which aligned the Belgian 
Copyright Act with Article 6(4) of the Directive. 
Article 6(4), we recall, excludes online services from 
the list of copyright exceptions that have to comply 
with technological protection measures. Copyright 
products accessible on line, therefore, can also in 
Belgium be subjected to usage restrictions that are 
regulated by contract law.
While in Europe advocates of the mandatory 
nature of copyright exceptions cite Belgium as an 
example to follow for its regulation of copyright 
and related rights,239 Séverine Dusollier, a 
Belgian commentator, expresses perplexity and 
dissatisfaction with the above norms. 
234 Art. 11 of Law of 31 August 1998, implementing in Belgium the European Directive of 11 March 1996 relating to the legal 
protection of databases, M.B. 14 November 1998, in force 14 November 1998 (‘Database Act’). Note however that the law 
implementing the Copyright Directive in Belgium (act of 22 May 2005, implementing in Belgian law the European Directive 
2001/29/EC relating to the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, M.B. 
27 May 2005, p. 24997) adds a second paragraph to article 11 of the Database Act, which makes an exception to this 
mandatory nature for databases made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of 
the public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
235 Art. 11 of Law of 31 August 1998, implementing in Belgian law the European Directive of 11 March 1996 relating to the legal 
protection of databases, M.B. 14 November 1998, in force 14 November 1998 (‘Database Act’). Note however that the law 
implementing the Copyright Directive in Belgium (act of 22 May 2005, implementing in Belgian law the European Directive 
2001/29/EC relating to the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society, M.B. 
27 May 2005, p. 24997) adds a second paragraph to article 11 of the Database Act, which makes an exception to this 
imperativity for databases made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the public 
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
236 Dubuisson 2001, at 213.
237 Ibid, at 214.
238 Ibid.
239 See comments on the Green Paper of 2008 on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
copyright/copyright-infso/copyright-infso_en.htm.
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First, she voices disappointment because the 
imperative nature of the exceptions is declared only 
with reference to contracts and not to technological 
protection measures. She argues that a fortiori 
that should have been the case.240  Second, she 
maintains that the exclusion of the copyright 
works accessible on demand from the purview of 
Article 23bis suggests that copyright exceptions, 
while mandatory for digital copyright works 
commercialised on a physical carrier (e.g. a CD or 
a DVD), are only optional when the same digital 
products are commercialised online via download. 
This creates an unjustified two-tier system.241
The status of the exceptions in Belgium, Dusollier 
argues, assumes a hybrid nature (mandatory and 
optional) depending on the means of diffusion of 
the work.242 The reasoning of the Belgian legislator, 
while adding the above exclusion for on-demand 
copyright works, that the online distribution of 
copyright goods has to be promoted, does not 
convince her. She considers this argument 
fallacious, except maybe for the exception for 
private copying. By declaring mandatory the 
exceptions for ‘offline’ digital works and entirely 
manageable by contract the exceptions for online 
digital works, the Belgian legislator indirectly 
encourages the practice of overriding copyright 
exceptions. It is regrettable, she concludes, that 
the Belgian legislator stopped somewhat halfway 
in a process that had commenced under the right 
auspices.243
Existing case law in Belgium does not clarify the 
matter. In the most notable case on copyright 
exceptions in the digital environment, Test-Achats 
v. EMI, the consumer Association Test-Achats 
demanded the possibility for users to make a 
private reproduction of a music CD equipped 
with DRM impeding the reproduction. The judge 
declared that the exception for private copying is 
only a ‘legal immunity’ against infringement and not 
a right.244 This ruling leaves therefore open both the 
question of the nature of other copyright exceptions 
(for example, those underpinned by fundamental 
rights) and the question of the overridability of 
copyright exceptions by contract and DRM. 
Ireland 
After relevant national and international pressure, 
Ireland adopted the Copyright act n. 38 of 
2000,245which was intended to adapt copyright 
legislation to the needs of the digital environment, 
and to implement the InfoSoc Directive. However, a 
few provisions of the Copyright Act 2000 departed 
from the binding provisions of the InfoSoc Directive 
and therefore, after an EU action brought against 
Ireland, the SI n. 16 of 2004 (Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations 2004) was adopted. 
This Statutory Instrument introduced the exception 
for caching copy (temporary copyright within 
a system), and sanctioned a non-interference 
of Rights Protection Measures with Permitted 
Acts.246With the latter provision, all permitted 
acts are protected from TPMs unduly expanding 
copyright protection.
240 Dusollier 2007b, at 451.
241 Ibid.
242 Ibid. at 452.
243 Ibid.
244 Tribunal de première instance de Bruxelles, L’ASBL Association Belge des Consommateurs TestAchats v. SE EMI Recorded 
Music Belgium, Sony Music Entertainment (Belgium), SA Universal Music, SA Bertelsmann Music Group Belgium, SA IFPI 
Belgium, Jugement du 25 mai 2004, N. 2004/46/A du rôle des référes.
245 The previous copyright legislation was the Copyright Act n. 10 of 1963, The Copyright Act of 2000 is available at http://www.
irishstatutebook.ie/2000/en/act/pub/0028/index.html.
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The boundaries of copyright protection, including 
the idea-expression dichotomy and the originality 
requirement, are expressed in S 17(2) and (3) 
of the Copyright Act 2000.247  The requirement 
of originality for databases has also been added 
in the same statute to comply with the Database 
Directive.248
The Irish Copyright Act provides an extremely 
detailed list of copyright exceptions. They are 
grouped by category, under the subsections 
dedicated to: Education; Libraries and Archives; 
Public Administration; Design; Computer 
Programs; Original Databases; Typefaces; Works 
in Electronic Form; and a miscellaneous section. 
The exception for private copying is reserved 
to domestic recording for the purpose of time 
shifting.249
On the mandatory nature of the exceptions, Section 
2(10) of the Copyright Act 2000 states: 
‘Where an act which would otherwise 
infringe any of the rights conferred by this 
Act is permitted under this Act it is irrelevant 
whether or not there exists any term or 
condition in an agreement which purports to 
prohibit or restrict that act.’ 
246  Section 5 of the SI 2004:
 ‘(1) Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed as operating to prevent any person from undertaking the acts permitted -
 (a) in relation to works protected by copyright under Chapter 6 of Part II,
 (b) in relation to performances, by Chapter 4 of Part III, or
 (c)  in relation to databases, by Chapter 8 of Part V.
 (2) Where the beneficiary is legally entitled to access the protected work or subject-matter concerned, the rightsholder shall 
make available to the beneficiary the means of benefiting from the permitted act, save where such work or other subject-
matter has been made available to the public on agreed contractual terms in such a way that members of the public may 
access the work or other subject-matter from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.
 (3) In the event of a dispute arising, the beneficiary may apply to the High Court for an order requiring a person to do or to 
refrain from doing anything the doing or refraining from doing of which is necessary to ensure compliance by that person with 
the provisions of this section.’
247 (2) Copyright subsists, in accordance with this Act, in—
 (a) original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works,
 (b) sound recordings, films, broadcasts or cable programmes,
 (c) the typographical arrangement of published editions, and
 (d) original databases.
 (3) Copyright protection shall not extend to the ideas and principles which underlie any element of a work, procedures, 
methods of operation or mathematical concepts and, in respect of original databases, shall not extend to their contents and 
is without prejudice to any rights subsisting in those contents.
248 See Conneely 2000, at 198.
249 Section 101 of the Copyright Act 2000.
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At first sight, the Irish provision seems broader than 
the corresponding legal provisions of Belgium and 
Portugal. It seems to cover all copyright limits. But 
in fact, since it uses the term ‘rights’, it can be said 
to refer to economic rights, rather than copyright 
as such, and thus to exceptions only and not all 
copyright limits, so that the meaning of the section 
is similar to its Portuguese and Belgian equivalent. 
Regrettably, no case law or literature, at national 
or European level, has elucidated in detail the 
reasons for the Irish legislator making such a 
choice. It is unclear therefore whether it is based 
on the nature of the exceptions or on utilitarian 
principles. Moreover, no empirical studies have 
been carried out on the impact that such provisions 
have had on local copyright industry. 
Portugal
Copyright in Portugal is regulated by the Code of 
Author’s Rights and Related Rights (Código do 
Direito de Autor e dos Direitos Conexos - CDADC) 
of the 14th of March 1985, which has been 
modified by the statutes implementing the Software 
Directive,250 the Rental Rights Directive,251 the 
Satellite-Cable Directive,252 the Copyright Term 
Directive,253 the Database Directive,254 the Term 
Directive 1993,255 and the InfoSoc Directive.256 
The matter is regulated also by the law on 
remuneration of private copying (Decreto-lei n. 
62/98, of the 1st of September) and by the law on 
collecting societies (Law n. 83/2001 of the 1st of 
August).257
The conditions for the protection of copyright works 
(and therefore the exclusion of copyright protection 
according to the idea-expression dichotomy and 
– indirectly - to the originality requirement) are 
enshrined in Article 2 of the CDADC. Further, 
exhaustion of the distribution right and copyright 
duration are stipulated by the above legislation in 
line with the corresponding directives.
250 Decreto-Lei n. 252/94, of the 20 October 1994. 
251 Council Directive 92/100/EEC of 19 November 1992 on rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright 
in the field of intellectual property, Official Journal L 346, 27/11/1992 P. 0061 – 0066. Decreto-Lei n. 332/97, of the 27th of 
November 1997.
252 Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights 
related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission, Official Journal L 248, 06/10/1993 P. 0015 
– 002. Decreto-Lei n. 333/97, of the 27th of November 1997. 
253 Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 harmonising the term of protection of copyright and certain related rights; 
Official Journal L 290, 24/11/1993 P. 0009 – 0013. Decreto-lei n. 334/97 of the 27th of November.
254 Decreto-lei nº 122/2000, of the 4th of July 2000.
255 Decreto-lei nº 334/97, of the 27th of November 1997. 
256 Law n. 24/2006 of the 30th of June 2006.
257 The complete legislation on copyright in Portugal is accessible at http://www.gpeari.pt.
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The system of copyright exceptions provides for 
an exhaustive list, which is strictly interpreted by 
courts.258 After the implementation of the InfoSoc 
Directive, the list presents the following exceptions 
in Article 75:
• Caching copy
• Private copying (on paper), except for 
musical scores
• Reproduction and public communication of 
summaries or excerpts, or speeches
• Press review
• Reproduction and communication of short 
extracts of literary works in current affairs 
reporting
• Copying by libraries and museums, for loan 
and archiving, non-profit
• Teaching (non commercial)
•  Quotation for criticism or teaching
• Disabled persons
• Public performance of national anthems, 
patriotic chants, or religious works and 
practices
• Inclusion for promotion of expositions or 
sales/auctions
• News reporting
• Public security and administrative or judiciary 
proceedings
• Research and private study (with dedicated 
terminals and within library premises) of 
works that are not available for sale or 
licensing
• Reproduction by social institutions
• Architectural works and sculptures placed in 
public places
• Incidental inclusion
• Demonstrative or maintenance purposes, 
including buildings, their drawings and plans
• Distribution of works lawfully reproduced, 
when justified by the act of reproduction.259
Citation requirements and fair compensation are 
also provided for in some instances. 
Moreover, private copying is regulated by a 
dedicated article (Article 81) which exempts the 
reproduction in one exemplar only, for scientific or 
humanistic purposes, when the work is not available 
for sale or is impossible to retrieve elsewhere. The 
personal copy, subjected to the three-step test 
(that does not affect the normal exploitation of the 
work and does not bring unjustified prejudice to the 
interests of the author)260 cannot be communicated 
to the public and cannot be commercialised.
258 See ALAI 2008, Portuguese Report.
259 Free translation and summaries by the author.
260 Berne Convention Art. 9.2: ‘It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such 
works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and 
does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.’
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In consequence of the implementation in the 
Portuguese legislation of the Software Directive 
and of the Database Directive, the corresponding 
imperative exceptions have been incorporated. 
Therefore, back-up copying, observation, study 
and testing of a computer program are allowed, 
and not overridable by contract.260 The same is 
valid for the decompilation of computer software 
aimed at achieving interoperability.261 Likewise the 
normal utilisation of a database is also guaranteed 
against contracts.262
Also for the exceptions to the exclusive rights of 
the author, the Portuguese Copyright Act provides 
for protection against contracts. Article 75(5) of the 
CDADC states that ‘any contractual clause which 
aims to eliminate or impede the normal exercise by 
the beneficiaries of the uses listed in paragraphs 
1, 2 and 3 of this article [which the law calls ‘free 
uses’] is null and void’263 without prejudice to 
contractual arrangements about the modes of 
exercise, in particular to establish the amount of 
fair compensation.264
All copyright exceptions in the Portuguese 
copyright legislation are thus protected against 
contracting, similarly to the Irish legislation and the 
Belgian law.266
Conclusion
In conclusion, the above examined countries adopt 
different approaches in the relationship between 
copyright exceptions and contracts. Some leave 
them to private ordering, some select few exceptions 
and declare them imperative, some protect all 
exceptions from contracts and technical locks. 
Apart from Belgium, there is no sufficient analysis 
of this legislation, in the literature or in the case law 
of the examined countries, to clarify the reasons for 
the choice of the respective legislators (e.g. whether 
the underpinning justifications for copyright limits 
determine their resistance to contracts). Moreover, 
there is no empirical research reviewing the impact 
of these different regulations on the relationship 
between owners and users of copyright works. In 
sum, it is difficult to understand whether legislation 
providing for imperative copyright exceptions helps 
users to benefit from them or harms the interests 
of right holders. In addition, apart from Portuguese 
law which seems clear on the point, it is unclear 
whether the whole contract or simply the clause 
overriding the exception will be void (art. 9(1) of the 
Software Directive, 15 of the Database Directive 
and s. 36(4) of the CDPA are good examples of 
such confusion).
261 Article 6 of the Decreto-Lei n. 252/94, of the 20 October.
262 Article 7, ibid.
263 Article 9 of the Decreto-lei n. 122/2000, of the 4th of July.
264 Translation by Patricia Akester, University of Cambridge.
265 Translation by the author.
266 See Dubuisson 2001, at 213.
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3.2  ACADEMIC COMMENTARY
3.2.1   Contracts override users’ 
freedoms 
Contracts have always been part of the copyright 
law scenario.267 They are essential to the correct 
implementation of the copyright system.268 Authors 
and publishers use contracts to define the profit 
sharing deriving from copyright protection. 
Commercial copyright users arrange with authors 
or their representatives (often collecting societies) 
the terms of use of creative works. Private users 
purchase copyright works on analogue media (e.g. 
a book) under the standard terms of a sale contract. 
These contracts in the digital environment take 
the form of licences, setting the usage rules of a 
given copyright product.269 This is how we see the 
emergence, in relation with digital copyright works, 
of standard form electronic contracts, such as 
shrink-wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap licenses.
Electronic licences, whose terms are determined 
by the rightholder, leave no room for negotiation to 
the user, who is confronted with a ‘take it or leave 
it’ choice. They are therefore different from arm-
length contracts, in which consent of both parties 
is fully informed and freely expressed.270 
Some literature suggests that these licences are 
not at all contracts. They therefore do not require 
consent from the user. They are unilateral actions 
by which the owner exercises their property right, 
and indicates to the user what uses of their property 
they wishes to exclude. It is in sum a permission to 
use a property which is subject to conditions.271
From the point of view of the end users these 
licences are often too long. Some have suggested 
that in practice users do not read them, in the ever 
rapid Internet environment, but they regret to have 
agreed to them when they learn what their terms 
are.272
Moreover, end-user licences are often worded in 
legal jargon, unintelligible to common users.273 
But even when they are comprehensible, they 
‘are not as clear as the indication of the price of 
a product’. This means that the user is unable 
fully to determine the real impact of the terms 
and conditions on their interest. For example, 
they cannot know in advance whether they will be 
inspired by the content of that particular creative 
work to produce further creations.274 Despite the 
above, some case law in the United States has 
held shrink-wrap licences to be enforceable, even 
when the user expressed only minimal assent.275
267  Goldstein 1997, at 866.
268  Nimmer 1998, at 63.
269  Ibid.
270 Cohen 1998, at 30.
271 Elkin Koren 2009, at 8.
272 Good et al. 2005, cited by Lemley 2006 at 462.  See also Lemley 2006 at 463, footnote 10, referring to an anecdote 
according to which a company put in its end-user licence agreement (EULA) that it would pay a prize to anyone who read 
the terms of use.
273 Ghestin 1993, at 367, cited in Guibault 2002, at 119. 
274 Elkin Koren 2009, at 8.
275 See ProCD Inc., 86 F. 3d 1447.
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Furthermore, often the contract is bundled with 
the digital copyright work: either it is written on the 
product (e.g. on a music CD) or it pops up in the 
reading device at the first, or every, utilisation of the 
product (e.g. in computer software). This means 
that not only the original buyer of the product, but 
also each and every person subsequently utilising 
it, is bound by the terms of the agreement. In this 
way the right in personam of the owner, obtained 
by contract, bears the characteristics of a right in 
rem, like a property right.276
On this point Elkin Koren argues that the outcome 
of cases like the ProCD277 in the United States, 
suggests as acceptable a total contractual control 
on every access to the copyright work, not only by 
the original contractor (the purchaser) but also by 
every subsequent user. In this way, the contract 
creates rights that are similar to property rights, 
enforceable against everybody. After the ProCD 
case, in practice, no third party will be allowed 
to use a CD without being bound by the original 
contract between the offerer and the purchaser.278 
She rejects the argument that copyright and 
contract do not hinder each other because the first 
creates initial entitlement and the second merely 
regulates the transfer of the entitlements. 
Although the contract cannot operate on the initial 
entitlement, she argues, it can operate on the final 
outcome of the rights on this entitlement, and the 
final result is often contrary to copyright policy.279
A few other copyright commentators maintain that 
end-user licences can override the privileges of the 
users.280 For example, most terms and conditions 
within these licences forbid any use or copy of 
the work, for any purpose whatsoever, thereby 
impeding the exercise of fundamental freedoms 
like citation, criticism, parody, and transformative 
works.281 Yet, abiding by the terms of the contract 
can become a pre-condition for the user to benefit 
from copyright exceptions.
Dusollier argues for example that, in order to 
benefit from the exceptions, the use has to be 
‘lawful’. The lawful use has been defined in several 
EU directives always in different terms, as the 
person that ‘has lawfully acquired the work’,282 the 
person that has the right to access the work (by law 
or by contract),283 or the person regularly licensed 
to access (by contract) from the owner.284 
276 Elkin Koren 2009, at 9.
277 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). The ProCD decision will be discussed below.
278 See the reading of ProCD in Elkin Koren 1997.
279 Ibid.
280 See for example Vivant 2008.
281 Guibault 2002, IViR 2007 Part 1, Samuelson 1999, Gasser 2004, Vinje 1999.
282 Consistent with the definition of the Software Directive, and supported by part of the literature. See Dusollier 2007, at 453.
283 Consistent with the InfoSoc Directive and with the Belgian Copyright Law. This construct is debated within the literature: 
certain commentators find that a lawful user is by law a beneficiary of a copyright exception. Others state this reasoning is 
circular. For the full debate see Dusollier 2007 at 451. See also Vanovermeire 2000.
284 Consistent with the Database Directive and supported by another part of the literature. See Dusollier 2007, at 454.
285 See Dusollier 2007, at 456-459.
286 Kupferschmid 1998. See also Netanel 1996, foreseeing this scenario, at 306.
287 Kretschmer 2003, at 337.
288 Hugenholtz 1997, Vinje 1999. Samuelson 2003, Dusollier 2003a, Guibault 2003, Westkamp 2004, Favale 2008.
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In all the above definitions the importance of the 
role of the contract is obvious. 
The user cannot benefit from a copyright exception 
by their own initiative (for example by performing 
a reproduction that is forbidden by contract but 
allowed by a copyright exception) without becoming 
an unlawful user who cannot benefit from copyright 
exceptions. The only available remedy (far more 
costly and time-consuming) would be to resort 
to courts or mediation boards. In this way the 
construct of a lawful user is used by owners as a 
supplementary tool to control and restrict copyright 
exceptions.285
It is not only copyright exceptions which are 
threatened by contract, but all copyright limits. The 
first-sale principle, for example, that allows a lawful 
purchaser to resell the product on the second-hand 
market, finds no place in the digital environment. 
If the licence prevents any copy of the work, for 
whatsoever purpose, this entails that reselling, 
lending, and giving away the work is forbidden.286 
Also the copyright duration could be endangered 
by the licences ‘in perpetuity’, granted by the 
copyright owner.287 
In the views of the above literature, in sum, the 
balance between the exclusive rights of the owner 
and the access privileges of the user created by 
copyright is hindered by the implementation of 
contract and technology;288 and so is the ultimate 
goal of copyright: the circulation of culture. 
Rigid control on access to copyright content, 
enabled by contracts and technology, produces 
negative externalities like stifling new creative 
processes.289 The only way to avoid this dysfunction 
of the digital copyright is to subject these contracts 
to the principles that inform copyright law.290
In more detailed terms, copyright law should require 
that each contract including a clause incompatible 
with copyright legislation is null and void. To this 
end, the implementation of imperative copyright 
exceptions, which would not be overridable by 
contract, has been deemed necessary. Some 
reckon the imperative exceptions should be those 
underpinned by fundamental rights;291 others 
point to those enabling productive uses, able to 
foster innovation;292 some add also the exceptions 
likely to have an impact on the internal market.293 
Another part of the literature believes that the 
whole copyright law, with all its exclusions, limited 
economic rights, and exceptions should preempt 
contracts infringing its provisions.294 Finally, 
others suggest that there should be a clause in 
supranational copyright law to declare null and void 
clauses in standard form contracts incompatible 
with copyright law.295 It has been argued that in 
an ever borderless market national copyright laws 
would not suffice to provide an effective safeguard 
for users’ entitlements, and therefore we need to 
resort to legal frameworks also outside copyright 
law and at a supranational level.296
289 Elkin-Koren 2007.
290 Nimmer 1998 at 871. 
291 Dusollier et al. 2000, at 18; Geiger 2006; Derclaye 2008; Favale 2008.
292 Heide 2000 and 2003.
293 IViR 2007, Part I, at 64.
294 Netanel 1996, at 382. Guibault 2008, at 10.
295 IViR 2007, Part I, at 163.
296 De Werra 2003; Hugenholtz and Okediji 2008.
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Alternatively, instead of the modification of current 
copyright legislation, a correct interpretation of 
its principles could be sufficient. To this end, the 
fundamental function of copyright needs to be 
taken as a guideline.297 The interpretation of 
copyright and of its limits should be underpinned 
by its democratic function, rather than by utilitarian 
justifications. Thus contracts overriding copyright 
limits would be preempted by copyright law.298 
In short, even in the absence of an express 
indication in copyright laws, court should hold end-
user agreements incompatible with copyright law 
unenforceable.299 
In conclusion, in the view of the above literature, 
while contracts have always been part of copyright, 
they have often created an imbalance between 
the interested parties. Initially, the authors were 
victims of the overreaching bargaining power 
of the publisher; and legislators enacted norms 
intended to protect them. Now, end-users are the 
weakest party in the relationship among copyright 
players. To assist them, either legislators should 
take normative action, or courts should inform their 
interpretation of copyright law in a different way.
3.2.2  Contracts are more efficient than 
Copyright
Another stream of the literature is significantly 
more positive on the effects of private ordering 
on copyright law. They reckon that contracts and 
technological protection measures are more 
efficient than public ordering. This is because the 
law is not capable to quickly adapt to the needs 
of copyright users, whereas the market is able to 
generate the most efficient transaction terms for 
the benefit of both owners and users. Fair use and 
other instruments to address traditional copyright 
market failures would then be safely replaced by 
‘fared use’.300 
This stance in the copyright literature is based on 
the assumption that copyright limits are based 
on the inefficiencies of the market: mainly, the 
impossibility to negotiate licences one by one 
with end-users. Digital technology bypasses this 
market failure by offering an individual negotiation. 
Thus, the intrusion of public policy tools to regulate 
copyright matters is no longer necessary, and the 
interaction between owners and users is left to 
the more efficient instrument of private ordering. 
Thanks to price discrimination,301 for example, 
users will get only the usage privileges they are 
ready to pay for. 
297 Geiger 2008.
298 Netanel 1996, at 382. But see Nimmer 1998, at 828, arguing that only a naïve observer can claim that policy in intellectual 
property can trump contract.
299 Derclaye 2006.
300 Bell 1998; Dam 1999; Easterbrook 1996; Hardy 1996; Merges 1997; O’Rourke 1997.
301 Fisher 2004; Ganley 2004.
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This, in the final analysis, will not restrict users’ 
privileges: it will broaden them.302 Against this 
scenario, it has been argued that information goods 
cannot be completely commodified, because of 
their peculiar characteristics. They are inherently 
different from other commodities, and therefore 
they cannot be efficiently subjected to the laws of 
the market.303   
Private agreements are also recognised as a 
vehicle for opportunities rather than threats in the 
field of open-access licences.304 These are new 
ways in which authors and creators make available 
their work to the general public (normally on the 
Internet) without charges, but under given terms and 
conditions (‘some rights reserved’). The General 
Public Licence (GPL), originally issued by the GNU 
Project, is designed for software developers.305 
Literary works, instead, can be licensed under 
the Creative Commons (CC) terms.306 These new 
forms of licensing are conceived to facilitate access 
to copyright works by the broadest possible share 
of the public, while at the same time protecting 
authors from abuse and misuse of their creations. 
According to some, open-access contracts are 
perfectly fit for the borderless digital environment, 
unlike copyright law. By acting worldwide, they 
offer unprecedented opportunities to improve the 
general functioning of the copyright system.307 
However, on this issue some commentators are 
cautious. According to Elkin Koren, for example, the 
multiple choices offered by CC licences augment 
the costs of information searching for users of CC 
works. This, in turn, ends up screening access to 
information rather than facilitating it.308  Moreover, 
Dusollier1 argues that the culture and philosophy 
at the basis of CC and GNU projects can lead to 
unintentional negative consequences. In particular, 
the relevant focus on the user and their need to 
access copyright works shadows the interests of 
the author. CC authors selflessly make available 
their creations to the public, for the benefit of the 
circulation of culture. But the diffusion of this type of 
licensing somewhat generates the expectation that 
all works of art should be made available for free. 
Moreover, the tool utilised by open-access projects 
to provide an alternative to the existing copyright 
system, is ironically the same tool that the copyright 
industry is using to tip the balance of copyright 
towards the owner: the ‘viral’ contract. This type of 
contract stipulates terms and conditions that bind 
not only the first user, but also every following user 
of the work. Thanks to ‘viral’ contracts, the rights 
enforceable with respect to the copyright work are 
more similar to property rights than to contractual 
rights.309 The open-source licensing system is 
therefore criticised with the same arguments 
opposing commercial electronic licences. 
302 Easterbrook 1996, at 211.
303 Benkler 2000.
304 Dizon 2009.
305 The project took off in 1984 and was supported by the Free Software Foundation. To avoid free software being copied 
by commercial software producers (and then patented), GNU elaborated the General Public Licence (GNU GPL). The 
functioning of the GNU GPL is simple: whoever wants to cooperate to produce and distribute free software has to patent it, 
in order to control the exploitation of the work. Afterwards, they can give away for free the software licence, thus ensuring 
that the creation will circulate for free and remain free. See http://www.gnu.org/copyleft.
306 Creative Commons found inspiration in the GNU GPL model, and it applied its concept to copyright. Some authors want 
their works to be freely accessible by the public, in order to maximise their distribution. This purpose cannot be achieved by 
simply putting a work in the public domain, because others could copy the work and claim its paternity. That is where the 
Creative Commons licence comes into play. On the CC website a licence is automatically generated according to the rights 
that the creator wishes to retain. For example, they can choose to claim the reproduction right only partially, by allowing free 
reproduction but only for non-profit activities. See http://creativecommons.org.
307 Dizon 2009.
308 Elkin Koren 2005 and 2009.
309 Dusollier 2006b. 
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3.2.3  Copyright and contracts are 
independent
Between contract supporters and contract 
detractors, however, there is a third stream of 
copyright commentators. While not necessarily 
supporting an expansion of the use of contracts 
to regulate copyright matters, some are not at all 
concerned by the effects of private contracting on 
the copyright balance. Contracts and copyright are 
somewhat symbiotic systems that coexist, serve 
and help each other. They do not risk hindering 
each other, because they impact on different 
legal areas. Copyright is generally regulated by 
international law (implemented in national law), it 
creates rights in rem (enforceable erga omnes), 
and it creates initial entitlements only. Contracts 
instead are generally regulated by national law, 
they create rights in personam (enforceable 
only against the contractors) and regulate the 
subsequent transfer of entitlements. Moreover, fair 
use and the first-sale principle are not endangered 
by contracts because these are default norms 
that apply only in the absence of an arrangement 
between the parties.311 
For other commentators, the current legislation, 
correctly interpreted, is sufficient to rein in 
copyright’s excesses.312 They reckon that a strict 
solution like rendering imperative copyright 
exceptions would be ‘too inflexible’.313 A similar 
solution cannot but be an extrema ratio: only 
a strong positive policy implication can justify 
overriding the freedom of parties to negotiate their 
agreements.314 Moreover, on a practical note, the 
financial implications of the interference of contract 
on copyright are held to be minimal. Even when 
the contract modifies copyright entitlements, 
remedies offered by contract law are far from being 
as onerous as those offered by copyright law. This 
is because in the case of breach of contract, all 
the owner can do is demand monetary damages 
in proportion with the real injury suffered, and the 
amount of those is likely to be minimal.315 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the examined literature is divided 
among supporters of a legal action (normative or 
interpretative) to be taken in favour of copyright 
users, those who would phase out copyright 
law in favour of contracts, and those that deem 
the status quo to be sufficiently balanced. In the 
absence of empirical data on the impact on users 
of electronic licences it is impossible to evaluate 
these arguments correctly. Moreover, different 
types of contract may be used depending on the 
type of user of copyright works and on the sector 
(e.g. database, software, music, film sectors...). 
The following section reviews the different 
licensing agreements and preliminarily explores 
their potential impact on users. 
311 Nimmer 1998.
312 Burrell and Coleman 2005, at 70.
313 Ibid.
314 Ibid, citing Lemley 1995. 
315 See Gasser 2004 at 18 and Nimmer 1998.
316 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidelberg ERG 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
317 Arizona Retail Systems v Software Links 831 F.Supp. 759, 763-766 (D. Arizona, 1993).
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3.3  COPYRIGHT WORKS AND THEIR 
COMMERCIALISATION
A wilful consent from a party to an agreement is 
important to determine the enforceability of that 
agreement against that party. Even in some recent 
case law, where minimal forms of assent were 
deemed to be sufficient to hold a purchaser bound 
to the terms of the contract,316 the possibility of 
accepting or rejecting the terms of the agreement 
was held to be crucial.317 While fully negotiated 
arm-length contracts presume wilful consent from 
all parties, and therefore do not raise this type of 
issue, standard form contracts, especially when 
entrusted to the jacket of a CD or to a URL on a 
web page, may create some problems. In order 
to explore the potential extent of these problems, 
it is useful to determine what share of copyright 
products is commercialised with the former or the 
latter form of contract. The analysis is organised by 
sector of copyright users:  consumers; libraries and 
universities; commercial users.
3.3.1  Consumers
Although official data on this issue are missing, a 
growing share of the digital copyright commerce 
(B2C) seems to take place through electronic 
standard form contracts. This can be inferred from 
the figures on the diffusion of electronic commerce 
(e-commerce), which normally deploys this type of 
agreements, which in the field of copyright take the 
form of licences.318 For the purpose of this study, 
we will divide electronic licences into three types: 
a) shrink-wrap, b) click-wrap, and c) browse-wrap. 
The terms and conditions of shrink-wrap licences, 
when they are enforceable, are binding for the 
purchaser from the moment the packaging of 
the product is open. Click-wrap licences require 
the user to read the terms and conditions before 
proceeding with the purchase, and to accept 
them by clicking a button carrying ‘I agree’, or ‘I 
accept’ or other similar formulas. For browse-wrap 
licences, the terms and conditions are accessible 
via a link on the front-page of the website. It is 
irrelevant whether the user has effectively read 
them or understood them. It is sufficient for the 
acceptance of the agreement that the user ‘utilizes’ 
the website.319
318 See IFPI Report 2009 at 4. See also the EU Commission Report on E-commerce 2009, on the diffusion of e-commerce in 
the EU. It reports that on average (among EU 27 Member States) 30/40% of copyright goods are sold online. More ‘mature’ 
markets like the UK, France and Germany reach 70% of the share. See also Guibault 2002 at 297.
319 See IViR 2007, Part I, at 140 et seq.
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Some digital copyright works can be accessed 
on a physical medium (e.g. CDs or DVDs) which 
can be purchased or rented on the Internet or in a 
shop. These products sometimes have terms and 
conditions external to the packaging, sometimes 
internal. Some others have a notice exterior to the 
package referring to terms and conditions inside.320 
For example, when the transaction involves the 
purchase of computer software on a material 
carrier, like a compact disk (CD), the terms of the 
licence are often printed in the instruction manual, 
or on a separate booklet that can be found in the 
package.321 On the other hand, when a music CD is 
purchased, the terms and conditions are succinctly 
printed on the disk (and sometimes, but not always, 
on the jacket too).322 Video DVDs, in addition, show 
a longer copyright notice before displaying the 
content.323 Between the purchaser and the retailer, 
normal conditions of sale apply. However, between 
the right holder and the final purchaser the licence 
regulates the agreement. To digital products 
commercialised on a physical carrier the doctrine 
of shrink-wrap licences applies.324 
The above products can also be purchased directly 
in digital form. They can be downloaded from a 
website onto the computer of the purchaser, and 
they do not require either packaging or delivery 
fees. For these products, click-wrap (or click-
through, or click-on) contracts are more common.325
 
Music compilations or music files, audio books, 
and multimedia material (games and films) are 
nowadays increasingly commercialised online, via 
download. This trend is particularly recent for video 
material because of technological progress and 
the diffusion of powerful broadband connections. 
The most popular online service specialised in 
downloadable music files (and now also films) is 
Apple iTunes, which accounts for the biggest market 
share of copyright digital products.326 This service 
involves the use of proprietary software to sell the 
products, and it implements click-wrap licenses to 
set users’ restrictions relating to the software and 
the products, and browse-wrap licences for the use 
of the website.327 
320 Derclaye 2006 at 169-170.
321 See Belgrove 2008 (for the National Consumer Council - UK). The study relates to EULAs implemented on computer 
software.
322 An example of terms and conditions is: ‘unauthorised copying, lending, hiring, public performance and broadcast of the 
recording’ is prohibited. See Gowers Review 2006 at 40. 
323 IViR 2007 Part I, at 143.
324 Ibid.
325 See IViR 2007, Part I at 140 et seq.
326 Ibid.
327 See Gasser 2004.
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Also photo, image and footage stocks or collections 
are nowadays mostly licensed on line (although 
CD versions still exist), and they implement click-
wrap contracts.328
Finally, online newspapers and magazines, 
whose diffusion on the market is increasing every 
year,329 are often commercialised via browse-wrap 
licences. This is a common practice in the copyright 
management of websites. However, some of them 
only report on the front page the indication: ‘© All 
Rights Reserved’, or similar. No data are available 
on the share of websites/services implementing 
the former or the latter practice.
To conclude the examination of digital products 
destined to private consumers, some business 
models that propose standard form contracts in 
more traditional forms need to be mentioned. 
These are providers that often propose ‘bundles’ of 
digital copyright products and hardware. Examples 
are mobile phones able to play music and videos, 
or TV services via cable or Internet.330 These 
products are commercialised either in shops or 
online, and they involve the purchase or rental of 
a material product (e.g. phone, set-top box, router) 
and subscription to a service, through standard 
form contracts. 
Most of the informational products considered 
above are commercialised through standard 
form contracts. As mentioned above, the terms 
of those types of contract are integrally set by 
the owner of the copyright work. This suggested 
to some literature that the position of the user is 
weak, and it needs special protection.331 This 
argument is refuted by others maintaining that 
standard form contracts are perfectly acceptable 
in contract law because the user has the choice 
to buy or not to buy the product; and the impact 
of this choice on industry’s policies should not be 
underestimated. When many users refuse to buy 
a product with over-restrictive terms of use, the 
owner is likely to change them.332 The main debate 
of copyright literature and of case law, however, is 
on the enforceability of shrink-wrap, click-wrap and 
browse-wrap licences.
328 Grosheide 2001.
329 IFPI Report 2009. at 4.
330 IViR 2007, Part I at 8.
331 Elkin-Koren 1997, Dusollier 2005 and 2007, Lemley 2006.
332 Nimmer 1998. Note that this is the case only if there is competition on the specific product market (Derclaye 2008).
333 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996)
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3.3.1.1   The enforceability of electronic 
contracts
The status of shrink-wrap, click-wrap and browse-
wrap licences is all but certain at international 
level. Shrink-wrap contracts in the US are held 
enforceable in some States (see ProCD)333 and 
not enforceable in other states (see Vault).334 
Many variables have to be considered: the 
juridical nature of the purchaser (natural or legal 
person: that is, private or professional user);335 the 
opportunity for the acceptant to have knowledge of 
the contract terms;336 and the possibility to accept 
or reject the agreement and to return the product 
free of charges.337 Common law instruments (e.g. 
the doctrine of unconscionability, misuse of rights, 
etc.) can be called upon to protect copyright users 
on a case-by-case basis, along with consumer 
protection instruments and antitrust law (see 
below, Section D).338 
In the US, the legal doctrine is divided. While 
some express concerns about the minimal level of 
assent339 sufficient to enforce shrink-wrap licences, 
others are in favour of upholding them. They argue 
that a contract also exists without formalities based 
on the fact that both parties have voluntarily started 
to deliver their performance.340  Therefore, in the 
US the validity of shrink-wrap licences is unclear.341
In Europe, some courts would not hold them 
enforceable, because the terms of the contract 
are known by the purchaser only after they have 
entered the transaction.342 Moreover, the indication 
on the jacket of the CD or on the disk itself that 
no copy is allowed is not considered a term of 
a contract, but rather a notice that copyright 
law applies, and therefore it is valid only to the 
extent to which it recalls the provisions of the 
respective national copyright law.343 In France, 
some legal commentators suggested that shrink-
wrap contracts could be enforceable provided that 
the user is aware of assenting to the terms of the 
contract by opening the package.344 But no case 
law confirms such a construct. 
334 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F.Supp. 750 (E.D.La.1987).
335 See Lemley 2006, at 261-262, arguing that most courts that have enforced a shrink-wrap licence have done so against a 
company, while most courts that have refused to enforce them have done so to protect consumers.
336 Arizona Retail Systems v. Software Links 831 F.Supp. 759, 763-766 (D. Arizona, 1993).
337 Derclaye 2006 at 173.
338 Guibault 2002 at 207- 213.
339 Lemley 2006 at 464-465, discussing the ‘death of assent’, and citing Radin 2002.
340 In the US this is sanctioned by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 19(1981). In civil law countries this is what is called 
to conclude a contract per facta concludentia.
341 Derclaye 2006 at 173.
342 See the Playstation case, Tribunal of Bolzano, Italy, 31 December 2003 [2006] E.C.D.R. 18. Also Coss Holland BV. v. TM 
Data Netherlands BV Dirstrict Court of Amsterdam, decision of 24th May 1995, Computerrecht 1997 at 63-65.
343 See Vermande v. Bojokovsky; District Court of The Hague, decision of 20th March 1998, in Informatierrecht/AMI 1998, at 
65-67.
344 Girot 1998, at 7, cited in Guibault 2002 at 205.
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Also in the UK, no case law exists on the specific 
matter of shrink-wrap licences, although some 
commentators expressed scepticism on their 
enforceability.345 We can only infer that case law 
on standard form contracts in general (the ‘ticket 
cases’)346 would be recalled in similar matters. In 
Scotland, a shrink-wrap licence has been held 
valid, but according to its commentators this case 
is of little help to clarify the possible fate of this 
type of agreement in the rest of Europe.347 Some 
other principles may be used to set aside such 
contracts. As they are applicable generally to all 
contracts, they will be reviewed in section 3.4.1. 
Click-wrap contracts, in contrast, are generally 
held valid both in the US and the EU.348 In Europe, 
the enforceability of such contracts is confirmed 
by Article 9(1) of the E-commerce Directive,349 and 
some European case law has upheld them.350  
Finally, browse-wrap licenses, which are able to 
bind the user purely by the fact of being available 
for consultation in the first page of the website/
service, are held enforceable by some US courts,351 
although some literature is highly sceptical about 
their validity.352  In a seminal case on this matter, 
Specht v Netscape,353 a ‘terms of use’ link at the 
bottom of a page was not considered binding for 
the user, with the argument that for a contract to be 
binding, both parties need to know the terms of the 
contract and to agree to them. 
345 Derclaye 2006 at 174.
346 Parker v. South Eastern Railway [1877] 2 C.P.D 416. L’Estrange v. Graucob [1934] 2 K.B. 394. Grogan v. Robert Meredith 
Plant Hire [1996] 15 Tr. L.R. 371. In essence, these cases state that standard form contracts are enforceable whether or not 
the purchaser has effectively read the terms and conditions. It is sufficient (‘reasonable notice’) that the purchaser had the 
opportunity to read them (for example, in case of the train ticket, on timetables), and that they had the possibility to return the 
ticket.
347 Derclaye 2006, at 174.
348 Derclaye 2006, at 180.
349 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of June 8, 2000, on Certain Legal Aspects of Information 
Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, Official Journal of the European Communities L 
178 (Jul. 17, 2000), 1.
350 See Association Famille de France v. SA Père-Noel.fr, SA Voyage Père-Noel.fr, Tribunale de Grande Instance de Paris, 
decision of 4 February 2003; Netwise v. NTS Computers, Rechtbank Rotterdam, 5 December 2002, in Computerrecht 2003/ 
02, at 149.
351 Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d 393; but see Specht below. 
352 Lemley 2006.
353 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y.2001). 
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However, following case law (Register.com,354 
eBay356) refuted this argument. In Register.com 
v. Verio the fact that Verio did not indicate assent 
by clicking the ‘I agree’ button was rejected. 
Moreover, in eBay, even a robot mining data 
from the eBay website was held capable of 
infringement; the judges argued that a person 
engaging an electronic agent ‘selected for making 
an authentication, performance, or agreement, 
including manifestation of assent, is bound by 
the operation of the electronic agent, even if no 
individual was aware of or reviewed the agent’s 
operations or the result of the operations’.356 The 
fact that the infringer in these two cases was a 
commercial entity, however, might have heavily 
weighed on the decision. This may suggest that 
browse-wrap licences are normally enforceable 
against professional users and not enforceable 
against private consumers.357 
Rulings by European courts on similar 
circumstances are still to come.358
3.3.1.2   The terms of the electronic licences 
No empirical study has been undertaken on the 
real impact of shrink-wrap, click-wrap or browse-
wrap licences on copyright limits. They commonly 
implement different terms and conditions, based 
on the commercialised product and the type of 
contract, and therefore they would need an analytic 
and systematic study in order to be correctly 
assessed.
However, a few commentators have analysed one, 
or a few of, these standard form contracts as a case 
study or as ‘samples’ of a growing phenomenon. 
iTunes for example has often been chosen as a 
case study.359 The choice is not without justification: 
iTunes leads the world market of music services 
unchallenged, and the terms and conditions of 
its competitors cannot but be more permissive if 
they want to gain a place in the market. However, 
iTunes as a case study presents some drawbacks. 
This service has peculiar characteristics that do 
not allow qualifying it as an ‘average’ service. It 
subjects the purchase of its products to the use of 
proprietary software, and hitherto it has obliged its 
customers to buy specific hardware (Apple iPods) 
in order to use its products.360 
354 Register.com v. Verio Inc.356 F. 3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004).
355 Ebay v. Bidders Edge 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
356 Uniform Computer Transactions Act (UCITA) §107(d), cited in Deveci 2007, at 229.
357 Lemley 2006.
358 A threatened action from the National Portrait Gallery (NPG) against Derrick Coetzee (an administrator of Wikipedia), for 
copying more than 3000 high resolution images from its database could, if brought to court, shed some light on the matter.  
The NPG argued the application of UK law, and breach of a browse-wrap contract. For more information, see http://www.
francisdavey.co.uk/2009/07/national-portrait-gallery-photographs.html and
http://www.technollama.co.uk/national-portrait-gallery-copyright-row. 
359 Gasser 2004 and Grondal 2006.
360 But currently is launching DRM-free music tracks that can be played on all devices. 
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Other services instead offer single music tracks 
or albums to download, without the use of any 
specific software, relying on terms and conditions 
accessible from the front page of the service.361 
Their products are normally compatible with most 
music players.
iTunes and the other services analysed by the 
literature commonly include in their clauses 
statements like: ‘you shall not copy, distribute, 
publish, perform, modify, download, transmit, 
transfer, sell, license, reproduce, create derivative 
works from or based upon, distribute, post, publicly 
display, frame, link, or in any other way exploit 
any of the Site Content’. The commentators that 
analysed this text found it might pose problems 
(amongst others) with some copyright limits and 
exceptions (namely fair use).362
Photographic stock services such as Corbis363 and 
Getty364 which license on line photographic material 
and footage have not been studied like iTunes. 
However, a few passages of Corbis’s terms and 
conditions, for example, seem to indicate the same 
potential for concern. Passages in Corbis’s EULA 
terms include the following:
3(c) (...) ‘The rights granted under this Paragraph 
include the right to make the Royalty-Free 
Content available to ten (10) separate 
individuals (cumulatively over the Term) for 
the sole purpose of manipulating or otherwise 
using the Royalty-Free Content to create the 
End Use according to the terms provided 
herein (‘Users’), in any and all media now 
known or hereafter devised.’ (...)
4 (...) ‘Any right, title or interest arising in any 
compilation or derivative work created using 
any Content shall not entitle You to use any 
Content except as permitted hereunder’ (...)
According to the above, royalty-free pictures 
allow a limited private copy allowance (embedded 
into the fair use doctrine). On the other hand, 
transformative works are made difficult. However, 
royalty-free pictures are often not protected by 
copyright, and therefore any usage restriction on 
them could be interpreted as an abuse. Services like 
Corbis, in fact, have been questioned by copyright 
commentators because they license images which 
have passed into the public domain.365 As with 
the other similar services mentioned in this study, 
analytical research is needed to clarify how and 
to what extent these terms of use depart from 
copyright legislation.
In conclusion, while the above case studies 
clearly suggest the potential problems caused 
to the entitlements of copyright works users by 
overreaching terms and conditions, the real extent 
of such problems needs to be carefully measured 
by systematic empirical studies before identifying 
its policy implications.
361 This is true for music services, like Amazon (http://www.amazon.com/MP3-Music-Download) and Tesco (http://direct.tesco.
com/), but not for video services which normally, like iTunes, use proprietary software. See http://www.netflix.com and http://
www.cinemanow.com.
362 Gasser 2004; Grondall 2006; Bechtold 2004.
363 http://www.corbis.org.
364 http://www.gettyimages.com/.
365 Grosheide 2001, at 324.
366 Akester 2009.
118
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 3: USER CONTRACTS
3.3.2  Libraries and educational 
institutions
Among publicly-funded institutions libraries are 
certainly the most affected by usage restrictions 
in copyright contracting. A recent empirical 
study carried out on the impact of DRM on the 
beneficiaries of copyright exceptions revealed that 
technological protection measures are not the main 
obstacle for libraries to access copyright works.366
In the course of this study, Benjamin White, the 
Publishing Licensing and Copyright Compliance 
Manager of the British Library, interviewed by 
Patricia Akester, declared that the biggest challenge 
faced by the British Library is not the technology 
but the licensing practices.  He stated: ‘Most of the 
licences imposed on the British Library are more 
restrictive than copyright law, including restrictions 
around copying such as only copy one per cent, 
copy once, only copy in the same medium or no 
wholesale copying, which prevent archiving and 
inter-library loans.’367
The British Library carried out an empirical study 
on contracts they have been proposed by the 
copyright industry.368 They examined 100 contracts 
and they found that 90% of them did not allow 
for at least one of the following: 1) Archiving; 2) 
Downloading and electronic copying; 3) Fair 
dealing; 4) Use by the visually impaired; 5) Inter-
library loan. Moreover, they found that the contracts 
did not make any reference to any exceptions from 
the UK copyright law or from another jurisdiction. 
In the conclusion of this study the British Library 
required the UK Government to take action against 
this practice of the copyright industry, in order to 
preserve the national literary heritage.369 They also 
submitted their position on copyright exceptions to 
the European Commission.370
No other empirical study on contracts with public 
libraries and university libraries has been carried 
out in the countries that this literature review 
examines. But interesting information can be 
drawn from a survey performed by the Australian 
Vice-Chancellors’ Committee (AVCC).371 This 
survey was drafted as a submission to the 
public consultation undertaken by the Australian 
Copyright Law Review Committee (CLRC), which 
has carried out the most comprehensive study to 
date on copyright and contracts.372 
The AVCC provided a number of examples of 
online licences. Many of them came from overseas 
(mostly the US), and imposed several restrictions 
on users. The Committee reports that ‘most 
contracts give universities and their staff and 
students rights which are in many respects broader 
than those allowed for by the exceptions - as you 
would expect given the subscription or licence fees 
that are paid by universities.  However, in most 
cases there will also be provisions which exclude 
or restrict uses and activities that would be allowed 
by copyright exceptions (...)’
367 Ibid at 36.
368 See http://www.bl.uk/ip/pdf/ipmatrix.pdf.
369  See the conclusion of this study on http://www.bl.uk.
370  See comments of the British Library on the Green Paper on the Infosoc Directive of 2008 at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/
markt/markt_consultations/library?.
371  The AVCC is an association of Australian universities. See http://www.universitiesaustralia.edu.au/10.
372  Available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Copyright_CopyrightLawReviewCommittee_CLRCReports_
CopyrightandContract_CopyrightandContract.
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They also provided examples of some worrisome 
restrictions:
-  restrictions on the ability of a university to 
copy, download or otherwise incorporate 
excerpts from the relevant copyright work 
into hard copy or electronic coursepacks, (...)
-  restrictions on the creation of an electronic 
reserve within a university by the copying 
or downloading of extracts from licensed 
copyright material.  Such reserves may 
carry significant advantages in terms of 
convenience of search and access for 
students, and management of resources by 
universities. (...)
-  not allowing users who have access to 
licensed copyright material to print or 
download that material to the full extent that 
they would otherwise be allowed to in the 
exercise of their fair dealing rights (...)
-  restricting the extent to which non-authorised 
users can be granted access to material or 
allowed to make copies from that material.  
Often the definition of authorised users will 
be limited to enrolled students and staff 
of the relevant university or even faculty. 
(...) Even where members of the public are 
entitled to access material, there will often 
be requirements that this is done on the 
premises of the licensed subscriber (...)
-  (…) restrictions on copying or communication 
for the purpose of inter-library loans (...) 
and on copying done on behalf of other 
universities (...)373
Also the Australian National Library, in the context 
of the same public consultation of the CLRC, 
carried out a similar study on electronic licences. 
On 218 titles of publications accessed from their 
reading room they found:
-  8 titles (3 %) where downloading was not 
permitted (...); one (...) where readers 
were not permitted to remove downloaded 
data from the library; and 82 (37%, mostly 
the Informit range of databases) where 
downloading was limited to ‘one copy of 
search output’; 
-  11 titles (5 %) that did not enable emailing 
of extracts; for some of these (the Pioneer 
Indexes) this is probably for technological 
reasons, but it is interesting to note here 
products such as the New Grove dictionary of 
music and musicians and Yearbook Australia; 
-  6 titles where printing is not permitted, 
two which allow a ‘single copy only,’ and 
three others where printing is permitted ‘for 
personal or internal use of the organisation’ 
or ‘only 1% of database material’ (...), total 11 
(5 %); 
-  26 titles (11 %) (principally newspapers 
received as part of the Electric Library 
subscription) where inter-library loan was not 
permitted; and 
-  7 titles (3 %) where reference staff were not 
permitted to use short extracts in answering 
email enquiries374
373 See the complete study at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/Clrhome.nsf/Page/F5EDCD258D62B255CA256B3B007D8616?
OpenDocument. 
374 At http://www.nla.gov.au/policy/clrcccip.html.
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The Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, 
Competition and Tax Law also participated in 
the debate on access to scientific information 
by the academic community. They submitted 
their conclusion to the EU Commission as a 
comment on the Green Paper on ‘Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy’.375 They propose to re-draft 
Article 5 of the Infosoc Directive376 so as to favour 
users and right holders on the one hand, and on 
the other hand the community of researchers, by 
distinguishing copyright exceptions on the basis of 
the category of user. In short, to address the scarce 
possibility of dissemination of scientific works, they 
propose a two-tier approach within copyright law, 
with exceptions and rules specifically designed for 
scientific research. 
In conclusion the Max Planck Institute makes 
a number of recommendations: a) Copyright 
exceptions should be based on the purpose of 
the use of the protected material; b) There should 
be no restrictions for non-commercial uses; 
c) The compensation system for right holders 
should be streamlined; d) The exceptions should 
be mandatory; e) Circumvention of copyright 
limits by contract or by technical locks should be 
sanctioned.377
Although the theoretical research and the examples 
of empiric evidence provided above do not have the 
value of a comprehensive study on the sector of the 
institutions benefitting from copyright limits, useful 
indications can be drawn concerning the problems 
that might be encountered by libraries dealing 
with electronic licensing. The research examined, 
moreover, suggests interesting questions. Although 
libraries and research institutions are professional 
users in the sense that they have the means to be 
correctly informed of their statutory rights and they 
have the bargaining power to negotiate their 
contracts at arm length, they seem to be confronted 
by the copyright industry with standard form 
contracts whose terms and conditions they have 
to accept. The reason why this happens is not 
clear from the above submissions. The licensing 
practices of the copyright industry vis-à-vis 
institutions benefitting from copyright exceptions, 
therefore, would deserve a separate study in order 
to clarify this matter.
3.3.3 Commercial users
Not all commercial users benefit from copyright 
exceptions. However, all of them benefit from 
copyright limits and exclusions (e.g. first sale, 
duration, idea-expression dichotomy). Examples 
of commercial users of protected copyright works 
are: broadcasting/ webcasting institutions (TV and 
radio), businesses related to leisure activities (e.g. 
sports clubs, dance classes, hotels or motels, 
eating and drinking establishments, night clubs, 
etc.), sound and audiovisual producers, and music 
services. 
While the latter two categories interact directly with 
the right holder for the licence of one (e.g. a song, 
some footage, or a picture) or more (up to millions 
of music tracks) copyright works, and therefore they 
are able to negotiate at arm’s length their terms and 
conditions, broadcasting organisations and leisure 
businesses pay blanket licenses to collecting 
societies. The licences vary according to the use 
the business makes of the copyright material, the 
size of the business and other factors.378 Their 
general terms and conditions, and the amount of 
the remuneration, are negotiated by the association 
of each category. There is no margin for individual 
negotiation, especially in countries in which the 
system of collecting societies is centralised.379 
375 Green Paper, Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, Brussels, COM(2008) 466/3.
376 Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society, Official Journal L 167, 22/06/2001 P. 0010 – 0019.
377 Max Planck Institute 2009 at 2.4.1.
378 See e.g. for the US Stim 2007, at 123.
379 See Ricolfi 2005. 
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However, in general, commercial users seem to 
have the chance, directly or indirectly, to negotiate 
the usage restrictions of the copyright works for 
which they purchase a licence.
Conclusion 
 
The above review of the commercialisation of 
copyright works suggests that standard form 
contracts prevail in the commercialisation of 
information goods, although no empirical research 
assessed the exact share of the adoption of such 
contracts by the different industries (software, 
music, literary works, etc). Individual users, not 
surprisingly, seem to be more affected than 
corporate bodies from overly restrictive terms 
and conditions. But the real impact of the latter 
on users’ entitlements stemming from copyright 
law and principles has not yet been systematically 
assessed. The position of public libraries and 
educational institutions is also interesting: the 
studies reported above highlight licensing terms 
inconsistent with copyright law, however none of 
them report attempts to directly negotiate different 
terms with the copyright industry.
3.4  DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONTRACT LIMITS
Freedom of contract is an established principle 
both in the EU and the US. In Europe, some 
argue it is indirectly protected by fundamental 
human rights.378 In the US, contracts enjoy rather 
extensive protection from constitutional principles. 
For example, Art. 1(10) of the Constitution forbids 
the States to pass legislation able to impair the 
Obligation of Contracts without the consent of the 
Congress.379 Moreover, the 14th Amendment has 
been interpreted by case law as protecting the 
freedom of contract.380
Both in the EU and the US most contract norms 
are default rules, which can be overridden by a 
different agreement between the parties.381 In 
general, the interpretation of contract terms by 
courts is not literal, but it is based on the presumed 
will of the parties, in view of the principle of good 
faith and of business practices.382 The fairness of 
the contract, in short, is not investigated by courts 
of law. But they do enquire into freedom of will. In 
fact, common reasons to rescind a contract, in both 
the US and the EU, are a) mistake, b) fraud, c) 
duress.383 
We need to recall, however, that the above standard 
contract rules were conceived in the 19th century, 
when most transactions were carried out at arm’s 
length by parties with equal bargaining power. This 
scenario is radically changed with the industrial 
revolution and mass production. 
378 As for example the Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention of Human Rights. See Guibault 2002, at 115.
379 Ibid, at 116.
380 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1879), at 589.
381 Guibault 2002, at 116.
382 See e.g. the French Civil Code, Artt 1154-64, and the German BGB Art. 157.
383 Guibault 2002, at 117.
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Nowadays it is common practice to offer products 
to the public accompanied by standard form 
contracts. In these contracts the seller sets the 
conditions of the agreement and proposes them to 
the purchaser for acceptance on a take-it-or-leave-
it basis. 
In order to protect consumers, as the weaker party 
of this bargain, legislators have issued a number of 
statutory limits to contracts.384 For example, unlike 
in the case of arm-length contracts, in relation to 
standard form contracts courts can enquire into the 
fairness of the terms and conditions.385 Moreover, 
contract law doctrines such as unconscionability 
and good faith are also used for consumer 
protection.
3.4.1 Unconscionability and good faith
In the US, contracts can be limited by the doctrine 
of unconscionability, stipulated by Section 2-302 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and by 
Section 111 of the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA). Under this doctrine, a 
clause is not enforceable if there is a flaw in the 
bargaining process or if the term is unfair.2 In 
general, this doctrine is more likely to be applied 
in defence of private consumers, rather than 
corporate bodies or cultural institutions. 
The latter in fact can hardly demonstrate that a 
term is ‘beyond reasonable expectations of an 
ordinary person or it causes an unfair surprise’.386 
However, according to some this doctrine can fail to 
assist copyright works users. A term contradicting 
copyright law would not be automatically declared 
unconscionable. In practice, it is argued, every 
case would be judged assessing what were the 
reasonable expectations of the purchaser in view 
of all the facts and circumstances.387 Others add 
that this doctrine is of limited use for consumers 
of copyright works, because in order to pass the 
unconscionability test a contract has to be clearly 
one-sided in favour of the owner; and contract 
overriding copyright limits would not necessarily 
appear one-sided to courts.389
384 Guibault 2002, at 118-119.
385 See the EU Directive 93/13/EEC OJ L 95/29; and for the US the UCC section 2-302, the Restatement of Contracts Section 
208 and the UCITA Section 111. Guibault 2002, at 151.
386 Guibault 2002, at 261.
387 Wilson Pharmacy Inc. v. General Computer Corp., Tennessee Ct. App. N. E2000-00733-COA-R3-CV, 2000, cited in Guibault 
2002 at 261. 
388 O’Rourke 1998, at 69.
389 De Werra 2003, at 286.
123
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 3: USER CONTRACTS
In Europe, the principle of good faith corresponds 
to the doctrine of unconscionability. In general, 
the good faith principle sets a number of rules 
of correctness to follow before and during the 
transaction. Civil Law countries all implement a 
principle of good faith in contract law, although the 
details of each national provision are different.390 
Also some common law countries reserve specific 
legal coverage to the principle of good faith. In the 
UK the Unfair Terms Regulation 1999 stipulates 
that a contract term is unenforceable if ‘contrary to 
the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’.391 Whilst another related 
act, the Unfair Contract Terms Act, does not apply 
to intellectual property matters and is therefore of 
no help392, some other principles could be helpful. 
First of all, if a clause of a contract contains a 
particularly onerous or unusual condition, the party 
seeking to enforce that condition has to show 
that it had been brought fairly and reasonably 
to the attention of the other party, otherwise the 
term does not apply.393 Secondly, the doctrine 
of undue influence could also be helpful. This 
doctrine applies when a person in a position of 
domination uses that position to obtain an unfair 
advantage for him or herself, and so influences 
the person relying on their authority or aid. It must 
be shown that there was a relationship where one 
party had a dominating influence over the other 
and the influence was used to bring a manifestly 
disadvantageous transaction. So far there is no 
decision applying this doctrine in relation to users’ 
contracts but as we have seen some case law 
exists in respect of creators’ contracts394 (see 
paper 2). 
Thirdly, the doctrine of restraint of trade could 
also be used in a few cases. As is mentioned in 
paper 2, contracts should not restrict the right of a 
person to practice their trade. In Schroeder Music 
Publishing v Macaulay395, the court held that a 
contract with an extended term with no obligation 
on the publisher to exploit the works of the creator 
was in restraint of trade. The effect of these two 
doctrines is to render the contract or else the 
clause unenforceable. However, these doctrines 
have been applied in most egregious cases and 
only in relation to creators’ contracts so that it is not 
immediately obvious that those doctrines would 
be as applicable in the field of users’ contracts. 
Indeed, few contracts will be entered into under 
undue influence (unless one could say that a party 
having a dominant position is akin to exercising 
undue influence). However, some user contracts 
may more often restrain the ability of the person to 
practise their trade. One can think of the case of a 
journalist or reviewer who relies on the criticism or 
review and/or news reporting exceptions for their 
trade. 
Their trade would be restricted if a contract overrode 
these exceptions. However, there is no literature 
on this case law which relates to its application in 
users’ contracts.
Finally, common law equity plays a remedial role in 
contract law, which can also usefully be applied to 
user contracts.  As far as we know, there is no case 
law relating specifically to users’ contracts.
390 The doctrine of good faith is different from country to country. See Musy 2000.
391 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulation (SI 1999 N. 2083), S 5(1).
392 See Schedule 1 paragraph 1(c) of the UCTA. The UCTA can be applied to terms in IP contracts but it does not apply to the 
terms that create or transfer a right or interest in intellectual property, or relate to the termination of any such right or interest, 
which are the relevant terms in most users’ contracts.
393 Interfoto Picture Library v. Stiletto Visual Programmes [1988] 2 W.L.R. 615; [1989] Q.B. 433. 
394 O’Sullivan v. Management Agency [1985] QB 428); Elton John v. James [1991] FSR 397.
395 [1974] 3 All ER 616.
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Another European doctrine impacting on contracts 
is the contra proferentem rule.396 According to this 
norm, in case of doubt, a clause of a contract is 
interpreted by courts in the sense less advantageous 
for the party that sets the clause. The rationale of 
this provision is in addition underpinned by the aim 
to protect the weakest party of a contract.397
No case law hitherto applied the principle of good 
faith or the contra proferentem rule to the interplay 
between contract and copyright limits. But the 
literature on the point highlights that the potential 
outcome of practical case law is difficult to foresee. 
Even in countries all applying the above principles 
to contracts, courts could take different stances on 
the matter. Guibault suggests that, for example, 
a contract would probably prevail on copyright 
exceptions in France, but it could have some of its 
clauses rejected as unfair in the Netherlands and 
Germany.398 
In conclusion contract law principles are of 
uncertain help in the case of users of copyright 
works restrained in their access and use of creative 
works from overreaching terms and conditions. 
However, as far as the UK is concerned, the lack 
of case law and doctrinal analysis on the issue 
probably shows another gap in the literature. It 
may be useful to consider a doctrinal study on 
the application of general English contract law to 
copyright
3.4.2  Limits to contracts set by 
Copyright law: The doctrine of 
pre-emption
As observed in Section A, in the US copyright 
limits can in principle be overridden by contract. 
However, the interplay between contract law and 
copyright law is complicated in the US by the federal 
structure of the country. Contract law is a matter for 
state legislation and copyright law falls under the 
jurisdiction of federal law. The latter, under certain 
circumstances, can preempt the former. This is the 
essence of the preemption doctrine.
Section 301(a) of the US Copyright Act399 prevents 
states from granting protection equivalent to 
copyright. Two questions need to be answered 
positively for a state law to be preempted by federal 
law. The first question is whether the subject-matter 
protected by the state law in question is eligible for 
copyright protection under sections 102 and 103 
of the Copyright Act (i.e. the state law must deal 
with a fixed work of authorship that comes within 
copyright subject-matter). The second question 
is whether the rights granted by state law are 
equivalent to the exclusive rights provided under 
section 106 of the Copyright Act 400.  
396 This principle has been codified in Art 4(6) of the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2004, available 
at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/principles2004/blackletter2004.pdf.
397 Guibault 2002, at 144.
398 Guibault 2002, at 298-299.
399 17 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.
400 See Abrams 1983, at 548-549;  and McGee 1998, at 1038.
125
Providing Government with strategic, independent and 
evidence-based advice on intellectual property policy.
STRATEGIC
ADVISORY BOARD
FOR
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
POLICY
SABIP
PAPER 3: USER CONTRACTS
This second part of the test is called the ‘extra 
element test’.401 According to the ‘extra element 
test’ a right provided by state law is equivalent to 
copyright, and therefore pre-empted by federal 
law, if it is infringed by the mere act of reproduction, 
adaptation, performance, distribution or display of 
the work.402 The legislative history of section 301 
is muddled to the point that it is impossible to 
know with certainty whether misappropriation and 
contract laws are or are not pre-empted.403 This 
has caused some difficulties to courts when having 
to apply Section 301. 
In this respect preemption is similar to the French 
unfair competition law. The latter provides that a 
fact or act distinct from infringement is necessary 
for the action against parasitism to succeed. 
Similarly, in the US, if the act in question is identical 
to copyright infringement no misappropriation 
claim is possible; as in France there must be an 
additional or different element. In other words it is 
not possible to protect an uncopyrightable work with 
the misappropriation doctrine unless the allegedly 
unlawful behaviour involves an extra element other 
than mere copying. 
A seminal case involving the tension between 
copyright limits and contract is ProCD.404 ProCD 
commercialised a telephone directory on CD-
ROM, incorporated in a database managed by 
proprietary software. The use of the software and 
of the telephone directory was limited by usage 
restrictions included in a licence agreement, which 
was prompted on the computer screen at every 
access to the product. Zeidenberg bought the 
CD, copied the directory, and published it on his 
website. 
ProCD claimed both copyright infringement and 
breach of contract. The first claim was not upheld 
(in relation to the directory listing) for lack of 
originality. The second claim, on the contrary, was 
upheld, although Zeidenberg claimed that he did 
not have the possibility of reading the terms of the 
licence.405 
In the ProCD case, Judge Easterbrook rejected the 
preemption of the licence under Section 301.  He 
reasoned that a simple two-party contract is not 
‘equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the 
general scope of copyright’ and therefore may be 
enforced.406 
401 For an in-depth analysis of the test see De Werra 2003, at 264.
402 17 U.S.C. §106; Computer Associates Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, at 716 (2d Cir. 1992); Guibault 2002, p. 231.
403 For an explanation regarding misappropriation see Ginsburg 1992, p. 356-357. For an explanation regarding contracts, see 
Guibault 2002, p. 232.   
404 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 86 F. 3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). See also Madison 1998.
405 For a detailed analysis of the ProCD case and its impact on the interplay between copyright and contract see De Werra 2003, 
at 255-263.
406 ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d at 1455.
407 See e.g; Guibault 2002, Elkin Koren 1997, De Werra 2003. 
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The case had wide coverage from copyright 
scholars arguing either in favour of or against 
Easterbrook’s construct.407 Moreover, US 
e-commerce legislation (the UCITA) following 
the ProCD case was underpinned by the same 
reasoning that inspired Judge Easterbrook.408 The 
drafters of the UCITA specified that the preemption 
doctrine would ‘seldom apply to contracts’. In sum, 
the reasoning in both case law and legislation 
was essentially the following: federal copyright 
law cannot normally preempt state contract law 
because contracts are simply not equivalent to 
copyright.409 And this reasoning was resumed also 
in subsequent case law.410 
A previous ruling to ProCD, however, had expressed 
the opposite view. In the Vault case,411 Vault 
manufactured a diskette with a copy protection 
device. Quaid circumvented the copy protection 
device, to be able to copy the content of the diskette. 
He also studied the protection system, so when 
Vault upgraded his product, Quaid was ready with 
a new work-around. The court in Vault upheld the 
prevalence of federal copyright law over state law. 
Under the law of the state in question (the Licence 
Act of Louisiana) the unauthorised reproduction 
of protected material is not permitted. The federal 
Copyright Act, on the other hand, allows archival 
copies and copies which are an essential step in 
the utilisation of a computer program. Moreover, in 
Vault it was argued that the Louisiana Licence Act 
grants unlimited protection to copyright material, 
while the federal Copyright Act grants a protection 
which has limits in terms of duration and originality. 
In conclusion, although the court did not expressly 
mention the preemption doctrine, Vault’s claims 
were rejected.
In Bowers which followed the ProCD ruling, Justice 
Ryk dissented, recalling the reasoning in Vault. He 
argued that only when a contract is negotiated at 
arm’s length is the extra element fulfilled and the 
preemption is barred.412 According to him, Bowers 
is different from ProCD because Baystate needed 
to reproduce part of the program to benefit from the 
fair use exemption. State law prohibiting reverse 
engineering contrasts with federal law allowing 
it, and therefore the latter should preempt the 
former.413
408 The same aim that inspired the outcome of ProCD, that is not stifling online commerce, also inspired the US Government, 
which added an Article 2B to the Uniform Commercial Code, upholding electronic licenses once and for all. This Article was 
the object of extensive debate among copyright commentators, and eventually entered the Uniform Computer Information 
Transactions Act (UCITA), which was also greatly criticised.  See Cohen1998, Ginsburg 1998, Samuelson 1999, Litman 
1998, Nimmer 1998, Dam 1999. For a summary of many of these positions see Samuelson 1999. The UCITA however was 
adopted in only two states of the US (Virginia and Maryland), and other states enacted specific legislation (BOMBSHIELD) to 
avoid the possibility that the UCITA could be applied on their territory via contractual clauses of ‘choice of forum.’ See http://
www.ucita.com/.
409 Guibault 2002, at 233.
410 Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 29 Jan 2003, 320 F.3d 1317 (the federal Copyright Act did not preempt the prohibition 
of reverse engineering embodied in Bower’s shrink-wrap license).
411 Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
412 Bowers, at 1337.
413 Ibid, at 1338.
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In conclusion, while cases like Vault may suggest 
that contracts cannot override copyright limits, 
cases like ProCD, which is still cited in subsequent 
case law, indicates the opposite.
It is unclear whether adhesion contracts, which 
provide right holders with even more protection 
than negotiated contracts, are pre-empted under 
section 301 of the Copyright Act.414 In line with 
the reasoning of Justice Ryk who dissented in 
Bowers415, some argue that the preemption doctrine 
applies specifically to standard form contracts, and 
does not apply to arm-length contracts, because 
only the former offers a protection to right holders 
that is equivalent to statute. In short, they think 
that the private ordering provided by standard 
form contracts equates with copyright law, and 
therefore is preempted by federal law according to 
the second step of the preemption test.416 In sum, 
courts seem to be divided on this issue, which 
makes contract law rather unreliable as a tool to 
override copyright limits.417
 
However, the preemption doctrine is not limited 
to the interface between state law and federal 
copyright law. Even if a State cause of action based 
on misappropriation or contract survives section 
301 preemption, it can still be preempted on the 
basis of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 
(art. VI §2 418). Under this clause, a cause of action 
may be preempted if its enforcement would ‘stand 
as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress’.419 In the 
Feist case, the last precedent on the point, the 
Supreme Court seemed adamant that certain 
unfair competition claims survive to protect sweat 
of the brow efforts.420 However, it is unclear under 
which conditions such claims would survive 
preemption.421 In sum, in the absence of a ruling 
of the Supreme Court on this issue, the law on this 
matter is uncertain. The constitutional preemption 
will be discussed below, in the subsection dedicated 
to constitutional limits to contract.
414 Derclaye 2006, at 183.
415 Ibid, at 1337.
416 Karjala 1997.
417 De Werra 2003 at 272.
418 Derclaye 2008, citing Djavaherian 1998, at 88-90. The Clause states: ‘This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the 
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in 
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.’ In ProCD the court did not analyse the issue. If the 
analysis in Vault had been applied to ProCD’s facts, the licence may well have been pre-empted under the Supremacy 
Clause. Guibault 2002, at 235 citing Nimmer, Brown and Frishling 1999, at 63; Karjala 1997, at 540. This is because ProCD 
was restricting the use of facts that both the Supreme Court (in the Feist case) and Congress (in the Copyright Act) decided 
to leave unprotected.
419 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 479 (1974). 
420 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991), citing Nimmer, § 3.04, at 3-23: ‘Protection for 
the fruits of such research [‘sweat of the brow’-type research] … may in certain circumstances be available under a theory 
of unfair competition’. 
421 Hovarth 1998, at 479 and Fujichaku 1998, at 467 nevertheless believe this reference in Feist implied that misappropriation 
is not pre-empted by the Copyright Act. 
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In Europe, the relationship between Community 
law and national law is clearer. EU law prevails 
over national law.422 Thus, national legislation 
overriding imperative copyright exceptions set by 
EU law423 is not applicable, and clauses protected 
by such national law should be declared null 
and void. Cases such as ProCD therefore would 
be resolved by competition law legislation, or 
the legislation protecting the sui generis right of 
database producers.424 Regrettably, no such cases 
have yet been decided by European courts. 
A threatened litigation between the National Portrait 
Gallery of London (NPG) and Derrik Coetzee (a 
Wikipedia administrator) has the potential to shed 
some light on the matter. The NPG threatened to 
sue Coetzee for database right violation, copyright 
violation, circumvention of TPMs, and breach of 
contract (a browse-wrap licence), because he 
copied more than 3000 images from the NPG 
website and published them in Wikipedia.425 The 
images are photographs of paintings that are no 
longer covered by copyright protection.
If the UK law applies (Wikipedia is based in the 
US), and if the photographs are found unprotected 
by copyright, a ruling could finally clarify a) whether 
browse-wrap licences are enforceable, and b) 
whether a contractual clause that forbids the 
reproduction of a public domain work is unlawful 
because it overrides copyright limits.426
3.4.3  The doctrines of misuse and 
abuse of rights
Stemming from US intellectual property principles, 
the doctrine of misuse of copyright is another 
instrument to be possibly employed which can 
be used to limit contractual clauses attempting 
to expand copyright protection. Under copyright 
misuse doctrine, practices which preclude others 
from developing and creating new works under 
pretext of copyright protection are abusive. 
Copyright misuse does not give the victim of 
misuse a right (and therefore it does not give 
them standing in a legal action) but only a defence 
against copyright infringement. During the period 
copyright is misused, the exclusive rights of the 
owner are suspended, thus excusing the acts of 
infringement.427 This doctrine is mostly used in 
connection with antitrust claims, or it is considered 
together with claims of an economic nature.428 It 
is therefore more likely to be employed between 
commercial entities rather than in favour of a 
private consumer. 
422 See Costa v. ENEL Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585, 593.
423 For example the exceptions stipulated by the Software directive and the Database Directive.
424 As the EU Database Directive. This point is argued by De Werra 2003, at 263.
425 A global online encyclopedia built up with voluntary contributions by users. http://www.wikipedia.org.
426 However, this second point has not yet been addressed by the letters of the respective counsels. See the terms of the debate 
and the letters of NPG and Coezee counsels at http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User:Dcoetzee/NPG_legal_threat.
427 Bell 2007, at 578.
428 Guibault 2002, at 286. De Werra 2003, at 278.
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The doctrine of misuse of Intellectual Property 
Rights is not stipulated by statutes. It was first 
articulated in Morton Salt Co,429 and then in 
Lasercomb.430 In the latter it was declared ‘[t]
he question is not whether the copyright is being 
used in a manner violative of antitrust law . . . but 
whether the copyright is being used in a manner 
violative of the public policy embodied in the grant 
of a copyright.’431 In other words, when copyright 
is used in a way to run afoul of the public policy 
rationale under which copyright is protected, there 
is a copyright misuse.
In most countries in continental Europe, the 
doctrine of abuse of right corresponds to the 
American doctrine of misuse. Abuse of right can be 
caused by: a) fault, when a person does not adopt 
a reasonable and prudent behaviour;432 b) intention 
to harm;433 and c) exercise of the right for a different 
purpose from that for which it was conferred.434 
According to Guibault this last occurrence shares 
with its American counterpart the underpinning on 
which it is based: the protection of public policy. It 
is in the interest of the community, in essence, that 
the rights granted by law are used coherently with 
the purpose for which they were conceded.435
Guibault argues that, given the public interest 
function of copyright, clauses violating statutory 
copyright law or fundamental copyright exceptions, 
like the exception for parody, for example, would be 
abusive under the misuse doctrine.436 But clauses 
that do not impede innovation and creation, as for 
example the exception for copying from libraries 
and similar institutions, would not be considered 
a misuse. A fortiori the same would apply for 
copyright exceptions justified by the elimination 
of transaction costs.437 Guibault concludes that in 
practice in the US the copyright misuse doctrine is 
rarely applied to protect copyright users. Moreover, 
in Europe it would not be possible to resort to the 
doctrine of abuse of right in circumstances that in 
the US would allow protection under the misuse 
doctrine. This makes these doctrines of limited 
utility overall.438
A few commentators reflecting on the copyright 
misuse doctrine have argued in favour of its 
application to cases of contracts overriding 
copyright limits (arguments based on fair use).439 
429 Morton Salt Co. v. Suppinger Co. 314 U.S. 488(1942). Guibault 2002, at 191.
430 Lasercomb America. Inc. v. Reynolds. 9ll F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. l990). Guibault 2002, at 192.
431 Lasercomb, at 978.
432 Guibault 2002, at 186.
433 Ibid.
434 Ibid, at 187.
435 Guibault 2002, at 192.
436 Lasercomb America, Inc. v Reynolds, 911 F.2d. 970 (4th Cir. 1990), at p 978, cited in Guibault Ibid.
437 Guibault 2002, at 285-286.
438 Guibault 2002, at 194.
439 Bell 2007 in footnote n.10, citing Judge 2004 (arguing that any attempt to use copyright to gain control over an idea or to 
deter fair use should constitute misuse and that courts should discourage copyright misuse by denying equitable relief), 
Knight 2006 (proposing that courts follow a multi-factor balancing test to invalidate copyright licenses that facilitate misuse), 
Pallas Loren 2004  (proposing that ‘if a shrink-wrap or click-wrap clause purports to limit activity that a majority of courts have 
found to be fair use, that clause should also trigger a presumption of misuse’). 
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Some have also called for a modification of copyright 
statutes to introduce a formal copyright misuse 
doctrine that can be used against overreaching 
contracts.440 Thomas Bell went a step further by 
wording a new prospective article in the US UCC 
that codifies the doctrine of copyright misuse in 
the sense of outlawing contracts that limit non-
infringing uses.441 Importantly, in his case law review 
on the copyright misuse doctrine he admits that 
current case law (wrongly, in his opinion) applies 
the misuse doctrine only in cases of copyright 
infringement, and not against contracts.442
In conclusion, on the one hand the preemption 
doctrine, which is characteristic of the US system, 
is unreliable as a tool to defend users of copyright 
works against overreaching contracts. On the other 
hand, while commentators on the misuse doctrine 
call for its modification in order to use it against 
terms and conditions overriding copyright limits (or 
at least the most fundamental among them), they 
also admit that current statutes and case law do 
not suggest the possibility to use such doctrine in 
this sense.
3.4.4  Other limits to contracts: Public 
policy
Public policy considerations can also limit freedom 
of contract both in the US and in the EU. In Europe, 
private agreements are required to respect the 
ordre public and the good morals,443 while in the 
US contracts cannot run afoul of public policy.444
 
According to a classification operated by Guibault, 
public policy considerations can be divided into 
two categories: a) economic public order and b) 
protective public order. The first produces norms 
of competition law (rules of antitrust in the US, and 
rules of fair competition in the EU); the second 
creates norms of consumer protection.
In relation to competition law, Lucie Guibault 
analysed Article 81 (ex Art. 85 and 86) of the EC 
Treaty and title 15 §1-7 of the US Sherman Act, 
which address respectively the abuse of dominant 
position in the market and the acquisition or 
maintenance of monopolistic positions. In both 
cases the condition for any of the two violations to 
exist is to have acted ‘with improper means’. 
The survey of case law she carried out 
demonstrates that in practice it is very difficult 
to prove the unlawful behaviour.445 Competition 
law therefore can be of limited utility if a contract 
overrides one or more copyright limits. Moreover, 
it is more likely to be used in relation to functional 
works (like patents) rather than copyright because 
of the support to innovation that underscores 
competition law and antitrust policies.446 However, 
the music and film industry probably represent 
an exception, where the concentration of market 
power in the hands of few companies can often 
raise competition issues.447
440 Bell 2007, at 575. citing Judge 2004 at 937.
441 Ibid, at 573.
442 Bell 2007, at 579.
443 See French Civil Code art. 6, and German Civil Code Art. 138.
444 See Restatement of Contracts, Art. 178(1).
445 Guibault 2002, at 294.
446 De Werra 2003, at 287.
447 De Werra 2003, at 288.
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In the US, the essential facilities doctrine has 
been examined as a potential instrument to limit 
overreaching contracts. The doctrine of essential 
facilities requires: a) the possession of an essential 
facility by a monopolist, b) the impossibility for the 
competitor to access such facility, c) the denial of a 
licence by the owner, d) and the viability of practical 
access to the facility. 
In the famous antitrust case against Microsoft,448 
which was considered by copyright literature as 
a perfect opportunity for the application of the 
essential facilities doctrine,449 this doctrine was 
not applied. It is true that Microsoft was obliged to 
disclose features of its products to its competitors, 
but only under section 2 of the Sherman Act (abuse 
of dominant position). This clearly shows the 
difficulty of applying such doctrine to the interplay 
between copyright and contracts. 
De Werra argues that, albeit useful to regulate 
abusive behaviours based on copyright protection, 
antitrust law alone cannot be relied upon to 
protect the interests of copyright users. Public 
policy as a limit to contracts overriding copyright 
limits can be difficult to apply. He warns that the 
legislation embodying public policy, which cannot 
be overridden by private agreement, has to be 
‘crystal clear’; and this is not necessarily easy in 
the copyright field, where fundamental concepts 
like fair use and the idea-expression dichotomy 
are defined by courts and not by law.450 Copyright 
law and antitrust law, he concludes, should both 
be used to stem overreaching behaviours of those 
implementing technical protection measures and 
contracts.451
3.4.5 Consumer protection
In the EU a limit to national contract law resides 
in national and supranational consumer protection 
legislation. The EU Directives providing for 
consumer contractual rights are:  
• Directive 85/577/EEC on Contracts 
Negotiated Away from Business Premises;  
• Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts (Unfair Terms 
Directive); 
• Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of 
consumers in respect of Distance Contracts 
(Distance Contracts Directive); 
• Directive 1999/44/EC on Certain Aspects of 
the Sale of Consumer Goods and Associated 
Guarantees;
• Directive 2000/31/EC Directive on Electronic 
Commerce (E-commerce Directive).
They generally set duties of correct behaviour 
for the seller of products, either commercialised 
online or through traditional means. A few of 
their provisions may also apply to consumers of 
copyright works.
According to Article 4 of the Distance Contracts 
Directive, for example, right holders should 
disclose to the purchaser ‘the main characteristics 
of goods and services’. When implementing TPMs 
on copyright works, therefore, the owner has the 
duty to inform the end-user preliminarily.452 
448 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999).
449 See O’Rourke 1995, at 546-548 and De Werra 2003, at 290-291.
450 De Werra 2003, at 280.
451 De Werra 2003, at 293.
452 See Helberger and Guibault 2005, at 12. See also the OECD 2006 report on disclosure of this information on DRM regarding 
digital copyright works.
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Moreover, to those digital copyright works that are 
considered goods (the statutes seem to suggest 
that on-demand downloadable works are services) 
the same directive stipulates, in Article 6(1), a right 
of withdrawal from the purchase, without penalty 
or justification. However, Article 6(3) excludes from 
its scope audio/video recordings and computer 
software. 
The Unfair Terms Directive of 1993 outlaws 
contracts contrary to good faith, and lists a 
number of unfair clauses as an example. However, 
the overridability of copyright exceptions is not 
mentioned in the list, and it is therefore unclear 
whether a similar clause would be considered 
contrary to good faith by courts.453 
It is worth noting that the above-mentioned 
directives on e-commerce and unfair terms are in 
the process of being modified by the Consumer 
Rights Directive, whose proposal was launched in 
2008.454 The proposal, among other things, replaces 
the indicative list of unfair terms with a black list of 
mandatory unfair terms and a grey list of presumed 
unfair terms. Neither of them, however, states that 
terms contrary to statutory law are unfair.455  
In the UK, consumer protection is covered by 
specific legislation, also implementing the above 
EU directives:
- Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977
- Sale of Goods Act 1979
- Consumer Protection Act 1987 
- Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999
- Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) 
Regulations 2000
- Electronic Commerce Regulations 2002
The Unfair Terms Regulation 1999 stipulates that 
a contract term is unenforceable if ‘contrary to the 
requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’.456 This provision of 
consumer law has been identified by copyright 
doctrine as the only one applicable to copyright 
users.457 
In the US, Section 2-302 of the UCC (later Section 
111 of the UCITA) serves a comparable function by 
applying the unconscionability doctrine to consumer 
protection. As noted in the previous section, the 
US unconscionability doctrine seems to be more 
restrictive than the European good faith doctrine, 
and both appear to have a limited utility for the 
protection of consumers of copyright material.458 
Consumer protection therefore does not seem to 
add a particular protection to users of copyright 
works beyond the already examined contract law 
doctrines. Specific legislation on consumers is 
rarely applicable to consumers of copyright works. 
In fact, copyright literature from both the EU and 
the US criticises consumer legislation in that it 
does not take into account the peculiarity of the 
consumers of copyright information.459 
453 Helberger and Guibault 2005, at 14.
454 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on consumer rights, Brussels, 8.10.2008 COM(2008) 
614 final.
455 Ibid.
456 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulation (SI 1999 N. 2083), S 5(1).
457 Helberger and Guibault 2005, at 14.
458 Guibault 2002, at 261.
459 For the US see for example Elkin Koren 2007, arguing that the DMCA and consumer legislation should take into account 
the peculiar nature of the consumer of information goods. The point is similarly stated by Benkler 2000b. For Europe see 
Guibault 2002, who seems sceptical on the ability of consumer legislation to protect copyright users. However, according to 
other commentators, consumer law, if correctly interpreted, has the potential to offer some protection. Mazziotti 2008, at 132.
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3.4.6 Constitutional limits to contracts
Constitutional principles and human rights have 
been examined by Lucie Guibault as applicable 
to private relationships, and therefore liable to 
have an impact on copyright user protection 
against abusive contract terms.460 Preliminarily she 
addressed the issue of the vertical or horizontal 
application of constitutional principles. 
Constitutional principles are traditionally invoked to 
protect citizens against the State (vertical action), 
but more recently they have been used to protect 
citizens against other citizens (horizontal action). 
The horizontal action can be direct (when a citizen 
brings to court another citizen for the breach of a 
constitutional principle) or indirect (when a citizen 
acts against the State to obtain the application of 
a constitutional principle within a private litigation). 
In Europe the direct horizontal action of the 
constitutional principles is not obvious. The indirect 
action is mostly recognised, however.461 According 
to Guibault this is confirmed by European literature 
and by the case law of the European Court of 
Human Rights.462 
In the US, the Bill of Rights protects citizens only 
against the State. As a general principle, in fact, the 
US Government tends not to intrude into private 
relationships. Therefore the real responsibility of 
the State in a case of violation of constitutional 
principles by a private citizen needs to be 
ascertained case by case.463 However, the issue 
of the direct application of the Constitution among 
citizens needs to take into account the possibility 
that a person can waive their constitutional rights. 
In Europe this is not possible. Only contractual 
arrangements that do not affect the essential 
content of constitutional rights are allowed. In the 
US, on the contrary, the waiver of constitutional 
principles is allowed, to enable self-governance. 
But in the case of waiver of fundamental rights the 
courts subject the validity of the assent to a strict 
scrutiny.464
In the US, constitutional principles on copyright, 
including the fundamental justification for copyright 
protection and freedom of expression (underpinning 
some instances of fair use) can be used to limit 
contracts on the basis of the Supremacy Clause 
preemption. 
Patterson and Lindberg, for example, maintain that 
copyright has been invented firstly and mainly to 
enhance the learning process of the community 
at large.465 Copyright does so by promoting the 
circulation of culture and the transmission of 
knowledge. 
460 Guibault 2002, at 152-175.
461 Guibault reports that in France there are two opposed doctrines on the direct horizontal working of constitutional rights, while 
in Germany the horizontal working is confirmed by Article 1 of the Constitution. Moreover the case law mostly recognises the 
indirect horizontal working. See Ibid. 
462  According to Guibault the case law of the ECHR points to an indirect application of constitutional rights to private relationships. 
See Ibid.
463 Guibault 2002, at 295.
464 Guibault 173-184.
465 Patterson and Lindberg 1991.
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Neil Netanel466 claims that copyright is a direct 
vehicle of democracy, by boosting exchange of 
ideas and communication of thoughts. All these 
authors maintain that if copyright law were applied 
by courts in such a way as to uphold and guarantee 
these fundamental copyright underpinnings, the 
balance between owners and users would be 
achieved.467 
Guibault argues on this basis that she would 
expect a contract clause overturning copyright 
fundamental principles, founded on freedom of 
expression and the diffusion of culture, to be held 
null and void.468 But the real potential and scope 
of the constitutional preemption is unclear, and 
the outcome of case law addressing the above 
issues would be uncertain both in Europe and 
in the US.469 In practice, examining case law on 
freedom of expression, Guibault concludes that 
the courts decide on the basis of whether the 
restriction imposed by the owner is content-based 
or content-neutral.470 Content-based restrictions 
are very difficult to enforce because more obviously 
in breach of freedom of expression. In contrast 
content-neutral clauses are upheld if they satisfy a 
‘substantial governmental interest.’471
Finally some commentators argue that, just like 
federal preemption, constitutional preemption also 
applies only to standard form contracts.472 But 
there is no case law confirming such a construct. 
In the case Goldstein v. California the Supreme 
Court held that states cannot use their legislation 
‘to protect that which Congress intended to be free 
and free that which Congress had protected.’ But 
the case at hand refers to state legislation directly, 
and not to a contract.473
Conclusion
The above suggests that limiting contracts to 
protect the interests of copyright users can hardly 
be done effectively outside copyright legislation.474
466 Netanel 1996. 
467 For an analysis of the solution to overreaching contracts through an interpretation of contract law in the light of copyright law 
itself see Derclaye 2006, at 188-211. The author argues, in essence, that a correct interpretation of existing copyright law 
and case law would provide an answer to the question of the overridability by contract of copyright exceptions
468 Guibault 2002 at 270.
469 Ibid.
470 See Netanel 2005. In the case of content-based restrictions, copyright legislation (including both exclusive rights and 
exceptions) impacts on works whose content is the reason why the rights are claimed. This normally occurs in cases where 
parody or criticism is called into play. In this case, Netanel argues, the scrutiny in the light of freedom of expression has to be 
strict. This means that freedom of expression can be identified also beyond the boundaries of copyright limits. In the case of 
content-neutral restrictions, copyright entitlements are claimed irrespective of the content of the work. One example could be 
the exception for private copying. In the case of content-neutral claims, Netanel claims it is not necessarily ‘a strict scrutiny’ 
on compliance with freedom of expression. This means that in this second case copyright exceptions have to be interpreted 
narrowly; i.e. their construct should not go beyond their boundaries. Strowel and Tulkens add that all issues regarding 
access are content-neutral, therefore they only require an intermediate scrutiny. This means that the in-built safety valves of 
copyright provide enough scrutiny for freedom of expression. See Strowel and Tulkens 2005.
471 Guibault 2002, at 296.
472 Karjala 1997, at 540 and De Werra 2003, at 271.
473 De Werra 2003, at 272.
474 Derclaye 2006.
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The InfoSoc Directive may be modified as a result 
of consultations following the Green Paper on 
‘Copyright in the Knowledge Economy’475 and the 
moment is timely to introduce some provisions 
that would guarantee such results. Some of the 
questions in the Green Paper include: Should there 
be encouragement or guidelines for contractual 
arrangements between right holders and users 
for the implementation of copyright exceptions? 
Should some limits be made imperative?
Many academics and institutions have responded 
by suggesting the introduction of new provisions 
which would at least protect fundamental copyright 
limits from contracts and TPMs.476 It remains to be 
seen to what extent the EU legislature will listen to 
the calls from the above commentators.
Hitherto we have analysed the interplay between 
contracts and copyright exceptions. However, 
it is worth noting that electronic licences are 
typically directed towards millions of end-users 
who are very difficult to track down and to bring 
to justice in case of infringement. The difficulty in 
enforcing electronic licences would limit in practice 
the threat posed by contracts to copyright limits. 
However, the implementation of technological 
protection measures has provided unprecedented 
possibilities for effective self-enforcement.
3.5  DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT 
(DRM), AND THE ENFORCEMENT 
OF CONTRACTS
3.5.1 The dangers of digital lock-up
DRM consists of licensing agreements and 
technological protection measures (TPMs) which 
set access and usage restrictions on information 
works. DRM reduces dramatically the costs of 
negotiation between owners and users of copyright 
works, and the costs of enforcement of copyright 
law (transaction costs). Often the acronyms DRM 
and TPM are used interchangeably, to indicate 
the latter. This is because the technological part 
of DRM (i.e. the TPM), by self-enforcing – in other 
words unilaterally as opposed to bilaterally as with 
contracts - the rules of the contract, raises the 
most significant issues in terms of copyright users’ 
protection.
With the advent of the digital era, where the 
reproduction of copyright works is easy and perfect, 
many legal commentators envisaged scenarios of 
substantial change in copyright legislation. Most of 
them foresaw an increase in copyright protection, in 
line with the trend of the last decades.477 Opposite 
positions, forecasting a reduction in copyright 
protection, are rather isolated.478
475 Green Paper: Copyright in the Knowledge Economy, Brussels, COM(2008) 466/3.
476 See the Comments to the Green Paper at http://circa.europa.eu/Public/irc/markt/markt_consultations/library?l=/copyright_
neighbouring/legislation_copyright&vm=detailed&sb=Title. In particular, see the comments from the IViR center in 
Amsterdam, the MaxPlank Institute in Munich, and the British Library.
477 Minassian 1997, at 21. He states that the diffusion of shrink-wrap licensing in the computer software field will lead to the end 
of copyright regulations, at least for digital goods, which will be more and more contract-based.
478 Martin Kretschmer, for example, hypothesised a radical subversion of copyright law within a generation. He argues that 
the current legislation (American, European and international) is counterproductive and ineffective because it hinders the 
diffusion of culture and information, whereas it should enhance it – and indeed repeatedly claims this in its declaration of 
intents. The author puts forward his vision: ‘Within a generation […] copyright laws will change, so as to be unrecognisable. 
There will be a short burst of exclusivity, encouraging fast exploitation, followed by a remuneration right for the lifetime of the 
creator. Criminal law will retreat to the traditional domain of unauthorised or deceptive commercial exploitation. As we reflect, 
digital copyright at the turn of the millennium will have marked the end of an era’. See Kretschmer 2003, at 341.
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Some commentators salute new technologies 
such as DRM as the way to fix the imperfections of 
the market (market failures), which are worsened 
by the digital environment. Therefore, for some 
commentators the expansion of copyright through 
the protection of DRM represents the way ahead.479
At the opposite end of the spectrum there are other 
copyright commentators who fear that DRM and the 
protection of DRM are damaging users’ traditional 
rights. They argue that this trend is dangerous for 
the public interest, because it dispels traditional 
allowances for the public to access copyright 
works.480 Some of them advocate radical changes 
to copyright law in order to resist this trend.481 For 
example, self-enforcing tools should be provided 
to the user as they have been provided to the 
owner.482 Others argue that a simple transposition 
of the traditional copyright principles to the digital 
environment could be sufficient. This in practice 
would need to ensure that the same balance of 
rights and exceptions guaranteed by copyright law 
is re-created in the digital world.483 
Against the detractors of DRM it has been argued 
that the technology in itself is neutral, and the use 
or misuse of it is the only circumstance liable to 
create problems with copyright law. The study 
of Patricia Akester mentioned in Section 3 has 
revealed that DRM developers are able to fine-
tune the technology to meet the needs of the 
users.484 But they do not fine-tune it, because 
they are not asked to do so by the owner. On the 
contrary, sometimes users’ allowances created 
by some DRM developers are not utilised. For 
example, researchers investigating the respect 
of the exception for disabled people (namely 
visually impaired people) have found that technical 
allowances implemented on digital products for the 
benefit of disabled people are deactivated upon 
request of right holders. They state:
Microsoft and Adobe, which have 
implemented the use of TTS [text-to-speech 
synthesizer] in their eBook reading systems, 
have heard from publishers that the audio 
rights to their eBooks may have been sold.  
Therefore a feature has been added that 
allows the use of TTS to be turned off.  This 
means that at the time of creation a decision 
can be made by the publisher to disable the 
use of TTS for this particular eBook.485
479 Among these, self-declared copyright optimist Paul Goldstein. See Goldstein 1996, at 236. See also Bell 1998, at 580. 
480 Patterson and Lindberg 1991; Netanel 2001. 
481 Hugenholtz 1996, at 99; and Geller 1994, arguing that in the digital environment it would not be enough to adapt old 
principles. We need a radical revision of copyright.
482 Reichman et al. 2007. Heide 2003.
483 Netanel 2001, at 289-290. See also Dreier 2005. 
484 See also Turnbull and Marks 2000, reaching the same conclusion.
485 See Kerscher and Fruchterman 2002. On the same topic see Bechtold 3003, at II.3.
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Technology therefore does not seem to be the main 
problem.486 Rather, the use that copyright owners 
make of the technology on their products can 
raise concerns. Some have suggested that such 
overreaching behaviour is allowed by law, and in 
particular, by the InfoSoc Directive in Europe and 
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 
the US.  This legislation seems to have created 
an expanded copyright protection in the digital 
environment, allowing right holders to control every 
use and access of copyright works. All in all, they 
argue, a new right has been created for the owner: 
a ‘right of access’.487
Also in Europe the copyright literature has detected 
in the last decades an expansion of the prerogatives 
of copyright owners, which in practice gives birth 
to an enhanced access control on copyright 
works. They argue that, broadly interpreted, the 
reproduction right488 and the communication 
right,489 as drafted in the InfoSoc Directive, can 
grant access-control prerogatives to copyright 
owners. However, a narrow  interpretation of these 
exclusive rights, which in the view of the same 
literature is the correct one, would outlaw only 
infringing reproduction and communication to the 
public, and would not unduly expand the privilege 
of the owner.490
 
Other commentators argue that access privileges 
are guaranteed by the anti-circumvention 
provisions of the InfoSoc Directive,491 and are de 
facto empowered by TPMs.492 For some this is a 
natural effect of the transition from the analogue to 
the digital world,493 while for others this transition 
unduly creates new privileges.494 Also these 
authors agree that TPMs should not expand the 
exclusive rights of the owner, and they should 
respect copyright limits.495
However, concerns of legal commentators picturing 
an evolution of DRM towards technical standards496 
that do not take into account the entitlements of 
the user is somewhat contradicted by some recent 
trends in the music industry. Recently, music 
service providers are offering their products DRM-
free. Initially, these DRM-free business models 
only interested music supplied by independent 
labels.497 
486 Bechtold 2003, who states that DRM is an instrument sufficiently flexible to adapt to the new digital environment; contra, see 
Burk 2005. See also Dam 1999, claiming that this is an ideal instrument to ensure copyright compliance and more efficiency 
in protecting copyright in the digital environment.
487 Vaidhyanathan 2001, at 160.  See also generally Lessig 1999.
488 Dusollier 2005b; Westkamp 2004.
489 Dusollier 2000, Heide 2001, Westkamp 2004.
490 Dusollier 2005b, at 202; Westkamp 2004, at 1098 and 1103; Dusollier 2000, at 39; Heide 2001, at 368.
491 The provision that forbids the circumvention of TPMs is Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive. See Koelman 2000, at 276.
492 Dusollier 2005a, at 109
493 See generally Ginsburg 2000 and 2003.
494 Heide 2001, at 378-379.
495 Ginsburg 2003, at 131;  Heide 2001, at 381-382.
496 Burk 2005.
497 See the case of eMusic at http://www.emusic.com.
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Currently, also the major music labels (the first was 
EMI498) have agreed to license DRM-free products 
for mass distribution. Nowadays several music 
services offer either their whole catalogue in DRM-
free version499 or they price-differentiate DRM-free 
products and DRM-protected ones.500
This DRM-free feature, however, seems to be 
limited to interoperability. This means that the 
above DRM-free products can be played on 
different rendering devices. But some of them 
(e.g. the iTunes files) can still be copied only on a 
limited number of hardware devices. These usage 
restrictions, set in the licensing agreement,501 are 
likely still to be guaranteed by the implementation 
of TPMs.  Empirical data on this issue are missing, 
but further research on these new DRM-free 
business models could be able to shed some 
light on many issues. First, it could determine to 
what extent the possibility of enforcing licensing 
agreements has changed with the introduction of 
DRM-free products, and what the impact of this 
new trend on owners and users is. Second, it could 
clarify whether fine-tuning rather than eliminating 
DRM systems could meet the needs of users of 
copyright works, as has been suggested by some 
theoretical research.502
3.5.2  Remedies for users against 
‘unfair’ DRM
Remedies available for beneficiaries of copyright 
exceptions in case of DRM impeding permitted 
acts are different, both between the US and the 
EU and within the EU. The reason for this latter 
difference is that the EU legislation on this matter 
did not take a clear position, and left ample leeway 
to Member States. 
In fact the InfoSoc Directive in Article 6(4) enjoins 
right holders to take ‘voluntary measures’ in order 
to comply with a selected number of copyright 
exceptions. Failure to do so, according to the 
directive, should lead Member States to take 
‘appropriate measures’ to make sure that right 
holders comply with the listed copyright exceptions. 
Further clarification of both ‘appropriate measures’ 
and ‘voluntary measures’ is provided by Recital 51 of 
the InfoSoc Directive. On ‘voluntary measures’ the 
Recital offers the example of agreements between 
right holders and other parties concerned,503 
clearly showing its preference for self-regulation. 
If self-regulation fails, Member States have to take 
‘appropriate measures’, which are also specified 
in Recital 51, and which can involve ‘modifying 
an implemented technological measure’ or ‘other 
means.’504
Such loose wording induced Member States to take 
different positions on this matter. A synoptic table 
on the next page provides the solutions adopted by 
all countries studied in this literature review.
498 See http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2007/04/emi-begins-licensing-drm-free-music-downloads.
499 For example Amazon; see http://www.amazon.com.
500 For example iTunes; see http://www.itunes.com.
501 In fact a survey showed that these DRM-free products are licensed under the usual restrictive terms. See IViR 2007 Part II, 
at 139.
502 Favale 2007.
503 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, Recital 51, second paragraph
504 Council Directive 2001/29/EC, Recital 51, third paragraph.
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The above shows that the remedies available to 
beneficiaries of copyright exceptions are very 
different from country to country. Some of them 
have also been criticised by the literature for their 
lack of efficiency or for the excessive burden 
they set on the user.505 The discussion on the 
effectiveness of the remedies against an ‘unfair 
DRM’ is outside of the scope of the present study; 
however, what is relevant to our discourse is that 
none of these measures seem to be envisaged to 
be directed towards contractual abuses from right 
holders.
3.5.3   Interplay between DRM and 
contract 
Copyright mass licensing is a by-product of the 
Internet revolution. Copyright owners not only 
license their works to institutions and businesses, 
but also to end users. However, in case of copyright 
infringement an end user is extremely difficult to 
sue. A solution to this problem has been provided 
by technology: the digital product itself bears some 
features that enforce the rights of the owner. These 
are the TPMs, which impede every access and 
use not authorized by the right holder. Normally, 
authorized acts are stipulated by the licensing 
agreement: the contract sets the rules, and the 
TPMs force users to respect them.506
DRM is a composite system formed by licensing 
agreements and TPMs, which has the objective of 
setting usage restrictions on digital copyright works. 
These usage restrictions should normally be limited 
by the boundaries of copyright protection. In other 
words, copyright owners should implement TPMs 
only to the extent that they enforce their exclusive 
rights provided by copyright law. Contracts (the 
licences) and technical locks (the TPMs) work in 
synergy to guarantee the enforcement of exclusive 
rights in the digital environment, where traditional 
enforcement tools, like a lawsuit, are not effective.
Moreover, among the rules set by the contract, 
often there is a clause that protects TPMs. 
The clause might enjoin, for example, that it is 
forbidden to circumvent, to hinder, or to remove 
the technological lock. Circumvention of TPMs, 
therefore, is not only sanctioned by law, both in the 
US and the EU507, but sometimes also by contract. 
This creates a circular protection between contracts 
and TPMs.508 
Conclusion
In conclusion, the strict inter-relation between 
contract and TPMs may suggest that contracts 
are akin to TPMs. Both are part of the product,509 
and both set usage rules that in the views of 
many go beyond the exclusive rights of the 
owner. Furthermore, some highlight that licensing 
agreements and DRM licences are often formulated 
in a similar fashion.510 However, the literature 
overview in the previous subsection suggests that 
the only relevant similarity between licences and 
TPMs consists in the ability to set norms of private 
ordering that might run afoul of copyright doctrine. 
Surely, TPMs and contracts are indissolubly 
intertwined. They work together and according to 
the prevailing literature they should be designed 
to comply with copyright law, that is, to protect 
the exclusive rights of the owner only within their 
boundaries.
505 See Brown and Bohm 2001. 
506 Without the TPMs users would not respect the terms and conditions set by contracts. See De Werra 2003 at 250.
507 See Title 17 USC §1201, Article 6 of the InfoSoc Directive, and S 296ZA of the UK Copyright Act.
508 See IViR 2007 Part 1, at 153-149.
509 In ProCD the judge argued that ‘Terms of use are no less a part of ‘the product’ than are the size of the database and the 
speed with which the software compiles listings’; see ProCD II, 86 F.3d at 1453. 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 14951. See also 
Friedman 1998, at 1159 arguing that TPMs are a feature of the product, as part of its design. However, he specifies that 
TPMs are not the contract.
510 Bechtold 2004, at 339, who reports,  in a study on a few music services, that the terms of use of DRM licences show a similar 
patterns to that of the usage rules of the service. Cited in Derclaye 2008, at 175.
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3.6  EMPIRICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES OF USER CONTRACTS 
AND DRM
3.6.1  Proportion of copyright material 
diffused electronically
Of relevant interest to this literature review are 
first data provided by the International Federation 
of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) and by the 
EU Commission, both in 2009. They are relevant 
to inferring the diffusion of electronic licences, 
and the products on which they are implemented. 
The IFPI reports that the market share of digital 
products is growing every year. Figures relative to 
2008 reported a share of 35% for games, 20% for 
recorded music, 4% for newspapers, 4% for films, 
and 1% for magazines.511 The EU Commission 
Report on e-commerce 2009 discusses the 
penetration of e-commerce in the EU Internal 
Market. The data of interest to our discourse is 
that on average (in 27 EU Member States) 30% 
to 40% of copyright goods are sold online. More 
‘mature’ markets like the UK, France, and Germany 
reach 70%.512 All material commercialised online 
potentially implements electronic contracts or 
end-user licence agreements. However, specific 
data on the type of contracts (e.g. shrink-wrap; 
click-wrap or browse-wrap) or the media via which 
they are diffused (e.g. web pages or booklets) are 
missing.
3.6.2   Contracts
The most comprehensive theoretical study on 
copyright and contracts in Europe has been 
performed by Lucie Guibault of the IViR centre 
in Amsterdam. Her analysis focuses on the 
US, France, Germany and the Netherlands. In 
essence, Guibault concludes that the limits on 
freedom of contract, including consumer protection 
law, competition law, constitutional principles and 
copyright law, appear insufficient to ensure that the 
legitimate interests of users of copyright works are 
respected by copyright licensing agreements.513
From 2002 when Guibault published her 
comprehensive study new literature, case law and 
legislation have been produced, impacting on the 
relationship between contract and copyright law. 
However none of this seems to bring substantial 
changes to the general scenario outlined by 
Guibault. However, her conclusions regarding 
potential overridability of copyright limits by 
contract still awaits confirmation by systematic 
empirical studies. The theoretical debate about the 
tension between copyright exceptions and contract 
continues to engross the copyright doctrine. Some 
authors believe, as Guibault does, that copyright 
law should offer enhanced shelter to beneficiaries 
of copyright exceptions against contracts. Some 
others, conversely, believe that the balance 
between copyright and contract does not need to 
be touched. For others, contracts are even more 
efficient than copyright in protecting the exclusive 
rights of the owner in the digital environment.  
511 See IFPI 2009, at 4.
512 EU Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels 5.3.2009 SEC(2009) 283 final.
513 Guibault 2002, at 302-304.
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No comprehensive supranational survey seems 
to have been performed on the interplay between 
contracts and copyright exceptions.514 At national 
level, outside our area of reference, the most 
interesting and in-depth theoretical and empirical 
study has been carried out by the Australian 
Copyright Law Review Committee.515 
The theoretical part of the study provides a literature 
and statute review including Australia, the US and 
the EU. They also examined potential limits to 
contract stemming from - or out of - contract law, 
as Guibault did. Similar conclusions were reached: 
remedies outside copyright law are of scarce 
effectiveness.516
The data utilised in the empirical part of the study are 
focused on Australian sources, and were gathered 
from a public consultation process and an open 
forum which involved several right holders, users’ 
associations, libraries, and academic institutions.517 
An Issues Paper was distributed among the 
stakeholders illustrating the terms of reference 
and posing a number of questions instrumental to 
determining the interplay between copyright limits 
and contracts.518 While the representatives of the 
right holders generally reported that they did not 
detect any use of licences overriding copyright
limits, a few libraries and universities produced 
examples of contracts hindering copyright 
exceptions.519
The Australian study concludes that ‘library and user 
interests generally identified a problem regarding 
the use of online licences to modify the exceptions 
and wanted legislative or other intervention. Owner 
interests variously asserted that contract law and 
the market can and should regulate the situation 
or that although the situation is uncertain, it is too 
early to take corrective action.’520 The Australian 
report also highlighted that licensing agreements 
that are the subject of the analysis are more and 
more likely to be governed by foreign law. Therefore 
national solutions could be of limited relevance.521
An empirical study on digital media and consumer 
issues in relation to electronic licences has been 
performed in Germany by the local branch of the 
BEUC (the European Consumer Organization).522 
The study detected legal uncertainties in Germany 
regarding the application of the exhaustion principle 
(related to physical copies of digital works, CDs, 
DVDs, etc.), and cross-border licensing. The legal 
wording of the licences was also found difficult and 
detrimental for consumers. 
514 The OECD confirmed that empirical studies and measurement of the practices in the distribution of digital content through 
systematic collection and analysis of data are missing. See OECD 2006a at 34.
515 Available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Copyright_CopyrightLawReviewCommittee_CLRCReports_
CopyrightandContract_CopyrightandContract.
516 Australian CLRC Report 2002, Chapter 1, at 2.09.
517 The full list of the submissions is available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Copyright_
CopyrightLawReviewCommittee_CLRCReports_CopyrightandContract_CopyrightandContract-Submissions.
518 The Issue Paper can be found at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(756EDFD270AD704EF00C15CF396D
6111)~CLRC+Copyright+and+Contract+-+Issues+Paper.pdf/$file/CLRC+Copyright+and+Contract+-+Issues+Paper.pdf.
519 See the Australian CLRC Study 2002, Chapter 4, Part II.
520 Australian CLRC Discussion Paper, available at http://www.ag.gov.au/agd/www/Clrhome.nsf/Page/F8CF4FE5DCBF1405C
A256B3C0076354A?OpenDocument.
521 Ibid. See also DeWerra 2003, arguing for a supranational solution.
522 http://www.verbraucherzentrale.de/.
523 The summary of this study in English is available at http://www.vzbv.de/mediapics/consumer_protection_in_digital_
media_2006.pdf. The study (in German) is available at http://www.vzbv.de/go/dokumente/545/5/24/index.html.
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Another interesting finding for our analysis is that 
legal entitlements of copyright users (such as the 
possibility to make a back-up copy of a computer 
program) were also often impaired.523
Case studies have also been performed in the 
US and Norway on the largest online retail music 
vendor (iTunes) and some other similar services. 
They all revealed that the terms and conditions of 
the service could run afoul of copyright limits (such 
as the fair use doctrine, for example),  negatively 
affecting consumer statutory rights.524
In the UK, the British Library carried out an 
examination of one-hundred licensing agreements 
that were offered to them.525 They questioned 
whether the licences at hand allowed the following 
operations (or accommodated the following needs, 
or even only mentioned them): Archiving; Printing; 
Downloading and electronic copying; Fair dealing; 
Visually impaired; Inter-library loans; Exceptions. 
The British Library found that 90% or these licences 
did not respect these copyright exceptions and 
limitations.526 They elaborate therefore a position 
on copyright exceptions, which includes a number 
of principles that, according to the British Library, 
should inform UK copyright policy.527
Also, the National Consumer Council carried out 
a survey on End User Licence Agreements on 
computer software,528 and found that most of the 
licences examined infringe consumer protection 
legislation. Unfortunately, the study did not address 
copyright issues, but it suggested that the Office of 
Fair Trading undertake a systematic survey on the 
practice of electronic licensing to detect potential 
incongruence with the current legislation.
3.6.3   DRM
On the issue of DRM, empirical studies seeking 
to identify the impact of DRM on beneficiaries of 
copyright exceptions have been carried out by 
Intrallect Inc.529 and by CIPIL530. Intrallect adapted 
the ‘use cases’ approach (which is a method 
originating from the field of software engineering) 
to the relation between DRM and education and 
research communities in the UK.531 Their study 
examines a broad number of practical situations 
affecting researchers, teachers, students, and 
libraries while interacting with DRM. Their purpose 
is to suggest to the Joint Information Systems 
Committee (JISC)532 the best approach and 
practice to adopt in relation to DRM.
 
524 Gasser 2004, Grondall 2006, Bechtold 2004.
525 As for the methodological approach relating to this collection, the BL specifies ‘The study of 100 contracts comprises a 
randomly selected collection of agreements offered to the British Library. Given the complexities of licensing and copyright 
exceptions, being able to map accurately provisions in a licence over to the intent provided for by exceptions law is a complex 
procedure and one open to debate. The study was carried out in good faith and is intended to be no more than broadly 
representative.’ See http://www.bl.uk/ip/pdf/ipmatrix.pdf.
526 See http://www.bl.uk/ip/pdf/ipmatrix.pdf.
527 See http://www.bl.uk/ip/pdf/digitalexceptions.pdf.
528 The study involved standard questionnaires to users of computer software. See Belgrove 2008. 
529 Intrallect. Incc, Digital Rights Management, final report, 22-11-2004 at www.intrallect.com/drm-study/DRMFinalReportv2.pdf.
530 Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law of Cambridge University, UK. See www.cipil.law.cam.ac.uk.
531 Intrallect’s method is illustrated in what follows: ‘The methodology is based on identifying the key participants (sometimes 
called ‘actors’) and their goals. For each primary actor and goal, one use scenario (or ‘use case’) is developed in detail and 
is examined to consider all possible alternatives to that scenario. A set of use cases is complete when use cases have been 
developed for the goals of all the primary participants. These use cases are described in terms of the user’s actions and make 
no assumptions about underlying technology. The use cases are then used to define the requirements for a system that will 
support these scenarios’. In short, as the authors of the report state, ‘[t]he use cases are simply a way of defining what people 
want to achieve’. See the JISC DRM Study - final report, at 23.
532 The Joint Information Systems Committee, www.jisc.ac.uk.
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Their method consisted in organising a number 
of workshops (six in total) to which they invited a 
relevant number of representatives of stakeholders 
(in total 47 participants).533 The workshop 
participants, after an introduction on DRM, were 
invited to work on their own to produce two case 
summaries each (‘short descriptions of a primary 
actor and their goals, usually no more than one or 
two sentences’). The workshop produced 125 case 
summaries in total. Afterwards, the participants 
were invited to work in pairs to expand on one of 
their case summaries to develop a use case.534
As a key finding, they identify the needs of the 
mentioned categories (researchers, teachers, 
students, and libraries) and suggest an alternative 
right expression language (REL)535 compatible with 
these needs. They show therefore that TPMs are 
neither good nor bad. They should be fine-tuned in 
order to accommodate users’ needs.
Patricia Akester from CIPIL carried out another 
survey on the impact of DRM on selected 
beneficiaries of copyright exceptions. Nine 
standardized questionnaires were submitted to 
representatives of the following copyright players: 
1) Libraries, 2) The visually impaired and partially 
sighted, 3) Private users, 4) Lecturers, 5) Students/ 
researchers, 6) DRM developers, 7) content 
owners, 8) The European Commission, and 9) The 
UK Intellectual Property Office.536
 
The questionnaires were partly open (allowing a 
free answer from the interviewee) and partly closed 
(with multiple-choice answers).537
She concluded that some beneficiaries of copyright 
exceptions are being adversely affected by the use 
of DRM. She therefore suggested a number of 
legal solutions, involving the modification of article 
6(4) of the InfoSoc Directive and the involvement of 
third parties that would guarantee to beneficiaries 
of copyright exceptions lawful access to copyright 
works.538 Similar solutions have already been 
proposed by some literature.539 However, it has 
been submitted that, in order to be effective, 
solutions in a complex field such as DRM , should 
involve both technological and legal solutions at 
the same time, coordinated between them.540
533 For the list of the participants see JISC DRM Study – final report at 23.
534 JISC DRM Study – final report 2004, at 24.
535 Rights Expression Language or REL is a machine-processable language used for Digital Rights Management
536 Akester 2009, at 31.
537 The reason of this choice was ‘to combine the need for rigour with the need to understand how respondents themselves 
describe the issue, in their own language’. Akester 2009, at 31.
538 She proposes to modify Article 6(4) as follows: a) clarifying the expression ‘appropriate measures’ that Member States 
have to take in order to have TPMs comply with copyright exceptions, in the sense of creating standardized ‘access to 
works portals’. These would function through a DRM deposit system ‘according to which the means to enable beneficiaries 
of privileged exceptions to benefit from them would be deposited and made available through access to works portals, in 
specified circumstances.’ See Akester 2009, at 2.
539 Erickson 2003; Burk and Cohen 2001.
540 Favale 2007.
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The OECD issued a Background Report on 
Empowering E-consumers in December 2009 
to serve in the conference on the same topic.541 
The conference and the report, together with 
other OECD publications, will be instrumental to 
the second edition of the OECD Guidelines for 
Consumer Protection in the Context of Electronic 
Commerce, to be released in 2010. The protection 
of consumers of digital products from restrictive 
Terms of Use or DRM are raised. The duty of 
disclosure of the right owner, the dangers for 
consumer privacy, and other consumer-related 
issues are discussed, but there is no specific focus 
on the issue of contracts overriding copyright 
exceptions.
An empirical survey of 514 websites making 
available digital media products has been carried 
out as part of the EC Framework 7 COUNTER 
project.542 The survey codes business models 
and terms of use, including the use of DRM and 
transferability of content to portable media players 
and mobile phones. A database containing the 
survey codes will be available online from March 
2010, and could be used to analyse the contractual 
approach to copyright exceptions.
541  DSTI/CP(2009)20/FINAL, available online at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/13/44047583.pdf. Conference documents 
are available at http://www.oecd.org/icr/econsumerconference.
542  Montagnani, M.L. and M. Borghi (2009), ‘Models for Managing Intellectual Property Rights on the Internet: An Empirical 
Survey of Online Distribution of Digital Media Content’, Report for EC Framework 7 COUNTER Project, available at www.
counter2010.org.
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3.7 CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the legislation, the case law, and 
the literature of the targeted countries so far reveals 
a substantial body of literature and case law on the 
interplay between copyright and contract within the 
United States. The European Union follows, with 
substantial legislation and literature, but not much 
relevant case law. Among the individual Member 
States examined, the United Kingdom and 
Belgium provided the richest doctrinal contribution 
to the present study, while hardly any case law 
or literature was found in relation to Ireland and 
Portugal. 
On the basis of the above data, potential research 
gaps have been identified. These gaps can be 
seen as new research questions that may provide 
the basis for subsequent research in support of 
copyright policy development. It also details the 
approaches and methodologies that could be used 
in answering such questions.
Section 1 
Apart from a few notable exceptions,543 hardly any 
literature and case law discussed the impact that 
imperative copyright exceptions had on contracting 
licences in those countries that stipulate mandatory 
exceptions. Moreover, the difference between 
countries implementing imperative exceptions and 
countries where freedom of contract prevails has 
not been the object of a comparative empirical 
study.
Section 2
Against overreaching licence agreements the 
examined literature proposed self-regulatory 
solutions, to be enacted through model licences 
and codes of conduct.544 A study on the feasibility 
of such solutions could be interesting for policy 
makers.
Section 3
The sector of the commercialization of digital 
copyright works seems to be most in need of 
empirical evidence. First of all, no comprehensive 
research has been done to determine the exact 
proportion of works commercialised online to 
further determine the pervasiveness of the problem 
of the overridability of copyright limits by contracts 
and/or TPMs/DRMs.545 In addition, specific data 
on the type of contracts (e.g. shrink-wrap; click-
wrap or browse-wrap) or the media via which 
they are diffused (e.g. web pages or booklets) 
are missing. No systematic cross-border study 
has been carried out specifically with respect to 
copyright exceptions by licensing agreements. The 
lawfulness of end-user licence agreements vis-à-
vis consumer statutory rights has been taken in 
consideration in a few countries, as we mentioned 
above in this conclusion. But they hardly refer to 
any copyright issue, other than indirectly. In this 
sector, sweeping techniques546 could be usefully 
implemented to gather data systematically online, 
while quantitative social research methods would 
be necessary to examine shrink-wrap licences on 
material carriers (CDs, etc.).
543 For Belgium, Dusollier 2007 and Dubuisson 2001.
544 See the Green paper on Copyright in the Knowledge Economy 2008, the Australian CLRC Study 2002, Garnett 2006, 
Hugenholtz 2008.
545 See the studies by IFPI and the EU Commission in 2009 cited above.
546 These involve exploring the Internet in search of relevant material. In addition this method is particularly attractive for its 
relatively contained costs.
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An interesting research gap has been identified in 
the licence purchasing practices of public libraries 
and educational institutions. Their needs in terms 
of copyright allowances as well as their ability 
to negotiate clauses allowing them need to be 
explored.
Section 4
At present, studies on the limits to contract and 
copyright, such as those carried out by Guibault, 
appear sufficiently exhaustive. Subsequent 
research should address practical solutions to 
accommodate the needs of copyright owners and 
users. This may include, for example, concrete 
proposals for normative action, or alternatively, for 
the adoption of model licences or codes of conduct. 
Incidentally, the exclusion of digital copyright works 
from a number of users’ privileges, as in Article 
6(4) of the InfoSoc Directive, is underpinned by 
their status as services rather than goods. Both 
their status and their exclusion from copyright 
exceptions (despite the fact that they are copyright 
works in every respect) could usefully be addressed 
by theoretical research.
Section 5
Many theoretical and technological solutions 
have been proposed in the field of DRMs. The 
CIPIL study revealed that technical solutions for 
TPMs compliant with copyright exceptions are 
already available.547 Nonetheless, the enjoyment 
of copyright exceptions is sometimes hindered by 
DRM. It is therefore a matter for policy makers to 
implement the correct solutions. 
However, recent business models emerging in 
the copyright industry should be included in the 
picture. The impact on users of copyright works of 
emerging DRM-free business models (in terms of 
acceptability) and their impact on right holders (in 
terms of benefits) should both be assessed and 
analysed theoretically (by economists) and verified 
empirically.
547 Akester 2009 at 70.
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